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# FOREWORD

## BY TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL

### LITHUANIAN CHAPTER

The aim of this publication is to introduce an international audience to the anti-corruption discourse in Lithuania. This book consists of two parts: an analytical study 'Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2001-2004'; and a compilation of results and insights of the latest Map of Corruption composed in 2005, which together offer the latest and most detailed insight into the perception and experience of corruption by Lithuanian residents and company executives.

Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter (TILS) views such sociological surveys as the most reliable and effective tool to identify corrupt practices in Lithuania, learn about personal experiences of confronting bribery and evaluate anticorruption potential. While its activities range from raising anti-corruption awareness to active engagement into transparency-related state policies, the Chapter has made a conscious effort to base its rhetoric on hard sociological data.

TILS would like to thank the United Nations Development Program for its kind and wholehearted support of anti-corruption activities in Lithuania and in making this publication possible.

This is the first TILS publication in English and hopefully not the last. Lithuania is now a member of the European Union but there is still considerable work to be done in the field of transparency by bridging the gap between the acquired and actual practices. At the same time, there is an increasing external demand for information about democratization processes in Lithuania.

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**LITHUANIAN  
MAP OF CORRUPTION  
2001–2004**



# INTRODUCTION

There is hardly any need to prove that corruption is a relevant and, alas, painful problem of Lithuanian society. It is illustrated by re-occurring corruption scandals, assessments of various influential international organisations, and finally, the Lithuanian residents themselves who see corruption as one of the most aching vices of today's social life.<sup>1</sup> There is also hardly any need to explain that curbing corruption is one of the most important priorities of the state: it is not just a formal requirement of the European Commission, but rather a well comprehended internal need documented in several Lithuania's political and legal instruments.

However, it is hardly possible not to see that the so-called fight against corruption takes the form of vain and desperate political rhetoric. Corruption is considered a social evil at which the radically thinking population suggests aiming cannons. All of these ideas lack understanding that corruption is not some sort of a monster the destruction of which is just a matter of good will and heroic resolution. It is rather a complex phenomenon entailing moral, legal, political and management issues.

Although there is no universally recognised definition of corruption, this social phenomenon is often described as an abuse of power for private gain. Such a concept of corruption places an emphasis on the source of corruption: a conflict of public and private interests. Resolution of the conflict in every society depends on a number of factors: established moral values, administrative and management capacities as well as political and legal systems that mould them. Most often corruption occurs when the principles of responsibility, accountability, transparency and openness are put into jeopardy.

<sup>1</sup> The 2004 social survey *Corruption Map in the City of Vilnius* conducted by the Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter of and *Baltijos tyrimai* showed that corruption hits the top ten list of the most painful social problems.



Traditionally, corruption is associated with the governmental sector; however, recently it has also been referred to when talking about the non-governmental sector (private companies, mass media, public bodies, etc.). Corruption can be sorted by its range (grand and petty corruption); goal (political, state capture, and administrative corruption, the latter referring to the application of favourable laws and regulations); the mode of operation (bribery, nepotism, abuse of office, etc.), the context of operation (monetary corruption in a market economy and favouritism in a traditional or planned economy), and the mode of conduct (active or passive corruption), etc.

Corruption is often claimed to be an inevitable response to unsound management and defective public administration, a natural attempt to avoid decision-making routine, red-tape obstacles and incompetence of public officials. As if it were to facilitate, though illegitimately, achievement of concrete and positive results by corruption participants. For instance, a company that corruptly obtains a grand contract in a public procurement tender ensures profit and earnings both for its owners and employees; moreover, “benefits” are granted to those who help to win the contract. However, does such practice favour the other members of society? The answer is simple and straightforward: in the long run such practice has a destructive impact upon the general public as it undermines public confidence, making public management chaotic and unpredictable and eventually resulting in poverty and demoralisation.

This is particularly characteristic of those societies that due to certain reasons are not rich or their welfare has suffered from various political and economic ‘experiments’. In such societies the wish to create effective market economy mechanisms, modern management and administrative principles inevitably are confronted with the problem of the way in which to tackle corruption. However, corruption is not just a problem of developing or transitional societies. No country is immune from its scandals irrespective of the level of the country’s development. Therefore, it is wrong to think that organising anti-corruption efforts is just a special challenge for Lithuania or the other former ‘communist’ Central and Eastern European states. The 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption lays down that ‘corruption is no longer a local matter but a transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making international co-operation to prevent and control it essential.’<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Convention Against Corruption. United Nations, 2003.

Forestalling corruption requires more than adoption of anti-corruption legislation, establishment of appropriate units in the law enforcement agencies or public declaration of good intentions. Anti-corruption efforts are as complex as corruption is, embracing various political, economic and cultural areas of life and calling for specific mechanisms to control and prevent corruption. The fight against corruption will not be effective if it lacks a clear definition of the objects and subjects of corruption activities. Therefore, one of the key components of anti-corruption efforts is corruption diagnosis that includes various surveys of the corruption phenomenon and helps identify corruption prone areas of public life.

Currently, many surveys disclosing manifestation of corruption are conducted on a global, regional or national scale. Their range is also very wide, from findings of investigative journalism to analysis of macroeconomic indicators. One of the most famous surveys of the kind is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Since 1995 it has been annually conducted by an international non-governmental organisation, Transparency International (TI). The CPI is an important source for international political bodies, business and financial structures. It is a composite index based on the internationally recognised social and other experimental surveys.

TI requires at least three sources to be available in order to rank a country in the CPI. In 2004, Lithuania's index, drawn upon the findings of nine surveys, scored 4.6 out of 10. Lithuania ranked 44 out of 146 surveyed countries failing to get on the TI list of the least corrupt states with the index of more than 5 scores.

The other well-known diagnostic surveys of business representatives from various countries were conducted by the World Bank in 1999 and 2002. It analysed two forms of corruption: *state capture* and *administrative corruption*. The first one has an impact upon the 'rules of the game' of public life shaping them to favour one or another interest group. The second type does not attempt to change those 'rules of the game' targeting those who are responsible for the implementation of those rules. The recent survey findings showed that the index of administrative corruption in Lithuania is medium and is not much different from such Central and Eastern European states like the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary or Poland.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Ch. Gray, J. Hellman, R. Ryterman. *Anti-corruption in Transition 2; Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999–2002*. Washington: The World Bank, 2004, p. 32.

On a global scale, many more diagnostic surveys of corruption are conducted by such prominent international organisations like Freedom House, World Economic Forum, World Markets Research Centre and the Gallup Organisation. One of the most recent ones is the *TI Global Corruption Barometer 2004* conducted in 64 countries, including Lithuania. The total number of respondents surveyed was 52,682.<sup>4</sup> The survey showed that in Lithuania, like in Argentina, Mexico, Latvia, Poland, South Korea, and Ukraine, from 51 to 70 per cent of the population thinks that corruption has a major impact upon political life. From 31 to 40 per cent of the Lithuanian population, similarly to Kenya, Nigeria and Moldova, said that during last 12 months they or their family members had given a bribe.<sup>5</sup>

Admittedly, TI conducts regional and national as well as international social surveys of corruption. One of the key tasks of this non-governmental organisation, which co-ordinates anti-corruption efforts in the entire world, is to examine and analyse corruption. In recent years, it has performed the following surveys: a regional survey of Corruption in South Asia (carried out in 2002 in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, evaluating citizen perception and experience of corruption in public institutions), a national Transparencia Brasil survey (which assessed citizens' perception of corruption), Kenya Bribery Index (which has been carried out annually since 2002), national Mexican Corruption Survey, etc. These surveys help establish the aspects of corruption which are the most painful to society and organise a more effective anti-corruption public campaign by establishing the target and concrete ways of tackling cases of corruption.

With this regard, Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter (further referred to as TILS) is not an exception. Since its establishment in 2000, Lithuania's surveys and analyses have become one of its strategic objectives. In co-operation with such public opinion research companies like *Baltijos tyrimai*, *Vilmorus* and *Spinter*, governmental organisations like the Special Investigations Service, Customs Department, State Border Protection Service, local authorities and academic establishments, TILS conducted more than ten different social diagnostic surveys of corrup-

<sup>4</sup> In Lithuania, the national representational population survey was carried out by the market research company TNS Gallup, July 2004; N=504.

<sup>5</sup> R. Hoddes, M. Wolkers. Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004. Berlin: Transparency International, 2004, p. 10, 12.

tion. It does not mean, however, that TILS was the first or the only organisation to carry out national corruption surveys in the country.<sup>6</sup> Yet these surveys were mostly random, patchy, having no special purpose to examine the phenomenon of corruption in Lithuania in a most elaborate manner.

In 2001, TILS launched its first social diagnostic survey in Lithuania called the *Map of Corruption*. Its purpose was to identify, on the basis of national opinion polls, the institutional and geographic spread of corruption and the areas of Lithuanian society and institutions where corruption is most rampant. The survey attempted to assess the following:

- public position towards corruption, its level and role in the state;
- personal experience of confronting instances of corruption (bribery);
- sources of information about corruption and attitude towards anti-corruption efforts.

While developing the survey methodology, consideration was taken both of international and national experience of conducting social, values and victimological surveys of corruption. Analysis of attitudes towards corruption and corrupt institutions is a common subject matter of different social surveys. Certainly, the authors of the *Map of Corruption* could disregard this fact. Therefore, next to traditional questions about the assessment of corruption the questionnaire included a question about the level of corruptibility in all the key Lithuanian institutions (90 of them were listed in the 2001 questionnaire). Besides that, corruption was also assessed from the geographical point of view.

Another new aspect to the *Map of Corruption* is that the spread of corruption was measured, besides the traditional way of analysing attitudes towards corruption, by examining, which is not so commonly done, personal confrontation with corruption, or to be more precise, one form of it, bribery. The respondents were asked to share their experiences about different aspects of corruption, including the institutional one. This course of investigation allowed to make an indirect assessment of the possible scale of the spread of bribery in Lithuania on the one hand, and although corruption and bribery are not the same (the latter is just one

<sup>6</sup> One example is a Phare project report *Preliminary Evaluation of Corruption Situation in Lithuania and Preparation of Outline of Strategy for Fight against Corruption*, Vilnius, 1999.

form of corruption), compare the general assessment of corruption and personal experience, on the other hand.

Another feature of the survey was that it chose two groups of respondents: common Lithuanian residents and company managers. The respondents of the first group were asked about their personal opinion, assessment and experiences. The respondents of the second group were given similar although somewhat different questions to show the company's, as well as personal, experience or attitude towards corruption. The approach of having two groups was based on the presumption that their attitude towards corruption and experience of corruption may be different because their social positions are different: businessmen, due to the mode of their operation, are closer to governmental institutions and are dependent upon their decisions. As a result, they may assess corruption and bribery differently than Lithuanian residents.

The questionnaire was developed taking in account the general social demographic features of the respondents and, in case of business representatives, the specificity of companies: geographic region, size of the company, type of activity, etc.

During the period of 2001–04, three opinion polls were conducted among the residents and company managers in 2001, 2002 and 2004. The social survey of residents, following the questionnaire developed by the authors of this book, was carried out by a joint British-Lithuanian public opinion and market research company *Baltijos tyrimai*. The survey of residents used the random sampling, whereas the company representatives were subject to the quota sampling. The first survey took place in July 2001, involving 2,028 residents (in two waves: 1,025 residents surveyed during the 1<sup>st</sup> one and 1,003 during the 2<sup>nd</sup> one) and 1,005 company managers. The second survey was conducted in November 2002, including 1,012 residents and 1,017 company managers. The last one was arranged in March 2004: 1,015 residents and 1,047 company managers. All the surveys were based on anonymous personal interviews. Analysis of the survey findings showed that statistical error did not exceed 3.1 per cent.

The book discusses three types of survey results. Chapter 1 focuses on the bribery related geographical and institutional experience of residents and company managers. Chapter 2 analyses the attitude of residents and company managers towards corruption as a social phenom-

enon, assesses the level of corruption among Lithuanian institutions and points out the sources of assessment. Finally, Chapter 3 takes a look at the anti-corruption potential of Lithuanian society, i.e. resolution of common people and company managers to curb corruption in Lithuania in a number of ways. The conclusions provide a summary of the survey findings.

The findings of the *Map of Corruption* were presented in the following international conferences:

- 10<sup>th</sup> International Anti-Corruption Conference (2001, Prague, the Czech Republic)<sup>7</sup>,
- 11<sup>th</sup> International Anti-Corruption Conference (2003, Seoul, Republic of Korea),
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology (2003, Helsinki, Finland)<sup>8</sup>,
- Seminar on *Corruption and Public Interest: Strategies, Practices and Identification of Prevention*, conducted by the United States Department of Justice and the National Institute of Justice in 2004, Washington D.C.,
- the other events organised by international organisations in Great Britain, Germany, Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.

Besides that, survey findings were regularly presented to the President's Office of the Republic of Lithuania, Seimas, Government, local authorities, law enforcement agencies, business and academic establishments, and the mass media. They were also provided to the embassies of foreign countries and offices of international organisations established in Lithuania.

The survey was taken into account while developing the National Anti-Corruption Programme of Lithuania; its findings have been often

<sup>7</sup> A. Dobryninas, L. Žilinskienė. *Corruption and Business in Lithuania from Small and Medium Enterprises Perspective*. Kn: 10th International Anti-Corruption Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, 7–11 October, 2001. Berlin: Transparency International: 2002, CD-ROM edition.

<sup>8</sup> A. Dobryninas, L. Žilinskienė. *Map of Corruption in Lithuania: The Residents' View*. Kn: S. Nevala, K. Aromaa (eds.) *Organised crime, Trafficking, Drugs: Selected papers presented at the Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology, Helsinki 2003*. HEUNI. Publication Series No. 42. Helsinki. 2004, p. 38–48.

referred to by international organisations making analytical reports<sup>9</sup>; and its description has been included in the TI Anti-Corruption Toolkit.<sup>10</sup>

The surveys were sponsored by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Finnish, British and United States embassies, United Nations Development Programme, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists, companies *Lietuvos Draudimas*, *Omnitel*, etc. Publication of the book was sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme.

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<sup>9</sup> See Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy. Hungary: OSI, 2002; GRECO, Evaluation Report on Lithuania, adopted by GRECO at the 8th Plenary Meeting, Strasbourg, 4-8 March 2002.

<sup>10</sup> TI Anti-corruption Toolkit. Berlin: Transparency International, 2003.

## I. EXPERIENCE OF BRIBERY

There are many forms of corruption; yet one of the best known and rampant one is bribery. This form of corruption is directly associated with administrative corruption which serves as the baseline for assessing transparency of public institutions and their efficiency in dealing with important public tasks. A survey on the experience of bribery was not chosen simply because it is said to be a 'quintessential form of corruption'<sup>11</sup> but also because it is a type which the respondents understand best. If people avoiding laws and regulations offer kickbacks to a public official for the services rendered, they do realise what they are doing: they are giving a bribe.

Yet even in a situation like that, researchers of bribery experience run into inevitable difficulties. Bribery is not a straightforward phenomenon. A public official charged with the abuse of office usually assumes personal liability for his illicit actions. However, bribery is a two-way deal: where there is a taker, there is a giver, and both are engaged in a criminal act. In other words, a question posed to the respondents whether they had given a bribe is not just a standard question of victimological surveys trying to figure out if the respondent had become a victim of a crime. The question here is of somewhat self-reporting character<sup>12</sup>, i.e. the respondent is provoked to say whether he or she has committed an illicit act.

The first difficulty is that the respondent, due to various reasons, may take a psychological self-defence position and deny his or her participation in bribery. In such a case, one has to look for alternative ways to overcome the psychological barrier and attempt at assessing bribery indirectly. To that end, the 2001 questionnaire included the following question: 'Have you ever heard about a bribe given to a public official by your relative or someone you know?'

<sup>11</sup> F. Anechiarico, B. J. Jacobs. *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> A survey method traditionally used in the Anglo-Saxon criminology.



The second difficulty lies in the definition of bribery. Respondents are not experts of criminal justice and should not necessarily be aware of the definition of bribery used in criminal law and know how to apply it in practice. What makes it more complicated is the concept of a 'gift'. The problem was well formulated by a famous Norwegian criminologist, Nils Christie, in a private conversation: 'Where is the limit where bribery ends and kindness starts?'

In this case, the decision was made to leave it for the respondents to assess their own actions and make a distinction between a bribe (which should be noted) from a gift (which should be left out). A bribe has a negative connotation in the respondent's mind, whereas a gift is positive, which makes it difficult to mix the two concepts. Certainly, such a concept of a bribe is not a legal one, yet it is very close to the primary understanding of corruption which is considered a moral and social evil. Irrespective of the manner in which the public official was rewarded (a box of chocolate worth 10 litas or 50 hundred litas notes placed in an envelope), if it is identified as a 'bribe', it is considered a bribe, i.e. a social and moral evil which the respondent was forced to commit or committed voluntarily in exchange for the desired services or goods. Those who dislike the socio-psychological concept of a bribe and who want 'real' statistics on bribery, may refer to criminal statistics reports. However, they will not find corruption or bribery identified there as a widespread social phenomenon in Lithuania. This, as a matter of fact, does not really coincide with the social experience that many of us have. Admittedly, corruption and one of its forms, bribery, have been for many years considered one of the most painful problems of Lithuanian society.

As mentioned earlier, the experience of bribery was shared by two groups of the respondents: Lithuanian residents and company managers. They were given similar questions with certain reservation to accommodate the operational particularities of business representatives. Besides that, with a view to having a better understanding of the field examined, some of the questions asked during the surveys in 2001-04, were elaborated, deleted or added later. This is a normal procedure of searching for the optimum methodology, particularly bearing in mind that this was the first social survey of bribery experience in Lithuania. The final analysis included only the data which were homogeneous and ensured reliability of social interpretation. For example, while making an assessment of certain aspects of bribery experience by residents in 2001, data of the

first wave were taken into account, whereas for the other aspects, data of the second wave were used. The questions asked in each wave were different, but the samples were the same and the margin of statistical error was almost equal.

### 1.1. EXPERIENCE OF BRIBERY BY LITHUANIAN RESIDENTS

The first bribery related question was about demanding a bribe. The respondents were asked if anyone had expected or demanded a bribe from them over the past five years. Certainly, this assessment is far more subjective than the statement about giving a bribe. The respondent may react inadequately thinking that a bribe was demanded although the other party had no intention of the kind. Admittedly, the survey makes an assessment of a real life situation. Therefore, demanding a bribe is not treated according to the criteria established by criminal law or the actual motives of the other party but from the perspective of the respondent himself of herself who communicates with the public official. The answers of the respondents are given in Table 1.1.1.

*Table 1.1.1. DURING RECENT FIVE YEARS, HAS ANYONE EXPECTED OR DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM YOU? (residents, %)*

	2001*	2002	2004
No, never	52.7	48.4	57.0
Yes, once	11.9	13.9	10.4
Yes, 2–3 times	15.3	19.3	18.4
Yes, 4–9 times	4.2	5.5	5.5
Yes, 10 and more times	3.7	3.6	2.2
Has no opinion	12.2	9.3	6.6

\* 1<sup>st</sup> wave estimates: N=1025.

As indicated in the table above, the majority of Lithuanian residents have not encountered any bribe demanding situations or felt that someone has expected it from them over the recent 5–8 year period. In 2002, as compared to 2001, the number of the respondents claiming that a bribe was demanded from them fell by 4.3 percentage points to grow again by 8.6 percentage points in 2004. During the latter year, as compared to 2002, the number of those who said that a bribe had been demanded from them *once* decreased by 3.5 percentage points. In 2002

and 2004, the number of the respondents who said that they had been asked to give a bribe 2–3 times was 3–4 percentage points higher than in 2001. Admittedly, the number of the respondents who did not answer the question was rather high, though during the comparative period it decreased almost two times to reach 6.6 per cent. As one could anticipate, the rarest social group to encounter the situation when a bribe is demanded or expected is the one which has little to do with various public bodies: young and senior people.

The 2004 questionnaire included a new question about bribe demands during the past 12 months. 71.3 per cent of the respondents said that no-one had demanded a bribe from them, 10.7 per cent said that it had happened once, 8.8 per cent noted 2–3 times, 1.3 per cent indicated 4–9 times, 0.7 per cent remembered 10 and more times and 7.2 per cent had no opinion. No special social demographic features could be identified apart from the group of the respondents aged 30–49 who were demanded to give a bribe more often than the other age groups.

Lithuanian residents were asked a question whether they had given a bribe over the past five years. Table 1.1.2 below shows the findings of the surveys conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2004.

*Table 1.1.2. DURING THE RECENT FIVE YEARS, HAVE YOU GIVEN A BRIBE? (residents, %)*

	2001*	2002	2004
No, never	54.5	61.6	59.5
Yes, once	13.6	12.6	11.4
Yes, 2–3 times	15.3	19.3	17.5
Yes, 4–9 times	4.8	4.5	5.2
Yes, 10 and more times	2.4	1.7	1.9
Has no opinion	9.4	0.2	4.5

\* 1<sup>st</sup> wave estimates: N=1025.

The survey findings show that in 2001, almost 36 per cent of the residents had given a bribe over the past five years; in 2002, the number of positive answers went up insignificantly (without exceeding the statistical error) to reach 38 per cent, and in 2004 it went back to the same 36 per cent. Moreover, in 2002 and 2004, as compared with 2001, respectively 7 and 5 per cent more respondents claimed that they had not given a bribe over the last five years. Yet such a sudden increase could be explained by the fact that in 2002 and 2004, as compared to

2001, the number of the respondents who had no opinion concerning the matter went down by 9 and 5 percentage points respectively.

A socio-demographic analysis of the respondents shows that during the period surveyed the majority of those who admitted having given a bribe are women, young and middle-aged people, having higher income and living in cities. Geographically, residents of Panevėžys and Telšiai counties claimed to have given a bribe rarer (i.e. their number is lower than the statistical mean) and Alytus, Tauragė (in 2001 and 2002) and Kaunas (2004) county residents said it more often.

The 2001 questionnaire contained a question about bribes given by the respondent's relatives and acquaintances. A positive answer was given by 47.9 per cent of the respondents, a negative response was provided by 30.8 per cent and those having no opinion or refusing to answer accounted for 21.3 per cent. The percentage of the latter is too high to be able to make a judgement about the ratio of bribe-givers and non-givers among relatives and acquaintances. The same could be said about comparing personal experience of bribery with that of relatives and acquaintances. The 2002 and 2004 questionnaires left out the question.


Admittedly, the 2004 questionnaire had an additional question about one's recent experience of bribery.

*Table 1.1.3. WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU HAD TO GIVE A BRIBE? (residents, %)*

	%
Have never given a bribe	44.1
This year (2004)	10.4
Last year (2003)	14.1
2–3 years ago	8.1
4–5 years ago	4.1
6–14 years ago	8.2
15 years ago or earlier than that	3.9
Not stated	7.1

As indicated in Table 1.1.3 above, almost half (48.8 per cent) of the respondents admitted that they had given a bribe at least once in their life; a slightly smaller percentage, 44.1, claimed they had never given a bribe and 7.1 per cent refused to respond. Figure 1.1.1 shows the distribution of responses by those residents who had admitted giving a bribe at least once in their life.

*Fig. 1.1.1. WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOU HAD TO GIVE A BRIBE? (bribe-givers N=495; residents, %)*



Noteworthy, the number of the respondents who said they had given a bribe during the Soviet times account for as little as 7.9 per cent, whereas almost half of those who had given a bribe mentioned the period of 2003-04. One could state that the majority of the respondents do not associate bribery with the Soviet past as they most often referred to the last 15-year period. However, a question arises in relation to the data illustrated in Figure 1.1.1 (which shows an increase of bribe-giving situations in recent years), whether they are in line with the data mentioned earlier (See Table 1.1.2) showing that during the period surveyed the scale of bribe-giving remained the same.

The following explanation could be provided. The fact that the last bribe given by the respondent happened during previous or the current year does not mean that he or she had not given bribes earlier. Thus it would not be correct to state that bribery is increasing. However, another fact that the percentage of those who admitted giving a bribe over the past 5 years remained the same (without exceeding the statistical error) (see Table 1.1.3 and Figure 1.1.1) shows not only the bribery experience by the respondent but also his or her awareness of it. Admittedly, people tend to remember better recent events; therefore the statement 'I have given a bribe in recent five years' could be interpreted as follows: about 60 per cent of the bribery experience is associated with recent years (2004-03) and only about 40 per cent is referred to earlier three years. Analysis of another question corroborated the assumption.

The 2004 questionnaire included a question about the experience of bribery over recent 12 months. 73.1 per cent of the respondents said they

had never given a bribe; 10.7 per cent admitted they had given a bribe once; 8.9 per cent noted 2–3 times; 1.3 per cent mentioned 4–9 times; 0.5 per cent admitted 10 and more times and 5.5 per cent had no opinion. This shows that 21.4 per cent (more than every fifth respondent) of those surveyed admitted having given a bribe over the last 12 months. Similarly to the five year period, those who said they had given a bribe during the past 12 months belong to the socio-demographic group aged 30–49 with higher income (LTL 1,200 and more).

Analysis of the respondents' bribery experience according to the scale of 5 years and 12 months showed that 59 per cent of the respondents who had bribery experience during the last 5 years had also given a bribe during the past 12 months, which is in line with the trends mentioned before.

In that respect, more accurate findings are obtained when analysing the bribery experience over the last 12 months rather than 5 years. Bearing in mind, that the experience of 12 months accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the 5 –year experience and having an aim to retain statistical reliability when analysing cases of bribery, it is necessary to reduce the maximum statistical error in the whole sample from 3.1 to 1.8 per cent. As a result, the size of a minimum sample grows from 1,000 to 3,000 respondents.

*Table 1.1.4. WHY DID YOU GIVE A BRIBE? (residents, %)*

Year	2001*	2002	2004
Because it was demanded by a person who had an impact upon positive resolution of your problem	12.5	22.0	22.6
Because you thought that it would help speed up the resolution of your problem	36.2	34.0	33.5
Because you thought it would be difficult to solve the problem without a bribe	30.7	29.3	27.3
Because it is common practice, the majority does it	30.8	25.6	20.7
Because you wanted to thank the person who helped you	34.5	17.6	19.8
Other	0.0	0.0	0.2
Has no opinion	1.0	3.7	2.5

\*2<sup>nd</sup> wave estimates (N=1003; bribe-givers in recent five years N<sub>k</sub>=405).

Yet the scale of 5-year experience, though not as accurate, also discloses important aspects of bribery experience.

The purpose of another question to those who mentioned having given a bribe over the past five years was to identify the motives of such a conduct.

As seen from the table above, the main motive of the respondents for giving a bribe in 2001–04 was a belief that a bribe may speed up the resolution of their problems (slightly more than one third) and if they refuse to give a bribe they risk to have their problems unsolved (slightly less than one third). In 2001, as many as 35 per cent of the respondents indicated their willingness to thank the person concerned, although the following years showed a sharp decrease by almost one half. Moreover, in 2002 and 2004, as compared to 2001, the percentage of those who claimed that a bribe was demanded by a person who could influence a positive resolution of the problem grew almost two times. However, the percentage of those who saw bribery as a common, ‘usual’ practice was steadily decreasing to reach about one fifth of all the bribe-givers in 2004.

The respondents who said they had given a bribe over the last five years were asked to say when the bribe was given.

*Table 1.1.5. DID YOU GIVE A BRIBE...? (residents, %)*

Year	2001*	2002	2004
before the service provided	52.2	53.7	57.1
after the service provided	20.3	16.5	14.5
during the provision of the service	22.1	18.8	24.4
Has no opinion	5.4	11.1	4.0

\*2<sup>nd</sup> wave estimates (N=1003, bribe-givers in recent five years N<sub>k</sub>=405).

Table 1.1.5 shows that the majority of the respondents give bribes before the service is provided. In 2001 and 2002, there was no significant statistical difference between those who gave a bribe before the service and during it. They accounted for one fifth of the respondents. However, the 2002 survey findings should be interpreted with certain reservation as they include quite a high number of those who gave no response, 11 per cent. In 2004, the percentage of those who gave a bribe during the provision of the service grew to a quarter of the respondents. Such a bribe-giving ‘strategy’ indicates an attempt to ensure a positive

result rather than a wish to thank 'a person who helped'. The years 2002 and 2004 saw an interesting trend: women more than men were more likely to give a bribe before the service, whereas men more often than women would give a bribe during the service.

The respondents were also asked to reply about the form of settlement with public officials. The survey results are summarised in Table 1.1.6.

*Table 1.1.6. IF YOU EVER SOUGHT A FAVOURABLE DECISION OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL, HOW DID YOU REWARD HIM OR HER? (residents, %)*

Year	2001*	2002	2004
By giving cash	68.6	73.1	75.1
By giving gifts	28.5	23.3	19.8
Services	4.4	1.1	1.5
Other	5.0	8.5	10.0
Has no opinion	12.9	7.7	6.9

\* 1<sup>st</sup> wave estimates (N=1025, bribe-givers in recent five years  $N_k=371$ ).

As shown above, the main form of settlement is cash: three quarters of the respondents who admitted giving a bribe over the last five years chose this form. Another form, yet far less popular, is gifts. Admittedly, the former is a more frequent form of rewarding an official by men, whereas the latter is more popular among women. The most common gifts are alcoholic beverages, sweets and chocolate.

The survey analysed administrative regional aspects of bribery experience. First of all, the respondents were asked to answer a question about the level of public officials whom they had given a bribe. The results are provided in Table 1.1.7 below.

*Table 1.1.7. WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC BODIES WHERE THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS WORKING WHOM YOU GAVE A BRIBE? (residents, %)*

Year	2001*	2002	2004
National public body	21.3	21.9	19.9
County level public body	31.5	23.9	27.5
Municipal body	46.5	54.1	46.3
Has no opinion	17.9	19.6	20.6

\* 1<sup>st</sup> wave estimates (N=1025, bribe-givers in recent five years  $N_k=371$ ).



Noteworthy, the percentage of those who refused to answer is high, 18–20. The reason could be that it was difficult for the respondents to establish the level at which the respective public official operates. The answers provided show the following trends: first, local officials were paid bribes most frequently, the percentage is lower of those who work in counties and the lowest (about one fifth) are employed on the national level. The latter percentage was stable throughout the period surveyed. Yet the first two, in comparison to 2001, changed insignificantly in 2002 and went back to the three-year old position in 2004.

Another question was put forward in relation to the geography of bribery experience. The attempt was made to assess the 2001 and 2002 geographical distribution by making a difference between major towns and regional centres, whereas in 2004 the distinction was made between counties and their centres. Tables 1.1.8 a and 1.1.8 b summarise the answers provided.

*Table 1.1.8 a. DID YOU GIVE A BRIBE TO A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WORKING IN A PUBLIC BODY LOCATED IN VILNIUS OR SOME OTHER PLACE? (residents, %)*

Year	2001*	2002
Vilnius	30.5	29.8
Kaunas	20.7	23.9
Klaipėda	10.1	11.6
Šiauliai	3.5	5.6
Panevėžys	4.3	3.3
Another regional centre	26.9	26.6
Some other place	8.2	3.7
Has no opinion	15.5	19.2

\* 1<sup>st</sup> wave estimates (N=1025, bribe-givers in recent five years N<sub>k</sub>=371).

*Table 1.1.8 b. DID YOU GIVE A BRIBE TO A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WORKING IN A PUBLIC BODY LOCATED IN VILNIUS OR SOME OTHER PLACE? (residents, %)*

Year	2004
Vilnius, Vilnius county	29.4
Kaunas, Kaunas county	25.9
Klaipėda, Klaipėda county	11.3
Šiauliai, Šiauliai county	6.1
Panevėžys, Panevėžys county	6.4
Alytus, Alytus county	4.3

*Table 1.1.8 b continued*

Year	2004
Marijampolė, Marijampolė county	4.6
Utena county	4.7
Telšiai county	3.3
Tauragė county	1.1
Has no opinion	14.4

Since the sample of bribe-givers of the three surveys did not exceed 400 and the percentage of those who refused to respond was rather high (14–19), the difference between Tables 1.1.8 a and 1.1.8 b should be evaluated with due care. However, it is clearly seen that the main centres of bribery based on the respondents' experience are Vilnius, Kaunas and Klaipėda (although the latter is slightly lagging behind from the first two 'leaders'). The three towns were mentioned by two thirds of the respondents.

When analysing the distribution of bribes, one has to identify institutional as well as geographical particularities of bribery. Table 1.1.9 provides a list of public bodies (about 90 public bodies were covered by the survey) whose public officials were given a bribe over the past five years, as stated by more than 3.1 per cent<sup>13</sup> of the respondents. The public bodies are listed according to the 2004 survey results.

*Table 1.1.9. TO EMPLOYEES OF WHICH INSTITUTIONS HAVE YOU GIVEN A BRIBE? (residents, %)*

Year	2001*	2002	2004
Out-patient departments	11.6	12.7	12.5
Local hospitals	12.5	13.2	11.0
National hospitals	7.6	12.2	10.9
Traffic police	12.4	11.6	8.6
Vehicle technical inspection centres**	–	5.0	5.0
Local authorities**	–	3.7	3.5
Customs	5.6	5.1	2.9

\* 2<sup>nd</sup> wave estimates (N=1003).

\*\* Institutions not included in the 2001 survey.

<sup>13</sup> This figure corresponds to the statistical error; it is some sort of the minimum statistical "visibility" of the respondents' bribery experience.

As seen from the findings above, most often to be offered bribes are employees of medical institutions, including out-patient departments, local and national hospitals, whereas the percentage of bribe-taking staff is lower in traffic police, customs, vehicle technical inspection centres and local authorities. During the period surveyed, the institutional bribery experience of residents stayed almost the same in local hospitals, out-patient departments, vehicle technical inspection centres and local authorities. In 2002 and 2004, as compared to 2001, the number of the respondents who claimed to have given a bribe in national hospitals, increased. However, customs in 2004, as compared to 2001 and 2002, stepped down from the position of the most statistically prominent ('visible') institutions.

The analysis of the situation of bribery in the bodies mentioned above can be facilitated by putting additional questions to the respondents as follows:

- During the last five years, have you had to deal with matters in those bodies or communicated with the staff of those bodies while dealing with your matters?
- When you were dealing with your matters, employees of which institutions demanded or expected a bribe from you?
- Did a bribe help you deal with your problem?

Table 1.1.10 shows the respondents' answers to the questions put above.

Noteworthy, the experience of the respondents in such institutions like local hospitals, out-patient departments, customs, vehicle technical inspection centres and local authorities is almost the same during the period surveyed. In 2004, there were fewer respondents who said they had to deal with matters in traffic police in the last five years<sup>14</sup>, and, in 2002 and 2004, as compared to 2001, the number of those who admitted having dealt with their matters in national hospitals, went slightly up.

According to the respondents, the practice of demanding bribes principally stayed the same in customs, vehicle technical inspection centres and local authorities. Yet in 2002 and 2004, it saw a sudden increase in out-patient departments and national hospitals. This is contrary to traffic police, where the practice of bribery went down in 2004. During 2002

<sup>14</sup> This can be explained by institutional change.

Table 1.1.10. INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE OF RESIDENTS IN 2001–04 (residents, %)

Year	Dealt with matters			Demanded a bribe			Bribe helped		
	2001*	2002	2004	2001*	2002	2004	2001****	2002	2004
Out-patient departments	56.3	57.4	59.0	9.1	13.4	12.9	–	10.4	10.7
Local hospitals	32.7	33.0	32.3	10.2	14.6	9.7	–	9.9	9.2
National hospitals	16.6	20.9	19.4	5.9	11.5	10.0	–	9.5	8.4
Traffic police	24.4	23.1	18.1	12.1	12.3	9.0	–	10.5	8.2
Vehicle technical inspection centres**	–	17.0	16.6	–	5.6	4.8	–	4.6	4.8
Local authorities**	–	20.8	19.0	–	5.5	4.7	–	3.1	3.0
Customs***	14.9	14.3	–	6.1	6.3	–	–	4.4	–

\* 2<sup>nd</sup> wave estimates (N=1003).

\*\* Institutions not included in the 2001 survey.

\*\*\* The 2004 customs indices were not included as non-compliant with statistical requirements.

\*\*\*\* No estimate of the 2001 index was made.

and 2004, almost the same number of the respondents said that bribes helped them solve their problem.

Admittedly, Tables 1.1.9 and 1.1.10 show the difference between the respondents in their overall institutional experience as well as their institutional *bribery* experience. For example, institutional experience of the respondents in national hospitals and local authorities is rather similar: over the recent five year period, every fifth of those interviewed claimed he or she had dealt with matters in those bodies, whereas the experience of bribery (including the situations where a bribe is demanded and proves 'effective' as well as giving a bribe) differs substantially.

The survey findings are easier to interpret by introducing the so-called bribery indices: *demanding*, *giving*, *effectiveness* and *initiative*.

The index of *demanding* is estimated according to the following formula:

$$I_p = S_p/S_i, \text{ where} \quad (F1)$$

$S_p$  is the percentage of the respondents who claimed that a bribe had been demanded from them, and

$S_i$  is the percentage of those who claimed they had dealt with their matters in the body concerned.

The index of *giving* is estimated according to the following formula:

$$I_d = S_d/S_i, \text{ where} \quad (F2)$$

$S_d$  is the percentage of the respondents who admitted they had given a bribe and

$S_i$  is the percentage of those who claimed they had dealt with their matters in the body concerned.

The index of *effectiveness* is estimated according to the following formula:

$$I_e = S_e/S_d, \text{ where} \quad (F3)$$

$S_e$  is the percentage of the respondents who claimed the bribe had helped them and

$S_d$  is the percentage of the respondents who said they had given a bribe.

The index of *initiative* is estimated according to the following formula:

$$I_i = (S_d - S_p) / S_i, \text{ where} \quad (F4)$$

$S_d$  is the percentage of those who claimed they had given a bribe,

$S_p$  is the percentage of the respondents who said that a bribe was demanded from them,

$S_i$  is the percentage of the respondents who said they had dealt with matters in the body concerned.

It is easy to notice that the first two indices show some sort of the minimum risk either in being asked to give a bribe or simply giving a bribe: the higher are the first two indices, the higher the probability of a bribe-demanding or bribe-giving situation. The third index shows the effectiveness of a bribe: '1' equals absolute effectiveness, whereas '0' means total ineffectiveness. The fourth index points out at the dominant power in the 'market of bribery': it is either the bribe-taker or the bribe-giver. In this case, '0' indicates the balance between the latter two, a negative figure means that initiative is taken by the taker, whereas a positive figure refers to the giver. Table 10 shows bribery indices, disclosing various aspects of institutional bribery experience by residents.

Table 1.1.11 highlights the respondents' communication with traffic polices during the period surveyed: both demanding and giving indices stood at about 0.5, which means that at least every second person interviewed claimed to have given or demanded to give a bribe. In that case, the effectiveness of the bribe was also rather high: 0.90–0.95. A slightly higher effectiveness index is exhibited by the vehicle technical inspection centres. The respondents' replies show that in 2002 and 2004, the number of bribes demanded exceeded the number of bribes given.

Another distinctive institution in this regard is national hospitals. Since 2002, this institution has showed a slightly higher index of bribe-demanding and a substantially higher index of bribe-giving than the respective indices in traffic police. The effectiveness index of the former is one of the smallest among the bodies assessed. However, national hospitals have the highest index of initiative.

A high index of bribery effectiveness illustrates a widespread opinion that bribes help to solve problems and that people are ready to pay big amounts for such illicit actions of 'problem-solving'. Since the distribution of financial amounts is usually not normal and big amounts which

Table 1.1.11. BRIBERY INDICES IN 2001–04. (residents)

Year	Demanding Index ( $I_p$ )			Giving Index ( $I_d$ )			Efficiency Index ( $I_e$ )			Initiative Index ( $I_i$ )		
	2001*	2002	2004	2001*	2002	2004	2001 <sup>4</sup> *	2002	2004	2001*	2002	2004
Local hospitals	0.31	0.44	0.30	0.38	0.40	0.34	–	0.75	0.84	0.07	-0.04	0.04
Out-patient departments	0.16	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	–	0.82	0.86	0.04	-0.01	-0.01
National hospitals	0.36	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.52</b>	0.46	<b>0.58</b>	<b>0.56</b>	–	0.78	0.77	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.05</b>
Traffic police	<b>0.50</b>	0.53	0.50	<b>0.51</b>	0.50	0.48	–	0.90	0.95	0.01	-0.03	-0.02
Vehicle technical inspection centres**	–	0.33	0.29	–	0.29	0.30	–	<b>0.92</b>	<b>0.96</b>	–	-0.04	-0.01
Local authorities**	–	0.26	0.25	–	0.18	0.18	–	0.84	0.86	–	-0.09	-0.06
Customs***	0.41	0.44	–	0.38	0.36	–	–	0.86	–	-0.03	-0.08	–

\* 2<sup>nd</sup> wave estimates (N=1003).

\*\* Institutions not included in the 2001 survey.

\*\*\* The 2004 customs indices were not included as non-compliant with statistical requirements.

\*\*\*\* No estimate of the 2001 index was made.

are paid rarer outweigh small and medium amounts that are paid more frequently, the current survey estimates the payment amounts by using the following indices: maximum and minimum means of payment amounts.

The mean of maximum payment amount ( $M_d$ ) is estimated according to the following formula:

$$M_d = (\sum_{i=1}^n S_i^d)/n, \text{ where} \quad (F5)$$

$S_i^d$  is the maximum amount paid by the  $i$ -respondent, and  $n$  is the number of the respondents who paid the biggest amounts.

The mean of the minimum payment amount mean is estimated according to the following formula:

$$M_m = (\sum_{i=1}^n S_i^m)/n, \text{ where} \quad (F6)$$

$S_i^m$  is the smallest amount paid by the  $i$ -respondent, and  $n$  is the number of the respondents who paid the smallest amounts.

On their basis, the estimate of the absolute payment mean  $M_a$  is made as follows:

$$M_a = (M_d + M_m)/2, \text{ where} \quad (F7)$$

$M_d$  is the mean of maximum payment amount,  
 $M_m$  is the mean of minimum payment amount.

Table 1.1.12 shows the summary of the respondents' answers to the question about the biggest and the smallest amount of the bribe paid. Like previously, the results are presented according to the most distinctive institutions statistics-wise.

During the period surveyed, the biggest amount paid by the respondents were in local authorities and customs. The 2004 maximum payment mean was LTL 958 and represented a much higher amount than the 2002 mean. Interestingly enough, the minimum payment mean decreased 2.5 times over the period surveyed.

In 2001-02, the trend of the absolute mean reducing is seen in local hospitals and traffic police. In 2002-04, it is observed in vehicle techni-



Table 1.1.12. MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM MEANS OF BRIBES PAID IN RECENT FIVE YEARS (residents, LTL)

Year	2001*			2002			2004		
	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )
Local hospitals	214	82	<b>148</b>	191	68	<b>130</b>	195	53	<b>124</b>
Out-patient departments	84	35	<b>60</b>	101	33	<b>67</b>	82	29	<b>56</b>
National hospitals	370	129	<b>250</b>	417	103	<b>260</b>	420	96	<b>258</b>
Traffic police	242	69	<b>156</b>	224	69	<b>147</b>	198	42	<b>120</b>
Vehicle technical inspection centres**	–	–	–	118	75	<b>97</b>	98	58	<b>78</b>
Local authorities**	–	–	–	654	201	<b>428</b>	958	80	<b>519</b>
Customs***	663	169	<b>416</b>	617	144	<b>381</b>	–	–	–

\* 1<sup>st</sup> wave estimates (N=1025).

\*\* Institutions not included in the 2001 survey.

\*\*\* The 2004 customs indices were not included as non-compliant with statistical requirements.

cal inspection centres. In 2001-02, the absolute mean was shrinking in customs. In out-patient departments and national hospitals the absolute payment mean went slightly up in 2002, but in 2004, it stayed practically the same in national hospitals and fell down in out-patient departments. In 2004, as compared with 2002, the absolute payment mean in local authorities increased by almost LTL 100.

## 1.2. EXPERIENCE OF BRIBERY BY LITHUANIAN COMPANIES MANAGERS

Lithuanian company managers were given similar questions to those of residents. The businessmen interviewed represent their company rather than act in person; therefore, the survey had to pay special attention to specific economic features of the companies rather than socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

First, company managers were asked about the types of corruption they happen to encounter most frequently. Their replies are summarised in Table 1.2.1.

*Table 1.2.1. WHICH TYPE OF CORRUPTION DOES YOUR COMPANY HAPPEN TO ENCOUNTER? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Abuse of office	35.8	35.6	40.9
Bribe-giving, bribe-taking	23.6	26.0	17.6
Self-seeking resolution of conflicts between private and public interests	17.5	20.2	16.3
Nepotism (favouring relatives or friends)*	–	–	8.0
Other	1.8	0.6	0.3
Has no opinion	21.3	17.7	16.9

\* This index was included in the 2004 survey only.

In 2001 and 2002, more than one third of the respondents said that public officials tend to abuse their office. Similar opinion was held by small, medium and large company managers. In 2004, the number of the respondents who thought this way grew to account for 40.9 per cent. The majority of those who referred to the abuse of office were private company managers.

In 2001 and 2002, almost the same number of the respondents (23.6 and 26 respectively) stated bribe-giving and bribe-taking as the type of corruption which they encountered most often. This time again, no difference in the opinion was expressed by the companies different in size and business type. In 2004, the number of the respondents thinking this way went down to 17.6 per cent. Those who mentioned bribe-giving and taking were managers of small enterprises and sole proprietorships.

17.5 per cent of company managers in 2001 and every fifth respondent in 2002 encountered a self-seeking resolution of conflict between public and private interests. The type of corruption was mentioned by managers of large and medium companies, as well as private and public companies. In 2004, their number accounted for 16.3 per cent, mostly referred to by managers of large enterprises and public companies.

In the 2004 survey, 8 per cent of company managers claimed that nepotism was the type of corruption which they had encountered most frequently.

A relatively high rate of those who gave no response could be explained by the fact that they did not confront corruption. In that case, businessmen see bribe-taking and giving as the second most popular type of corruption after the abuse of office.

Similarly to residents, company managers were asked about their experience of a bribe demanded or expected in the last five-year period. The survey results are presented in Table 1.2.2.

*Table 1.2.2. DURING RECENT FIVE YEARS, HAS ANYONE EXPECTED OR DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM YOUR COMPANY? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
No, not once	42.0	43.0	43.4
Yes, once	11.5	12.6	12.6
Yes, 2–3 times	23.6	24.9	22.6
Yes, 4–9 times	9.5	9.6	11.3
Yes, 10 and more times	12.1	9.3	8.6
Has no opinion	1.3	0.6	1.5

The table above shows that during the period of 2001–04 surveyed, the experience of company managers remained the same: about 43 per cent of managers were demanded or expected to give a bribe and about 56 per cent did not encounter such situations. Most frequently compa-

nies were asked to give bribes 2–3 times. No consistent pattern showing the difference between companies on the basis of their type, profit or other parameters was spotted during the years of survey.

Company managers were asked to share their experience of bribe demands in recent 12 months. Their responses are summarised in Table 1.2.3.

*Table 1.2.3. DURING RECENT 12 MONTHS, HAS ANYONE EXPECTED OR DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM YOUR COMPANY? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
No, not once	61.3	61.3	67.8
Yes	37.1	38.7	28.6
Has no opinion	1.6	0.0	3.6

In contrast to Table 1.2.2 above, the 2004 survey results were different from those of 2001–02. In 2004, the respondents who said they had encountered bribe demanding or expecting situations was 10 percentage points smaller than during surveys of earlier years. A more thorough analysis shows that 2004 also saw a change in the frequency of bribe demands. In 2001–02, the number of the respondents who said that a bribe had been demanded from them 2–3 times was 8 percentage points higher than the number of those who indicated one time. Yet in 2004, the first group of the respondents was 4 percentage points smaller than the second group. Noteworthy, the 2004 survey showed that bribes demands were mostly claimed by managers of companies with an annual turnover of LTL 2 million and representatives of foreign firms.

Confronted with bribe demanding situations, company managers could opt for one of the following alternatives: pay no attention to such demands, report about them to the bodies concerned or start playing by the bribery ‘rules of the game’. The first two options are discussed in Chapter 3 and here we will attempt to analyse the bribery experience of company managers.

The survey asked the respondents about the bribery experience by businessmen they knew. Similarly to the residents’ survey, this was a controlling question which served as the basis for a qualitative assessment of openness of responses concerning the bribery experience by the respondents. In case of residents, the question did not prove effective due to a small number of responses received. Whereas the number of

company managers who did not respond is much smaller as shown in Table 1.2.4 below.

*Table 1.2.4. HAVE YOU EVER HEARD ABOUT A BRIBE GIVEN TO A PUBLIC OFFICIAL BY A BUSINESSMAN YOU KNOW? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Yes	75.9	81.0	72.9
No	23.3	18.2	16.7
Has no opinion	0.8	0.8	10.4

In 2002, as compared to 2001, the number of the respondents who heard about their acquaintances participating in bribery went up. Yet it would be too bold to claim that their number in 2004 decreased to reach the level 2001 as those respondents who gave no answer or had no opinion account for quite a high percentage, about 10. Therefore, it would be more accurate to say that the situation in 2004 was as good as the situation in 2002. The response given by the absolute majority of company managers about the relevant issue of bribery in the business sector is an important social background which can facilitate or justify the act of bribe-giving (as discussed later).

The experience of bribery by businessmen is shown in Table 1.2.5 which summarises company managers' responses to a direct question about their company's bribe-giving experience.

*Table 1.2.5. DURING RECENT FIVE YEARS, HAS ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF YOUR COMPANY GIVEN A BRIBE TO SECURE ITS SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN LITHUANIA? (company managers, %)*

	2001	2002	2004
No, not once	60.3	47.8	52.2
Yes, once	8.3	8.8	11.9
Yes, 2–3 times	18.2	17.3	18.6
Yes, 4–9 times	5.1	10.7	9.4
Yes, 10 and more times	5.7	7.5	6.4
Has no opinion	2.5	0	1.4
Given by company managers*	–	7.9	–

\* Estimated only in 2002.

The table above shows that in 2002, as compared to the previous year, the number of those companies who gave no bribes decreased signifi-

cantly by 13 percentage points to grow again by 4 percentage points in 2004. The 2004 analysis of the companies whose employees had given a bribe discloses an even stronger trend: in 2002, in comparison to 2001, the share of bribe-giving companies increased by 15 percentage points (from 37.3 to 52.2 per cent) and in 2004, as compared to 2002, it fell down by 6 percentage points (from 52.2 to 46.3 per cent). Thus a presumption is that the bribe-giving situation in 2004 was somewhat more favourable than in 2002, although it was worse (with the number of bribe-givers 9 percentage points bigger) in 2001.

Noteworthy, the period surveyed showed quite a lot of companies (about 18 per cent) whose employees said they had given bribes 2–3 times. Furthermore, from the year 2001, the number of companies whose employees gave bribes 4-9- times went up. Presumably, such types of companies and their managers consider bribe-giving a certain business practice.

Analysis of the distribution of regional companies, where, according to company managers, bribe had been given, showed no particular patterns. For example, in 2001 bribes were mostly given by Vilnius and Kaunas county company employees, in 2002 their position was occupied by new 'leaders', Alytus and Klaipėda county companies, and in 2004 Vilnius county companies came back to join Alytus and Šiauliai county companies in giving bribes to public officials most frequently. In 2001 and 2002, company employees from Marijampolė and Panevėžys counties gave fewer bribes than their counterparts in other towns and counties. In 2004, the smallest amount of bribes was given by the company staff from Tauragė (in 2001, they were also among those who were the rarest to offer bribes), Telšiai and Klaipėda counties.

This time again, no pattern could be established linking bribe-giving with characteristics of companies, including the area of operation, size of the company, turnover, type, etc. All the differences either do not exceed statistical error or are peculiar of one particular year but not the entire period surveyed. What could be noted though is that foreign companies mentioned fewer instances of giving bribes in 2004. However, this parameter was not measured in 2001 and 2002, which does not allow us to state that such firms had such a characteristic during the entire period surveyed.

Company managers were also asked to answer a question about their experience of bribe-giving in the last 12 months. Their answers are summarised in Table 1.2.6.

*Table 1.2.6. DURING RECENT 12 MONTHS, HAS ANY OF YOUR COMPANY STAFF MEMBERS GIVEN A BRIBE TO SECURE SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF YOUR COMPANY IN LITHUANIA? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
No	70.8	72.9	67.8
Yes	26.4	27.1	28.6
Has no opinion	2.8	–	3.6

As compared to Table 1.2.5, one could see that bribe-giving in the past 12 months was far more stable and is not statistically distinctive throughout the period surveyed: approximately 27 per cent of company managers said they had to give bribes. A somewhat bigger difference, accounting for 3 percentage points, is seen among those who gave a negative response about their bribery experience in 2001 and 2004. However, bearing in mind similar percentage of those who did not answer the question, one could not consider the difference seriously.

In 2001 and 2002, the most frequent answer of the respondents was that they had to give bribes 2-3 times, yet in 2004, their number was smaller by 4 percentage points than those who mentioned one time (10.5 and 14.8 per cent accordingly). Similarly to the analysis of a 5-year period, no pattern could be established linking bribe-giving during the past 12 months with the structural characteristics of companies.


In 2004, company managers, like residents, were asked to remember the last time they had given a bribe. Their responses are shown in Table 2.2 7.

*Table 1.2.7. WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOUR COMPANY (COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES) GAVE A BRIBE TO SECURE ITS SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN LITHUANIA? (company managers, %)*

Has never given a bribe	42.2
This year (2004)	15.6
Last year (2003)	17.2
2–3 years ago	7.2
4–5 years ago	3.8
6–14 years ago	2.8
15 years ago or earlier	0.4
Not stated	10.9

About 47 per cent of the respondents mentioned that their company representatives had to give a bribe at least one time throughout the years

*Figure 1.2.1. WHEN WAS THE LAST TIME YOUR COMPANY (COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES) GAVE A BRIBE TO SECURE ITS SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN LITHUANIA? (bribe-giving companies N=491, company managers, %)*



of their operation. Those who denied ever giving bribes account for a smaller percentage, 42. Quite a high percentage of those who gave no response could be explained by the fact that new companies could have been excluded from the period surveyed, whereas old companies, where the respondent had been employed, might have been engaged in bribery. The distribution of bribe-giving, time-wise, is shown in Figure 1.2.1.

This time again we observe the phenomenon discussed in section 2.1: the respondents primarily tend to register instances of bribery that happened this or previous year. In the time-scale of five years they account for as much as 75 per cent of all the instances of bribery mentioned. The difference in the dynamics of bribery in the 5-year and 12-month periods shown in tables 1.2.5 and 1.2.6, could be explained by presuming that such a distribution reflects not only the experience of businessmen but rather the awareness of it (people tend to remember recent events better).

The 2004 questionnaire of company managers included a question about the bribe-giving 'technique', i.e. they were asked to indicate a stage at which the bribe was usually given. 46.1 per cent of managers who had admitted giving bribes over the past 5 years, mentioned that they offered a bribe before the service was provided, 29.2 per cent said they committed the act during the provision of the service, 15.1 per cent noted after the service and 9.7 per cent either refused to answer or pointed out another way. Those who 'rewarded' the public official before the service was provided include production companies, having 50 or more employ-



ees, also those with the annual turnover of more than LTL 2 million and joint Lithuanian-foreign firms.

After this, company managers were asked to answer a question about the type of bribe-giving. Their responses are summarised in Table 1.2.8 below.

*Table 1.2.8. HOW DID YOU REWARD THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS FAVOURABLE DECISION? (company managers, % of the bribe-givers in recent five years)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
In cash	49.9	69.7	75.1
Giving presents	29.4	40.1	31.6
Providing services	16.9	18.8	13.3
Other	0.3	0.2	0.0
Not stated	3.6	–	7.2

As seen from the table above, the main form of bribe-giving is cash which was becoming more and more popular throughout the period surveyed: in 2004, three out of four bribe-giving companies chose this form for ‘rewarding’ public officials. A less widespread form is gifts which was practised by almost one third of the bribe-giving companies. The rarest form of settlement is services. The most popular gifts mentioned by the respondents were alcoholic beverages and sweets, and the most popular services were the production of a good or provision of services. Services were mostly offered by companies operating in the services sector, whereas gifts were most frequently given by production companies.

Besides that, company managers were asked to answer a question about the level of public officials whom their staff had given bribes in the past five years.

*Table 1.2.9. WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC BODY WHERE THE PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS WORKING WHOM YOU HAVE GIVEN A BRIBE? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
National public body	24.9	19.2	28.0
County level public body	49.7	34.1	37.2
Municipal level	64.2	55.6	49.3
Not stated	10.4	–	20.1

A high percentage of those who refused to answer distorts an exact picture of bribe-giving dynamics and structure. Yet Table 1.2.9 shows that

companies would more often give bribes to municipal officials, less often to county level officials and finally to national public officials.

While examining companies, similarly to residents, the attempt was made to assess the geographical distribution of bribery. The 2001 and 2002 surveys looked at big towns and regional centres, whereas the 2004 survey (like that of residents) focused on counties and their centres. Tables 1.2.10 a and 1.2.10 b show responses of company managers according to the bribe-giving geography.

*Table 1.2.10 a. DID YOU GIVE A BRIBE TO A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WORKING IN A PUBLIC BODY LOCATED IN VILNIUS OR SOME OTHER PLACE? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002
Vilnius	54.0	37.7
Kaunas	22.5	17.5
Klaipėda	14.2	13.0
Šiauliai	4.5	6.8
Panevėžys	7.0	5.1
Another regional centre	24.9	27.1
Some other place	5.1	5.3
Not stated	8.3	–

*Table 1.2.10 b. DID YOU GIVE A BRIBE TO A PUBLIC OFFICIAL WORKING IN A PUBLIC BODY LOCATED IN VILNIUS OR SOME OTHER PLACE? (company managers, %)*

Year	2004
Vilnius, Vilnius county	45.5
Kaunas, Kaunas county	21.3
Klaipėda, Klaipėda county	11.5
Šiauliai, Šiauliai county	8.7
Panevėžys, Panevėžys county	7.4
Alytus, Alytus county	6.0
Marijampolė, Marijampolė county	6.6
Utena county	4.0
Telšiai county	2.8
Tauragė county	2.0
Not stated	9.3

As seen from the tables above, bribes were most frequently given in Vilnius, Kaunas and slightly less often paid in Klaipėda and the coun-

ties of these towns. The other county centres are seriously lagging behind from the 'leaders'.

The institutional bribery experience by company representatives was assessed in the same way as the respective experience of residents. Table 1.2.11 shows the bodies (out of the total 90 state bodies surveyed) which were referred to by 3.1 per cent of the respondents as those whose employees were given bribes in the last five years. The results have been ranked according to the 2004 survey findings.

*Table 1.2.11. TO EMPLOYEES OF WHICH INSTITUTIONS HAS YOUR COMPANY (OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES) GIVEN A BRIBE? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Traffic police	13.2	23.2	18.2
Customs	10.0	13.1	12.7
State Tax Inspectorate (STI)	10.1	12.6	10.5
Town and regional municipalities*	–	12.6	8.1
Vehicle technical inspection centres*	–	12.0	7.4
National hospitals*	–	11.0	5.6
Out-patient departments*	–	10.5	5.6
Local hospitals*	–	8.8	5.6
County and regional state food and veterinary services	2.2	5.6	5.1
State Labour Inspectorate	3.7	5.9	4.9
State Social Insurance Fund Board	4.7	5.7	3.9
Fire prevention and rescue services	4.3	6.3	3.6
Non-Food Products Inspectorate	2.0	3.2	2.4
Public Health Centre	3.6	3.8	2.2
Land and other real estate cadastre and registry companies	3.1	5.9	2.1
High educational establishments*	–	3.8	1.1
Wards**	3.1	3.8	–
State Quality Inspectorate**	2.7	3.4	–
Financial police***	3.5	–	–

\* Public institutions not included in the 2004 survey.

\*\* Public institutions not included in the 2001 survey.

\*\*\* Public institution not included in the 2002 and 2004 survey as subject to reorganisation.

Statistics-wise ‘visible’ institutions, i.e. those whose employees had given bribes in recent 5 years, as claimed by their managers, included 19 public bodies over the total period surveyed. As seen from the table above, in 2002, as compared to 2001, the bribe-giving percentage those institutions increased to decrease again in 2004. In 2002, it grew significantly in traffic police (by 10 percentage points), customs (3 percentage points) and county and regional state food and veterinary services (3 percentage points). In 2001, 6 institutions were not included in the questionnaire and in 2002, one body was deleted from the list. The 2002 list of institutions which, according to the respondents, were given bribes by companies was the longest, including 18 public bodies. In 2004, it shrunk to contain 12 institutions (3 bodies were not included and another 4 failed to overcome the 3.1 per cent barrier). The year 2004, as compared to 2002, saw a major reduction of bribe-giving in traffic police, vehicle technical inspection centres, national hospitals and out-patient departments (by 5 percentage points), municipalities (4 percentage points), local hospitals and land and other real estate cadastre and registry companies (3 percentage points).

In the 2001 survey, company managers were asked to reply about the bribery experience of businessmen they knew as well as the experience of their company staff. Their replies are summarised in Table 1.2.12.

*Table 1.2.12. TO EMPLOYEES OF WHICH INSTITUTIONS HAVE THE BUSINESSMEN YOU KNOW GIVEN A BRIBE? (company managers, %)*

Year	2001
Traffic Police	24.8
Customs	24.2
State Tax Inspectorate (STI)	20.0
Financial Police	11.4
State Social Insurance Fund Board	7.9
<b>District courts</b>	7.0
State Labour Inspectorate	6.7
<b>Privatisation agency</b>	6.4
Wards	6.3
State Quality Inspectorate	6.2

*Table 1.2.12 continued*

Year	2001
<b>Border Police</b>	5.8
Public Health Centre	5.1
Land and other real estate registration companies	5.1
County and district state food and veterinary services	4.9
Fire Prevention and Rescue Department	4.3
<b>Land-Use Planning and Law Department</b>	4.0
<b>Territory Planning and Construction Inspectorate</b>	4.3
<b>County courts</b>	3.7
<b>Uniformed Police</b>	3.6
<b>Ministry of Health</b>	3.5
<b>Public Procurement Agency</b>	3.4
<b>Incarceration institutions</b>	3.2

As compared to Table 1.2.11, Table 1.2.12 included 10 new statistically 'visible' institutions: law enforcement and law and order institutions (uniformed and border police, county and district courts and incarceration institutions), the Ministry of Health, Privatisation agency, Territory Planning and Construction Inspectorate, Land-Use Planning and Law Department. Contrary to the responses presented in Table 1.2.11, this table does not reflect the experience of companies, mostly showing its problematic areas, as spotted by company managers. Noteworthy, all the 12 statistically 'visible' institutions listed in Table 1.2.11 were included in Table 1.2.12. The correlation of responses of both of these tables is rather high (0.95). The mean ratio of the responses about those 12 institutions is  $M=2$  (i.e. the respondents were two times more eager to mention the experience of other businessmen rather than their own). A higher mean ratio is between the responses about the financial police (3.3), customs (2.4), State Quality Inspectorate (2.3) and county courts (2.2).

A presumption could be made that the responses of company managers about the bribery experience of their staff reflect the overall confrontation of the business sector with the trends of bribery practices (obviously, as seen by the Lithuanian business leaders). As a result, the surveys of 2002 and 2004 did not include a question about the experi-

ence of their colleagues businessmen as an overlapping question concerning the experience of company representatives.

The attempt was made to examine the bribery experience of company representatives in the bodies listed in table 1.2.11 by asking them the following additional questions:

- During the last five years, have your company staff had to deal with matters in those bodies or communicated with the staff of those bodies while dealing with their matters?
- When your company staff were dealing with their matters, employees of which institutions demanded or expected a bribe from them?
- Did a bribe help solve the problem which your company had encountered?

Table 1.2.13 includes the summary of the respondents' answers to these questions.

As seen from the data above, in 2002 and 2004 about two thirds of company managers dealt with their matters in the tax inspectorate and Social Insurance Fund Board; about half of the respondents mentioned local authorities and traffic police. Those bodies, except for the Social Insurance Fund, were also most frequently mentioned as those where bribes had been demanded. Another institution of the kind is customs. In 2002, the frequency of bribe demands from company managers in traffic police jumped by 6 percentage points. In the other bodies mentioned, such bribe demanding situations remained principally the same. When talking about the effectiveness of bribes, most often company managers mentioned traffic police.

A comprehensive analysis of the data presented in tables 1.2.11 and 1.2.13 could be made by estimating the so-called bribery indices: demanding ( $I_p$ ), giving ( $I_d$ ), effectiveness ( $I_e$ ) and initiative ( $I_i$ ). The indices are estimated in the same way as in case of measuring the bribery experience of residents.<sup>15</sup> In 2001, no indices were estimated due to the lack of estimates of companies dealing with their matters in the respective institutions. Furthermore, no estimate of indices was made if at least one of their elements failed to meet the statistical error criterion ( $K < 3.1$ ) or if one of the elements had no percentage expression in tables 1.2.11 or 1.2.13.

Final estimates are presented in Table 1.2.14.

<sup>15</sup> See formulas (F1)–(F4).

Table 1.2.13. INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE OF COMPANY STAFF IN 2001–04 (company managers, %)

Year	Dealt with matters			Demanded a bribe			Bribe helped		
	2001*	2002	2004	2001	2002	2004	2001*	2002	2004
Traffic police	-	51.5	47.5	12.3	18.1	19.7	-	20.2	17.3
Customs	-	39.8	34.7	12.5	11.8	14.0	-	11.2	12.3
State Tax Inspectorate (STI)	-	68.0	64.9	10.0	9.3	11.8	-	10.3	9.1
City and district authorities**	-	57.0	48.6	-	10.3	10.5	-	10.3	7.5
Vehicle technical inspection centres**	-	43.0	41.5	-	8.5	8.4	-	10.8	6.7
National hospitals**	-	25.6	15.9	-	6.5	5.7	-	8.5	5.0
Out-patient departments**	-	47.7	37.5	-	4.9	5.7	-	7.9	4.9
Local hospitals**	-	26.2	20.2	-	5.6	5.2	-	7.1	3.8
County and district state food and veterinary services	-	14.2	15.2	2.6	3.7	5.1	-	4.7	4.3
State Labour Inspectorate	-	37.4	42.6	4.1	3.4	6.0	-	4.5	4.3
State Social Insurance Fund Board	-	61.2	66.1	3.7	3.7	5.4	-	4.8	3.7
Fire Prevention and Rescue Services	-	23.2	21.0	5.3	5.7	4.2	-	5.5	3.3
State Non-Food Products Inspectorate	-	14.9	16.4	2.2	2.0	3.1	-	2.9	2.0
Public Health Centre	-	17.1	14.8	3.0	1.9	2.3	-	2.9	1.8
Land and other real estate cadastre and registry companies	-	27.4	21.8	2.4	4.4	4.0	-	5.4	1.7
High educational establishments**	-	17.0	7.9	-	2.4	1.5	-	3.2	1.1
Wards***	-	26.6	-	2.8	2.9	-	-	3.3	-
State Quality Inspectorate***	-	16.8	-	2.7	2.9	-	-	2.9	-
Financial police****	-	-	-	4.1	-	-	-	-	-

\* No estimate of the 2001 survey was made.

\*\* Institutions not included in the 2001 survey.

\*\*\* Institutions not included in the 2004 survey.

\*\*\*\* The institution was subject to reorganisation and hence excluded from the surveys of 2002 and 2004.

Table 1.2.14. BRIBERY INDICES IN 2002 AND 2004 (company managers)

Year	Demanding Index (I <sub>p</sub> )		Giving Index (I <sub>d</sub> )		Efficiency Index (I <sub>e</sub> )		Initiative Index (I <sub>i</sub> )	
	2002	2004	2002	2004	2002	2004	2002	2004
Traffic Police	<b>0.35</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.38</b>	0.87	0.95	0.10	-0.03
Customs	0.30	0.40	0.33	0.37	0.85	<b>0.97</b>	0.03	-0.04
State Tax Inspectorate (STI)	0.14	0.18	0.19	0.16	0.82	0.87	0.05	-0.02
City and district authorities	0.18	0.22	0.22	0.17	0.82	0.93	0.04	-0.05
Vehicle technical inspection centres	0.20	0.20	0.28	0.18	0.90	0.91	0.08	-0.02
National hospitals	0.25	0.36	0.43	0.35	0.77	0.89	<b>0.18</b>	-0.01
Out-patient departments	0.10	0.15	0.22	0.15	0.75	0.88	0.12	0.00
Local hospitals	0.21	0.26	0.34	0.28	0.81	0.68	0.12	0.02
County and district state food and veterinary services	0.26	0.34	0.39	0.34	0.84	0.84	0.13	0.00
State Labour Inspectorate	0.09	0.14	0.16	0.12	0.76	0.88	0.07	-0.03
State Social Insurance Fund Board	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.84	0.95	0.03	-0.02
Fire Prevention and Rescue Services	0.25	0.20	0.27	0.17	0.87	0.92	0.03	-0.03
State Non-Food Products Inspectorate *	-	-	0.21	-	-	-	-	-
Public Health Centre *	-	-	0.22	-	-	-	-	-
Land and other real estate cadastre and registry companies *	0.16	0.18	0.22	-	<b>0.92</b>	-	0.05	-
High educational establishments *	-	-	0.22	-	0.84	-	-	-
Wards*	-	-	0.14	-	0.87	-	-	-
State quality inspectorate *	-	-	0.20	-	-	-	-	-

\* The index was not estimated if one of its elements did not meet the statistical error criterion or one of its elements was not included into estimation.



Judging from the comparison of two years experience, it is difficult to identify substantial quantitative patterns. Yet both in 2002 and 2004, the biggest index of bribe-demanding (as well as bribe-giving) was in traffic police. The former (bribe-demanding) is seen to grow, whereas the latter (bribe-giving) was reducing. Accordingly, the initiative indices changed from positive in 2002 to negative in 2004. The highest index of effectiveness in 2002 was in the land and other real estate cadastre and registry companies and in 2004, in customs (0.97).

Noteworthy, all the initiative indices were positive in 2002 (the highest was in national hospitals), whereas in 2004, they were mostly negative and rather low.

Company managers were asked (as an open question) to estimate the share of bribery in their company's annual turnover. Unfortunately, the percentage of those who gave no response was rather high and uneven: from 30 to 70 per cent. Therefore, the results summarised in Table 1.2.15 represent only a small part of the respondents' estimates.

*Table 1.2.15. WHAT IS THE APPROXIMATE SHARE (%) OF YOUR COMPANY'S ANNUAL TURNOVER PAID AS BRIBES? (company managers)*

Year		2001	2002	2004
In the business sector	Number of those who responded	386	289	571
	Share of turnover	4.2	4.1	4.7
In the company	Number of those who responded	445	321	702
	Share of turnover	2.1	2.0	1.3

On the basis of those findings one could presume that bribery funds may account to 1-2 per cent of the annual turnover of the company. The fact that bribery in the business sector is considered two times bigger should not come as a surprise, bearing in mind that such an assessment is made on the basis of the experience of colleagues. Yet this was the ratio that the 2001 survey established between personal experience of institutional bribery and that of colleagues.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, the previously mentioned 1-2 per cent of the annual turnover spent on bribery may be considered a certain indicator of the cost of bribery in Lithuania.

<sup>16</sup> See commentary to tables 2.2.11 and 2.2.12.

Table 1.2.16. MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM MEANS OF BRIBE PAYMENT IN RECENT FIVE YEARS (LTL)

Year	2001			2002			2004		
	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimums payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )
Traffic police	331	55	<b>193</b>	273	63	<b>168</b>	708	64	<b>386</b>
Customs	3061	563	<b>1812</b>	1043	257	<b>650</b>	1006	199	<b>603</b>
State Tax Inspectorate (STI)	1680	332	<b>1006</b>	895	303	<b>599</b>	978	160	<b>569</b>
City and district authorities*	–	–	–	1323	230	<b>777</b>	1361	339	<b>850</b>
Vehicle technical inspection centres *	–	–	–	161	93	<b>127</b>	203	78	<b>141</b>
National hospitals*	–	–	–	1021	128	<b>575</b>	596	98	<b>347</b>
Out-patient departments*	–	–	–	129	29	<b>79</b>	100	40	<b>70</b>
Local hospitals*	–	–	–	342	79	<b>211</b>	223	55	<b>139</b>

Table 1.2.16 continued

Year	2001			2002			2004		
	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimums payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )
County and district state food and veterinary services**	–	–	–	295	83	<b>189</b>	419	124	<b>272</b>
State Labour Inspectorate	494	101	<b>298</b>	372	173	<b>273</b>	807	256	<b>532</b>
State Social Insurance Fund Board	279	79	<b>179</b>	511	169	<b>340</b>	879	56	<b>468</b>
Fire Prevention and Rescue Services	404	110	<b>257</b>	506	152	<b>329</b>	319	112	<b>216</b>
State Non-Food Products Inspectorate**	–	–	–	1154	84	<b>619</b>	–	–	–
Public Health Centre**	996	129	<b>563</b>	346	191	<b>269</b>	–	–	–

Table 1.2.16 continued

Year	2001			2002			2004		
	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimum payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )	Maximum payment mean (M <sub>d</sub> )	Minimums payment mean (M <sub>m</sub> )	Absolute payment mean (M <sub>a</sub> )
Land and other real estate cadastre and registry companies**	–	–	–	472	172	<b>322</b>	–	–	–
High educational establishments*	–	–	–	1112	241	<b>677</b>	–	–	–
Wards***	–	–	–	227	94	<b>161</b>	–	–	–
State Quality Inspectorate****	414	203	<b>309</b>	262	70	<b>166</b>	–	–	–
Financial Police****	655	164	<b>410</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–

\* Institutions not included in the 2001 survey.

\*\* Means have not been estimated as their constituent elements were non-compliant with statistical requirements.

\*\*\* Institutions not included in the 2004 survey (The 2001 means of wards were non-compliant with statistical requirements).

\*\*\*\* The institution was subject to reorganisation and therefore not included in the 2002 and 2004 surveys

The survey conducted allows assessment of micro- as well as macro-economic aspects of bribery. Furthermore, those aspects could be characterised by the amount of bribes offered to various institutions. Similarly to residents, company managers were asked to specify the biggest and the smallest amount of the bribe they had paid. Table 1.2.16 shows the mean of maximum and minimum amounts of bribes ( $M_d$  ir  $M_m$ ) given in the statistically 'visible' institutions as well as the absolute payment mean ( $M_a$ ) estimated on their basis.<sup>17</sup>

Table 1.2.16 above shows that during the period surveyed company representatives paid the biggest amounts in customs and local authorities. In 2001, particularly large sums, judging from the responses given by company managers, were paid in customs: the maximum payment mean was LTL 3061. In 2002 and 2004, the 'leader' of unofficial payments was the local authorities with the highest maximum payment means. The 2002 survey shows a high maximum payment mean in national hospitals and State Non-Food Products Inspectorate.

Analysis of the dynamics of absolute payment mean discloses that it was steadily decreasing in two bodies only: customs and the tax inspectorate. Curiously enough, the absolute payment mean in those bodies went radically down in 2002: almost three times in customs and more than one and a half times in the tax inspectorate. The 2004 decline is not as significant. Certain similarities could be observed in the fluctuation of the absolute mean index in traffic police and labour inspectorate: a minor reduction in 2002 and the double growth in 2004. The situation in the Fire Prevention and Rescue Service is quite the opposite: showing an increase of the absolute payment mean in 2002 to drop by 1.5 times in 2004.

In 2002, as compared to 2001, *absolute* payment indices fell almost two times in public health centres and quality inspectorates. In 2004, in comparison to 2002, the absolute mean was falling substantially in national and local hospitals; a drop in out-patient departments was not as significant. However, in 2004, the growth of the absolute payment mean was rather big in the Social Insurance Fund Board, local authorities and slightly smaller in vehicle technical inspection centres as well as food and veterinary services.

As seen from the survey findings of residents and company managers, bribery in society and its one specific sector, business, is considered an aching and significant problem.

<sup>17</sup> All the indices mentioned above are estimated following formulas (F5) – (F7).

An assessment of bribe demands over the period of last five years shows that residents face the problem less frequently than business representatives. Besides that, the bribery situation in the business sector stayed almost the same during the period surveyed, yet the 2004 survey of residents witnessed a small improvement. Admittedly, the survey of the bribery experience by company managers in the last 12 months shows that the situation got better in 2004.

In recent five years, residents and company managers also had different bribe-giving experience. The experience of residents over the period surveyed was more or less stable, whereas that of company managers was getting worse. In 2001, the percentage of residents and company managers who gave a bribe was almost the same (36–37) and in 2004, the number of the bribe-giving company managers was 10 percentage points higher than that of residents. However, while measuring the experience of company managers in the last 12 months, the worsening of the situation is not as radical as in the last five years without practically exceeding the statistical error.

Analysis of bribe-giving motives (this question was put to the residents only) showed that the main reason for bribery is the unwillingness to 'be on a waiting list' and the willingness to secure 'quality' of services. In other words, these are the problems related to public administration. Thus in order to curb or reduce bribery, one should primarily think about how to optimise the market of public services, meet the demands of residents communicating with public officials more effectively to prevent both parties from entering into conspiracies or looking for compromises beyond law.

Comparison of the bribe-giving 'technique' used by residents and company managers (the latter were given the question in the 2004 survey only) suggests that residents, more than company managers, take a risk and more frequently pay bribes before the service is rendered. The 2004 survey showed the difference of 10 per cent between those two groups. Yet both residents and company managers prefer such a form of settlement to the payment during the service or after it is performed.

In recent years, cash was a predominant form of unofficial payment for services both among residents and company managers: it was mentioned by about three fourths of the respondents. However, company managers, in contrast to residents, were more in favour of other forms, such as 'gifts' or services. The most popular gifts both among businessmen and residents were alcoholic beverages and sweets.

Both businessmen and residents showed similar preferences, in terms of bribe-giving, to administrative entities: most frequently bribes were given in local authorities, less often in counties and the rarest cases were in national bodies. However, businessmen, as compared to residents, gave more bribes to the county level public officials.

Similarities are also seen in the bribe-giving geography. The lion's share of residents and company managers said they gave bribes in Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda. In 2004, those towns and their counties were mentioned by 65 per cent of all residents and 80 per cent of company managers. The latter gave more bribes in Vilnius, and the difference of bribe-giving by those two groups in Kaunas and Klaipėda is not as significant.

The institutional bribe-giving 'geography' of residents and company managers is also different. All the seven statistically 'distinct' bodies at which the residents admitted having given bribes over the period surveyed are among nineteen bodies mentioned by company managers. Yet the top five includes only two bodies mentioned by both of these groups: traffic police and vehicle technical inspection centres. Residents tend to give bribes more often in medical establishments: out-patient departments, local and national hospitals. Contrary to that, company managers bribe institutions that are more related to the business sector, including customs, tax police and local authorities.

There is a gap of difference between the internal institutional bribery experience by residents and company representatives. In 2002 and 2004, residents experienced a bigger risk of bribe demanding and bribe-giving in national hospitals, whereas company representatives felt it while dealing with traffic police. During the same period, bribes mostly helped residents in vehicle technical inspection centres and company managers in land and other real estate cadastre and registry company (2002) as well as customs (2004). Both residents and businessmen showed bigger initiative in offering bribes in hospitals.

Analysis of the amounts of bribes offered suggests that the bribery 'market' of residents is more stable and predictable than that of company representatives. Obviously, company representatives pay bigger amounts than residents. Yet here some qualitative similarities can be spotted: both residents and company representatives paid the biggest amounts in the local authorities. The other two 'most expensive' bodies were customs and tax inspectorate for company representatives and national as well as local hospitals for residents.

Consequently, the *business* of corruption has its own logic, motivation, structure and even payment rates. What is the price of bribery paid by Lithuanian society? Without going too much into moralisation, we will make one simple assessment. If, judging from what has been assessed, Lithuanian companies spend 1.3% of the annual turnover funds on bribery and Lithuania's gross value added (excluding banks and other financial companies) in 2004 amounted to LTL 100 billion, the percentage mentioned above totals LTL 1.3 billion. This could be an estimate of the price of bribery in Lithuania.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Information about the Lithuanian gross value added the authors were kindly given by famous Lithuanian financial expert dr. Gitanas Nausėda. Noteworthy is his comment about the price of bribery: "Admittedly, the total price of bribery in 2004 exceeded the amount of profit tax collected in the national budget, LTL 1.17 billion."



## II. ATTITUDE TOWARDS CORRUPTION

The first regular representational public opinion surveys were conducted in 1910-20s examining residents' attitude towards various important public issues. In the beginning they became widely used in the USA, later spread to other Western democracies. Lithuania started conducting consistent representational public opinion surveys immediately after the restoration of its independence. The recent fifteen years saw a huge number of public surveys conducted in Lithuania, including general public opinion surveys and various focus groups (businessmen, young people, politicians, etc.), examining their attitude towards a variety of issues.

The aim of most of these surveys is to find out the respondents' attitude towards different issues. Attitudes are important phenomena of a person's consciousness. These are more or less permanent individual judgements guiding the person in the social environment and allowing him or her to react in different situations, to various phenomena or objects in a faster and more effective way. Theorists have been long analysing the link between attitudes and behaviour. It is stated to be mutual: in usual situations a person tends to behave according to his attitudes (positive or negative, determining different actions). On the other hand, there are certain life situations in which an individual, due to some reasons, acts contrary to his or her attitudes. In that case, he or she gets into the so-called cognitive dissonance situation, which usually results in the change of attitudes (i. e. behaviour determines attitudes).

Attitudes are formed and change throughout the entire life of a human being. Their formation is based on a number of factors. One of the key factors is personal experience, opinion and experience of other people whom he or she considers important, and the growing importance of the mass media. The latter informs the person about such events and phenomena with which he or she has no direct contact. To have this information influence the person's attitudes, the degree of trust in the source of information has to play an important role. Lithuanian public

opinion surveys of the last fifteen years show that residents tend to trust the Lithuanian mass media as a public institution (during the entire period of the recent fifteen years, 60-70 per cent of the Lithuanian population have shown their trust in the mass media; this institution retained its position among the three most trusted institutions by the Lithuanian population).<sup>19</sup>

Social surveys of *Lithuanian Map of Corruption* analysed in this book are different from usual public surveys as they are probably the first ones to attempt examine not just the residents' attitude towards corruption as a social phenomenon but also to find out the peculiarities of residents' behaviour and their experience of communication with various institutions. Certainly, every survey is based on the information provided by the respondents. Therefore, analysis of residents' behaviour and experience is based on their responses to the questionnaire presented, rather than observation or registration of real life behavioural patterns. The quality of the information collected depends on the openness and sincerity of the respondents answering the questions. The fifteen year experience of conducting surveys in Lithuania shows that those who agree to take part in them usually answer the questions honestly, particularly being aware of confidentiality and anonymity of the surveys, i.e. knowing that the answers are never associated with a concrete person. The fact that the information provided by the respondents could be trusted is verified by the analysis of other surveys whose results can be compared with the information received from other sources (various product purchasing surveys, pre- and post-election surveys, household surveys, etc.).

Chapter II of this book analyses the dynamics of public attitude towards corruption, i.e. assessment of corruption as a phenomenon, intentions to behave in one or another way in various situations and sources of information about corruption. Similarly to Chapter I, the attitudes of the Lithuanian residents will be compared with the attitude of businessmen. It will also analyse the link between the respondents' attitudes and bribery. Such analysis is important because, as we mentioned before, attitudes and behaviour (experience) are interrelated and interact with each other. Bribery is one form of corruption, yet it is the easiest to comprehend for the majority of the population. Besides that, social sur-

<sup>19</sup> *Baltijos tyrimai*, 1992–2005. Project *Lithuanian Barometer*. Information is periodically publicised at [www.eurovalstybe.lt](http://www.eurovalstybe.lt).

veys are the simplest way in which they can answer questions about it. A more comprehensive description of the concepts of corruption and bribery is provided in the Introduction and Chapter I. With regard to attitudes, the experience of bribery will be considered as one of the factors helping to realise the difference between various attitudes towards corruption held by various population groups.

### 2.1. LITHUANIAN RESIDENTS' OPINION ABOUT CORRUPTION

Most frequently residents receive information about corruption from television, national press, their own experience and the experience of their acquaintances. In recent three years, the role of television, friends and relatives has grown. Thus the key sources of information about corruption are national media and closest friends. The experience of friends and acquaintances is equally important to all the population groups. Personal experience was mostly mentioned by the most active population groups: middle-aged people with higher income. Television is the most important source of information for young people.

*Table 2.1.1. WHICH SOURCE OF INFORMATION ALLOWS YOU TO FORM THE MOST RELIABLE OPINION ABOUT THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%)*<sup>20</sup>

Year	2001	2002	2004
Television	27	33	42
Personal experience	23	16	18
National press	22	16	18
Friends, acquaintances	18	24	32
Radio	3	3	8
Local press	2	3	5
Special publications, reports	2	1	1
Seminars, conferences, special events	1	0	0
Internet	1	1	2
Has no opinion	7	5	0

<sup>20</sup> Data about the respondents' attitude shown in part 1 and 2 have been traditionally rounded to the nearest whole number.

Obviously, personal experience is the main source of information about corruption to those who had given a bribe themselves. Whereas the experience of friends and acquaintances as well as the national press are equally important sources of information both for those who have and those who have not given a bribe. Television is a more important source of information for those who have no bribe-giving experience.

*Table 2.1.2. WHICH SOURCE OF INFORMATION ALLOWS YOU TO FORM THE MOST RELIABLE OPINION ABOUT THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Television	29	24	39	24	50	31
Personal experience	14	35	8	28	5	38
National press	25	20	16	17	19	16
Friends, acquaintances	18	20	23	25	33	31
Radio	4	1	3	3	9	5
Local press	2	2	4	2	6	4
Special publications, reports	2	2	1	1	1	1
Seminars, conferences, special events	1	1	0	0	0	0
Internet	1	1	2	1	2	2
Has no opinion	8	2	7	3	0	0

We will begin analysing residents' attitudes towards corruption by primarily looking at the general level, i.e. by measuring the overall public attitude towards the impact of corruption (positive or negative) to public life.

Findings of three surveys show that Lithuanian residents have a firm and constant opinion concerning the issue and it does not depend on the difference of their life styles (determined by such social demographic features like the gender, age, type of residential area, income, etc.).

The absolute majority of Lithuanian residents think that corruption is an obstacle in public life. More than half of the respondents consider

corruption a major obstacle. Comparison of survey findings of three years shows that public opinion about the issue remained the same: in 2001-04, eight people out of ten in Lithuania thought that corruption is an obstacle to public life (see Table 1.2.3).

*Table 2.1.3. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DOES MOSTLY CORRESPOND TO YOUR OPINION? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Corruption is a major obstacle in public life	56	61	59
Corruption is more of an obstacle in public life	21	19	20
Corruption is neither an obstacle to nor a facilitator of public life	6	6	6
Corruption is more of a facilitator of solving public problems	1	4	5
Corruption facilitates solution of public problems	1	2	2
Has no opinion	15	9	9

All the three surveys showed that male and female assessments are the same. Middle-aged people (30–49 years old) hold the most negative opinion about corruption out of all the age groups (61 per cent in 2001, 69 per cent in 2002 and 63 per cent in 2004 thought that corruption is a major obstacle in public life). Young people (up to 30 years old) were the rarest age group to agree with this statement (45 per cent in 2001, 47 per cent in 2002 and 49 per cent in 2004). Furthermore, the surveys show that the level of income has little impact upon the residents' assessment, yet residents with smaller income could not state their opinion concerning the matter more often than those who are better-off.

The attitude of town-dwellers towards corruption is far stricter than that of rural residents. Asked whether corruption is a major obstacle in public life, a positive answer was given by the majority of city-dwellers, including 59 per cent in 2001, 64 per cent in 2002 and 61 per cent in 2004. Residents of small towns who held the same opinion accounted for 58 per cent in 2001, 64 per cent in 2002 and 62 per cent in 2004. However, the percentage of positive answers among rural population is

lower, making up 48 per cent in 2001, 56 per cent in 2002 and 56 per cent in 2004 of all the respondents.

Noteworthy, those who had no opinion concerning the matter in 2001 represented 15 per cent of all the respondents (24 per cent in rural areas), whereas in 2002 and 2004, the number of such people decreased to 9 per cent (showing major change in villages and small towns). One could presume that processes which were taking place in Lithuanian society over the period of last three years (since 2001) unveiling public corruption and political scandals (President's impeachment, bribery allegations against members of the Seimas) did not change residents' attitude towards corruption's impact to society (this attitude had been already negative), yet they drew the attention of some of them to this phenomenon.

How important in forming the residents' attitude towards corruption is the source of information about the phenomenon? We compared the answers of those who said that the most reliable source of information for them is their personal experience and the experience shared by their friends and acquaintances with the answers of those who pointed at the mass media. Both of these groups think that corruption is a major obstacle in public life. In 2001, 50 per cent of those who base their opinion on their own experience and 63 per cent of those who rely on the mass media said that corruption is a major obstacle; 23 and 19 per cent accordingly said it is an obstacle. In 2002, the first group of the respondents gave the following answers: corruption was considered a major obstacle by 63 per cent and an obstacle by 18 per cent. During the same year, the second group saw corruption as a major obstacle (61 per cent) and an obstacle (20 per cent). In 2004, the following responses were given: those for whom experience is important stated that corruption is major obstacle (60 per cent) and an obstacle (19 per cent) and those who rely on the mass media gave the same answers representing 59 and 20 per cent accordingly. Consequently, for those two groups of the respondents the key source of information has no impact upon their opinion.

Does personal experience play a role in forming the opinion about corruption's impact upon society? We have compared the answers of those residents who said they had given a bribe in the last five years with those who said that they had not (see Table 2.1.4).

*Table 2.1.4. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DOES MOSTLY CORRESPOND TO YOUR OPINION? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Corruption is a major obstacle in public life	56	58	60	64	62	57
Corruption is more of a obstacle in public life	19	23	18	19	19	21
Corruption is neither a obstacle nor a facilitator of public life	7	6	6	7	5	7
Corruption is more of a facilitator of solving public problems	1	3	4	3	3	7
Corruption facilitates solution of public problems	1	2	1	3	2	3
Has no opinion	16	9	11	5	9	6

The findings of Table 2.1.4. show that those who have the experience of bribery (have given a bribe) and those who lack it have similar opinion about the role of corruption in society: both of the groups consider it harmful. Those who have given bribes are more willing to respond the question than those who have not. Six respondents out of ten in the group of bribe-givers and those who have no such experience consider corruption a major obstacle in public life and two more out of ten think of it as an obstacle. Consequently, in those cases attitude towards corruption (as well as bribery, which is one form of it) has no major impact upon the actual behaviour of residents: the majority of bribe-givers (eight out of ten) disapprove of such public behaviour. Therefore, it is important to find out how this group of the respondents justifies its actions to itself when trapped in the situation of cognitive dissonance, i.e. when it behaves contrary to its attitudes.

Surveys have shown that respondents tend to justify bribery thinking that it is an effective way of solving the problems they face. This highlights a dual attitude towards corruption: on the general, public, level, corruption is assessed in a negative way, whereas on individual level, they

separate themselves from corruption as a social phenomenon and look at it from the point of view of its effectiveness. In other words, attitudes towards corruption gain two new characteristics: one is terminal (as an end-state, following the Rokeach value system), another is instrumental (as a means of achieving the end-state).

The absolute majority of the respondents think that bribes help solve the problems they face. During the period of three years, the residents' opinion stayed unchanged concerning the issue (the question was put forward to both residents and company managers in 2002 and 2004) (Table 2.1.5).

*Table 2.1.5. DOES BRIBE-GIVING HELP SOLVE PROBLEMS YOU FACE? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Yes	72	76	73
No	16	11	14
Has no opinion	12	13	13

The table above shows that seven respondents out of ten claim that bribes is an effective way of solving problems. The same opinion is held by various social groups. However, personal experience has a major impact upon the assessment of bribery effectiveness: during all the three surveys almost all the respondents who had given a bribe in past five years said that bribe-giving helps solve problems. Although those who had not given a bribe said that bribery is an effective problem-solving tool less often than bribe-givers yet more than half of them admitted this to be true (Table 2.1.6).

*Table 2.1.6. DOES BRIBE-GIVING HELP SOLVE PROBLEMS YOU FACE? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Yes	60	90	65	92	65	89
No	24	7	14	7	18	7
Has no opinion	16	3	20	1	17	4



Those who rely more on their own experience and the experience of their friends and acquaintances tend to think more often that the others that bribes help solve problems (in 2002, they accounted for 81 per cent and in 2004, they represented 78 per cent of all the respondents of this group).

The majority of residents think that corruption does harm to public life, yet they consider bribes an effective problem-solving tool and hence would give a bribe to fix their important problem. This attitude over three years was not subject to change: six respondents out of ten are disposed to give a bribe and only every fifth resident is against such action.

*Table 2.1.7. WOULD YOU GIVE A BRIBE IF YOU HAD TO SOLVE A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM AND A BRIBE WERE EXPECTED FOR THAT? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Yes	61	60	59
No	22	21	22
Has no opinion	16	19	19

Those who gave a bribe over the past five years said they would give it again to solve an important problem. Their opinion did not change in three years. One third of the non-givers said they would not give a bribe to solve a problem and four respondents out of ten admitted they would (see Table 2.1.8 below).

*Table 2.1.8. WOULD YOU GIVE A BRIBE IF YOU HAD TO SOLVE A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM AND A BRIBE WERE EXPECTED FOR THAT? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Yes	43	90	44	86	46	81
No	37	4	29	7	31	9
Has no opinion	20	6	27	7	24	10

Admittedly, those who have bribery experience are firmly determined about their intentions: they include a very small percentage of those who have no opinion concerning the matter. On the other hand, one fifth

respondent out of those who have no experience of the kind could not say how they would behave in such a situation. Bearing in mind the overall negative attitude towards corruption and a strong instrumental characteristic of the attitude towards it, one could presume that quite a few of those who gave no response would be inclined to give a bribe; they refuse to respond due to normative reasons (trying to avoid a conflict between their attitude and anticipated behaviour).

Although the legislation provides for the liability of both the bribe-giver and the taker, a 'justifying' attitude is predominant among the residents. They tend to see a bribe-giver as a victim who is forced by circumstances or a public official to give a bribe and hence he or she is less of a criminal than the bribe-taker.

The 2004 survey asked the residents about who should bear bigger bribery liability: a giver or a taker. Half of the residents think it is the bribe-taker and every fourth respondent ascribed it to both parties equally. Bigger liability for the bribe-giver was stated by as little as 6 per cent of the respondents.

Those who have bribe-giving experience exhibit a bigger tendency to associate bribery liability with the taker and those who have not given bribes more often than bribe-givers ascribe liability to both parties equally.

*Table 2.1.9. WHO DO YOU THINK BEARS BIGGER LIABILITY IN CASE OF BRIBE-GIVING? (2004, %)*

	All residents	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
A bribe-giver	6	8	5
A bribe-taker	51	48	56
Both equally	25	27	22
Depends on circumstances	11	10	14
Has no opinion	7	8	4

Those who rely on experience tend to link liability with the bribe-taker.

Another comparison, of the situation in Lithuania and other countries, discloses the influence of the mass media and other opinion-forming sources (acquaintances, persons of authority, etc.) that help mould attitudes. Admittedly, people asked about the level of corruption in Lithuania and abroad also show their overall attitude towards the stan-

dard of living, democratic traditions, etc. in their own and other countries, because the majority of the respondents have no direct experience of corruption in foreign countries (except for the CIS which they associate with the former USSR).

In three years Lithuanian population did not change its opinion about the level of corruption in their country as compared to its neighbours. They predominantly think, representing 40 per cent of the respondents, that the level of corruption in Western countries is lower than in Lithuania. Less than one tenth of the respondents consider the situation worse in Western countries than in Lithuania and every fifth respondent said that the situation is similar. Unfortunately, every fourth respondent could not state his or her opinion when asked the question.

Comparing the situation in Lithuania and Central and Eastern countries, Lithuanian residents tend to think that the level of corruption is similar. In this case again, every tenth respondent thinks that there is less corruption in Lithuania and every fourth-fifth said it is bigger in this country.

Lithuania's position corruption-wise is regarded better as compared with the CIS countries. Yet these assessments in three years became worse. In 2001, 27 per cent of the respondents thought that corruption is bigger in the CIS than in Lithuania and 25 per cent said it is similar. Whereas in 2004, 28 per cent of the respondents said the situation is similar in those countries and 20 per cent regarded Lithuania as less corrupt. As a matter of fact, the number of those who saw Lithuania with bigger corruption did not increase. Noteworthy, Lithuanian residents have no opinion about the situation in the CIS more often than talking about Western countries and Central and Eastern European states.

The situation in Lithuania is worst regarded by middle-aged people (30–49 years old), and people younger than 30 and older than 50 more often than others have no opinion concerning the matter. Rural residents find it more difficult to respond to the question than city-dwellers.

Those who mostly receive information about corruption from their personal experience and the experience of their friends and acquaintances have similar judgement concerning the issue like those who rely on information provided by the mass media. Both of those groups think that corruption in Lithuania is bigger than in Western states (in 2001, such opinion was expressed by 49 per cent of the group which indicated experience as the main source of information, 42 per cent of the group

which referred to the mass media; in 2002, they represented 52 and 47 per cent accordingly and in 2004, they accounted for 45 and 41 per cent respectively).

*Table 2.1.10. DO YOU THINK CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA, AS COMPARED TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES, IS SMALLER, BIGGER OR THE SAME? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
<i>As compared with Western countries:</i>			
Smaller in Lithuania	10	8	7
The same	20	19	24
Bigger in Lithuania	43	48	43
Has no opinion	27	25	27
<i>As compared with Central and Eastern European states:</i>			
Smaller in Lithuania	9	10	8
The same	38	34	37
Bigger in Lithuania	20	27	24
Has no opinion	33	29	31
<i>As compared with the CIS countries:</i>			
Smaller in Lithuania	27	23	20
The same	25	28	28
Bigger in Lithuania	13	19	16
Has no opinion	35	30	36

While comparing the situation in Lithuania and Central and Eastern European states those groups also expressed similar opinion. In 2001, those who said that experience was the main source of their information thought that the level of corruption in Lithuania was the same as in Central and Eastern Europe (42 per cent) or bigger (23 per cent) and those who relied on the mass media as the main source of information were of the same opinion representing 38 and 20 per cent accordingly. In 2002, 34 per cent of the experience group (35 per cent of the media group) saw the situation the same in Lithuania and Central and Eastern European countries and 30 per cent (26 per cent of the media group accordingly), thought of Lithuania as more corrupt. In 2004, the two groups held similar opinions: 36 per cent of the first group and 37 per cent of the second group saw the Lithuanian situation the same as in other Central and Eastern European countries and 25 per cent of the first group and 22 per cent of the second group considered it worse in Lithuania.

While comparing the Lithuanian situation to that of the CIS, the first group which relied on their own experience and that of their friends and acquaintances had the same views like those who trusted the mass media most: the opinions in both of the groups split into three almost equal parts.

The opinion of bribe-givers and non-givers over the last five years about the level of corruption in Lithuania as compared to Central and Eastern European countries and the CIS is the same. However, those who have not given a bribe more often than bribe-givers could not state their opinion concerning the issue. Comparison of the situation in Lithuania and other Western states shows that those who have personal bribe-giving experience are more categorical about the issue: they tend to think more often than those who have not given a bribe that corruption is more widespread in Lithuania than in other Western countries.

*Table 2.1.11. DO YOU THINK CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA, AS COMPARED TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES, IS SMALLER, BIGGER OR THE SAME? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
<i>As compared with Western countries:</i>						
Smaller in Lithuania	12	8	9	8	6	7
The same	21	21	18	20	25	24
Bigger in Lithuania	37	52	42	58	40	48
Has no opinion	30	19	31	14	29	21
<i>As compared with Central and Eastern European states:</i>						
Smaller in Lithuania	9	9	10	10	9	7
The same	38	43	32	37	34	43
Bigger in Lithuania	18	22	23	34	25	24
Has no opinion	36	26	35	19	32	26
<i>As compared with the CIS countries:</i>						
Smaller in Lithuania	28	29	23	22	19	24
The same	24	27	25	32	28	31
Bigger in Lithuania	11	15	16	25	16	17
Has no opinion	37	29	36	21	38	28

The assessment of any processes taking place in the country hugely depends on the concrete situation during which the assessment is made. Admittedly, with the improvement of the economic situation, Lithuanian

residents tend to evaluate the work of public institutions and processes in general (the chosen direction of development, democratisation, etc) in a more positive way.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, analysis of the change of corruption scale should bear in mind that the 2004 survey was conducted during the political crisis in the country when the respondents regarded the majority of political and social processes negatively (in that case, the attitude was formed both by the situation and bigger media attention on the corruption related issues).

While making an assessment of the change in the level of corruption, Lithuanian residents give pessimistic answers: all the three surveys showed that every third-fourth respondent saw corruption increasing significantly over the last five years and another 25 per cent of the respondents thought that corruption was also growing, though not galloping. Every fourth-fifth respondent said that the level of corruption was the same and as little as 6-7 per cent saw it decreasing.

Males and females held similar opinion concerning the issue.

People younger than 30 saw the situation slightly better than people aged 30-49 and the most senior respondents (aged more than 50). The scale of corruption increasing in the last five years was observed by 44 per cent of young people in 2001, 46 per cent in 2002 and 47 per cent in 2004. Middle-aged respondents who thought this way accounted for 59 per cent in 2001 and 2002 and 55 per cent in 2004 and senior people represented 55 per cent in 2001, 58 per cent in 2002 and 56 per cent in 2004.

*Table 2.1.12. IN RECENT FIVE YEARS, DO YOU THINK THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION HAS INCREASED OR DECREASED IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

	2001	2002	2004
Increased significantly	26	30	26
Slightly increased	27	24	28
Stayed the same	20	24	21
Slightly decreased	5	6	7
Decreased tremendously	1	0	0
Has no opinion	22	15	19

In three years assessments of residents who rely on different sources were subject to little change. In 2001, those who mostly rely on the mass media were more sceptical than those who trust only their own experi-

<sup>21</sup> *Baltijos tyrimai* information.

ence and the experience of their friends and acquaintances. In 2001, 51 per cent of those who rely on experience and 58 per cent of those who trust media saw corruption growing in the country. In 2002, the proportion of sceptical responses changed, representing 67 per cent of those who rely on experience and 56 per cent of those who rely on the mass media. In 2004, the number of the two groups thinking similarly accounted for the same 52 per cent.

Views about the change of corruption scale depend on the personal experience of the respondents: bribe-givers have a firmer opinion concerning the issue than the respondents who have not given bribes (the latter group constitutes a higher percentage of people who did not respond to the question).

The residents who gave a bribe in the last five years think more frequently than those who did not that the scale of corruption is growing. In 2001, the increase of corruption was noted by 49 per cent of those who did not give a bribe and 59 per cent of bribe-givers, in 2002 they accounted for 49 and 64 per cent respectively and in 2004 they represented 51 and 60 per cent accordingly. The presumption is that real life experience (bribe-giving) helps form a negative attitude towards the overall scale of corruption in Lithuania.

*Table 2.1.13. IN RECENT FIVE YEARS, DO YOU THINK THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION HAS INCREASED OR DECREASED IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Increased significantly	23	30	27	37	24	30
Slightly increased	26	29	22	27	27	30
Stayed the same	22	20	24	23	20	22
Slightly decreased	4	6	6	6	7	8
Decreased tremendously	1	1	0	0	0	0
Has no opinion	24	15	20	7	22	11

Talking about the operation of various institutions the respondents rely on their own experience, on the experience of their friends and acquaintances as well as the information presented by the mass media. The latter is the main source for those people who have no direct contact with the institution concerned. The mass media usually provides

negative information by unveiling scandals of corruption rather than drawing attention to its incorruptibility. When people have direct contact with institutions, they first of all rely on their own negative experience. For example, if a person had to give a bribe to at least one public official of that body, that person would probably tend to think of all the body being corrupt irrespective of whether further contacts with its staff corroborates or not his or her presumptions. However, if the person dealing with his or her matters did not face corruption, this does not necessarily mean that he or she will have a positive opinion about the body because he or she may rely on the indirect information (provided by other people or the mass media).

The surveys asked the residents to list the institutions which they consider the most corrupt.

The findings show (see Table 2.1.14) that the institutions and areas mentioned most frequently were changing their positions. The Government was mentioned less frequently in 2002 and 2004 than in 2001, whereas the situation in the police is regarded contrary to that. The biggest change in terms of perceived corruption is observed among medical institutions: in 2001 and 2002, every tenth respondent saw them as the most corrupt and in 2004, every third respondent thought of them this way. In 2004, more often than before the local authorities were mentioned in the list of the most corrupt institutions in the country.

People younger than 30 more often than more senior respondents consider the police as the most corrupt (in 2004, they mentioned the police as a corrupt body more often than medical institutions).

*Table 2.1.14. WHICH INSTITUTIONS ARE THE MOST CORRUPT? (10 INSTITUTIONS MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED BY THE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES) (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Medical institutions	12	11	31
Customs	18	22	22
Police	13	20	22
Courts	20	21	21
Seimas	12	13	12
Local authorities	3	5	8
Law enforcement and law & order in general	4	9	7
Traffic police	3	2	5
Government	13	6	3
Tax inspectorate	3	4	2



People with bribery experience (i.e. those who had given a bribe in the last five years) are of worse opinion about medical institutions (particularly in 2004), courts and police (2002 and 2004), local authorities (2004) than those who had not given a bribe (see Table 2.1.15).

*Table 2.1.15. WHICH INSTITUTIONS ARE THE MOST CORRUPT? (10 INSTITUTIONS MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED BY THE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES) (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Medical institutions	10	17	17	27	24	45
Customs	19	16	21	23	21	24
Police	10	20	18	24	22	23
Courts	19	22	18	28	20	23
Seimas	11	16	12	13	12	11
Local authorities	4	3	5	5	6	11
Law enforcement and law & order in general	4	5	8	9	5	10
Traffic police	3	4	2	2	5	6
Government	11	16	6	6	4	2
Tax inspectorate	3	4	5	4	2	2

Does the source of information play a role in forming the opinion? In 2001, those who relied on the mass media more than the experience of their friends, acquaintances and their own saw biggest corruption in the customs, local authorities, tax inspectorate, privatisation services, and the law enforcement. Whereas those who mostly relied on experience indicated the police, government, medical institutions and traffic police.

In 2002, the media group, more often than the experience group, mentioned Seimas, government, privatisation service, prisons, private companies, and the President's office, whereas the experience group referred to the courts, police, medical institutions, educational establishments and land-use planning bodies.

In 2004, due to the change of the political situation, those who rely on the mass media more than experience mentioned the police, Seimas, President's office, law & order and prosecution offices. Those who place more trust in experience saw more corruption in medical institutions, law enforcement bodies in general and the traffic police in particular.

This comparison shows that information presented by the mass media has a bigger impact upon the assessment of such institutions like the Seimas, Government, President's office and law enforcement (with which people have fewer direct contacts), whereas the experience gained by themselves or their closest circle influences the opinion about the police (particularly traffic police) and medical institutions, with which they interact more frequently.

The survey asked the respondents to state their opinion about the level of corruption in the institutions listed. We will present the assessment of those institutions with which residents came into contact more frequently (i.e. at least 10 per cent of the respondents had dealt with them). We will compare the opinion of those who dealt with their matters in each of the institutions (including those who had no opinion) and make an assessment of the impact of personal experience upon the respondents' judgement.

*Table 2.1.16. TO YOUR OPINION, IS EACH OF THE INSTITUTIONS LISTED VERY CORRUPT, PARTLY CORRUPT, ABSOLUTELY NOT CORRUPT? (% of those who answered 'very corrupt'; analysis made of those institutions dealt with by at least 10 per cent of the respondents in 2002, and 2004)*

Year	2002		2004	
	Dealt with matters	Did not deal with matters	Dealt with matters	Did not deal with matters
Customs offices	64	54	59	44
Traffic police	48	33	56	38
Land and other real estate cadastre and registry enterprises	34	21	34	23
National hospitals	31	20	34	22
Local authorities	30	21	26	20
Vehicle technical inspection centres	25	18	27	19
Local hospitals	24	16	31	19
Social Insurance Fund Board	23	21	10	10
Notaries public	20	15	7	11
Labour exchange	19	13	20	14
High educational establishments	18	14	17	17
Out-patient departments	12	11	17	13
Schools	2	5	7	5

As seen from the table above, all the institutions are worse assessed by those who had matters with them (with the exception of schools in

2002 and notaries public in 2004). Thus one could presume that in this case a negative opinion is formed on the basis of direct experience rather than information provided by the mass media or other intermediaries.

In 2001 and 2002, the majority of the respondents thought that political and administrative corruption was equally widespread in Lithuania. However, the 2004 survey differences in the way of thinking: one third of the respondents continued to think in the same way (i.e. that administrative and political corruption were equally rampant), yet the number of those who thought of administrative corruption more widespread increased from 18 to 28 per cent, and those who regarded political corruption more rampant grew from 12 to 21 per cent.

The opinion of women and men, as well as various age groups was the same. However, people with different income held different views. Residents with higher income thought more often than poorer respondents that administrative corruption is more widespread. This type of corruption has been also more often indicated by city-dwellers. One of the possible reasons for having different opinions about the issue is more experience of city-dwellers and better-off residents of dealing with public officials.

*Table 2.1.17. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST WIDESPREAD IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

	2001	2002	2004
Political corruption	10	12	21
Administrative corruption	12	18	28
Both equally	62	58	34
Has no opinion	16	12	16

In 2002, those residents who mostly relied on the mass media thought more often than the group of residents relying on experience that both forms of corruption are equally rampant (those who trust their experience more than the mass media mentioned political corruption more frequently). In 2002 and 2004, the former group more often than the latter mentioned political corruption as a more widespread type of corruption than administrative corruption. Thus the political scandals of 2002–04 which were widely covered by the mass media had a major impact on the opinion of the group of residents who mostly trust the information received from the mass media.

In the period of five years, the opinion of bribe-givers and those who gave no bribes differed: those who had personal bribery experience had a more resolute opinion concerning the matter (they constitute a smaller number of those who gave no answer). Since 2002 bribe-givers have considered administrative corruption more widespread than those who have not given bribes.

*Table 2.1.18. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST WIDESPREAD IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Political corruption	11	9	11	14	24	19
Administrative corruption	11	17	17	20	24	38
Both equally	60	66	55	62	34	34
Has no opinion	18	8	17	4	19	9

The assessment of harm done by various forms of corruption was subject to change in three years. In 2001 and 2002, residents mostly saw political and administrative corruption as equally harmful. In general, political corruption was more frequently mentioned as the most harmful. In 2004, the number of those who thought of both corruption forms equally harmful decreased, whereas the number of those who distinguished one form (particularly administrative corruption) went up. The opinion change coincides with the change in attitude towards both forms of corruption. As mentioned earlier, the 2004 survey, more often than the surveys of previous years, showed administrative corruption developing. In 2004, residents' opinion concerning the matter divided into three almost equal parts (Table 2.1.19).

Men and women held similar opinions concerning the issue. Middle-aged and senior people more often than the youth thought that both forms of corruption are equally harmful (in 2004, the response was chosen by 30 per cent of residents younger than 30 and 42–43 per cent of people older than 30). Younger people more often than senior residents mentioned administrative corruption. City-dwellers opted for one form of corruption, whereas residents of smaller towns and rural areas thought more often that both forms of corruption are equally harmful.

*Table 2.1.19. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST HARMFUL TO SOCIETY? (%)*

	2001	2002	2004
Political corruption	15	18	24
Administrative corruption	8	8	20
Both equally	62	63	39
Has no opinion	15	11	17

In 2001 and 2002, the resident groups who rely both on the mass media and experience saw both forms of corruption as equally harmful to society. In 2004, the media group indicated political corruption more often and the experience group mentioned administrative corruption more frequently. Those differences could be explained by the fact that the latter group confronts administrative corruption more often, whereas the mass media unveiling political scandals makes an impact upon the residents who rely on it as the main source of information.

In 2001 and 2002 those who had given a bribe in five years and those who had not treated the damage done by various forms of corruption as equally harmful. However, in 2004 those with personal experience mentioned administrative corruption more often.

*Table 2.1.20. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST HARMFUL TO SOCIETY? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Political corruption	15	16	18	19	24	26
Administrative corruption	8	11	8	9	17	27
Both equally	60	64	59	68	41	36
Has no opinion	18	9	16	4	19	12

Further we will analyse the opinion of business representatives about corruption, its geographical and institutional spreading.

## 2.2. LITHUANIAN COMPANY MANAGERS' OPINION ABOUT CORRUPTION

For businessmen, the main source of information is their personal experience and the experience gained by their friends and acquaintances. The three years during which surveys were conducted saw the reduction of importance of the national press as the main source of information about corruption. Television remains to be one of the key sources of information but it is not as important to businessmen as it is to common people.

*Table 2.2.1. WHICH SOURCE OF INFORMATION ALLOWS YOU TO FORM THE MOST RELIABLE OPINION ABOUT THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

	2001	2002	2004
Personal experience	31	24	27
National press	27	24	14
Experience of friends, acquaintances	22	21	23
Television	16	20	22
Has no opinion	4	4	4
Special publications, reports	3	2	6
Radio	2	1	1
Local press	1	1	1
Seminars, conferences, special events	1	2	2
Internet	1	3	1

Similarly to the case of residents, personal experience is the main source of information about corruption for those businessmen who have given a bribe. To them, information conveyed by the mass media has less impact than to those businessmen who have not given bribes. Yet the experience of friends and acquaintances is equally important both to bribe-givers and those who have not committed bribery (see Table 2.2.2).

The 2001–04 surveys of the *Lithuanian Map of Corruption* showed that contrary to common residents, the opinion of businessmen (company managers) about the role of corruption in society was subject to change, i.e. they became more tolerant of this phenomenon. In 2001 and 2002, 72 per cent and in 2004, 61 per cent of company managers surveyed said that corruption constitutes a major obstacle for business. Furthermore, the number of businessmen who thought that corruption has no impact upon business or facilitates its development grew steadily (from 21 per

cent in 2001 and 25 per cent in 2002 to 34 per cent in 2004). Noteworthy, businessmen assessing the negative impact of corruption to their business show more tolerance than common residents.

*Table 2.2.2. WHICH SOURCE OF INFORMATION ALLOWS YOU TO FORM THE MOST RELIABLE OPINION ABOUT THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Television	20	11	24	16	29	14
Personal experience	22	47	15	32	19	36
National press	30	20	30	19	17	10
Friends, acquaintances	21	24	18	23	22	25
Radio	3	1	1	1	1	1
Local press	1	1	1	0	1	1
Special publications, reports	4	1	3	1	6	6
Seminars, conferences, special events	1	1	2	1	2	2
Internet	1	1	3	2	1	1
Has no opinion	4	3	4	4	3	5

*Table 2.2.3. WHICH OF THOSE STATEMENTS DOES MOSTLY CORRESPOND TO YOUR OPINION? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Corruption is a huge obstacle for business	40	38	28
Corruption is more of an obstacle for business	32	34	33
Corruption is neither an obstacle nor a facilitator of business development	17	21	22
Corruption is more of a facilitator rather than an obstacle for business development	3	3	9
Corruption facilitates business development	1	1	3
Has no opinion	9	4	5

Those businessmen who had given a bribe in the last five years were more critical of corruption than those who had not committed bribery,

yet the opinion of the former about corruption was becoming less categorical. In 2001, corruption was considered an obstacle by 69 per cent of those who had not given a bribe and 74 per cent of bribe-givers, in 2002, they represented for 70 and 73 per cent accordingly and in 2004, they accounted for 68 and 66 per cent respectively. Corruption was not seen as an obstacle by 24 per cent of those businessmen who had not given a bribe and 16 per cent of bribers in 2001, then 27 and 23 per cent respectively in 2002 and finally by 38 and 31 per cent accordingly in 2004.

*Table 2.2.4. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS DOES MOSTLY CORRESPOND TO YOUR OPINION? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Corruption is a huge obstacle for business	36	44	34	41	25	31
Corruption is more of an obstacle for business	33	30	36	32	33	35
Corruption is neither an obstacle nor a facilitator of business development	21	12	23	19	28	16
Corruption is more of a facilitator rather than an obstacle for business development	2	4	3	3	7	11
Corruption facilitates business development	1	0	1	1	3	4
Has no opinion	9	9	3	4	5	4

Those businessmen who rely on their personal experience and the experience of their friends and acquaintances and those who trust the mass media as the main source of information make similar assessments. In 2001, corruption was considered an obstacle to business by 41 per cent of those who rely on experience and 39 per cent of those who trust the mass media. In 2002, they made up 37 and 39 per cent respectively and in 2004, they represented 30 and 23 per cent accordingly. In the year



2004, the opinion of businessmen who rely on the mass media about corruption's impact on business remained negative, yet slightly less categorical (the number of those who thought of corruption as a major obstacle decreased and the number of those who considered it an obstacle increased).

Consequently, quite a few businessmen, similarly to residents, find themselves in the cognitive dissonance situation, i.e. they act contrary to what they believe in (that corruption is negative phenomenon). This dissonance is more apparent among businessmen than among common people because bribe-givers assess the impact upon business more negatively than those who had not given bribes. On the other hand, the change in attitudes of businessmen during the period of four years follows a different pattern than that of common people. If, due to certain reasons, businessmen have to act contrary to their initial attitude (i.e. by giving a bribe although thinking that corruption damages their business), they gradually start changing their behaviour rather than attitude.

Similarly to the case of common residents, it is worth analysing the attitudes which the bribe-giving businessmen adopt to justify their behaviour.

Such businessmen hold similar opinion to that of common people, emphasising the instrumental characteristic of bribes, i.e. believing that bribes help solve the problems they face. In two years, the opinion of businessmen did not change: seven company managers out of ten said that they believed in the problem-solving power of bribes (see Table 2.2.5).

*Table 2.2.5. DOES BRIBE-GIVING HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEMS YOU FACE? (%)*

	2002	2004
Yes	76	75
No	12	22
Has no opinion	12	2

The businessmen who have given bribes in the past five years are more confident than those who lack such experience that bribes help solve problems (see Table 2.2.6).

Those who mostly rely on experience more frequently than those who trust the mass media consider bribes an effective problem-solving tool.

In 2002, such opinion was held by 83 per cent of the first group respondents and 71 per cent of the second group businessmen, in 2004, they represented 83 and 66 per cent accordingly. Admittedly, the 2004 survey revealed almost twice the number of the mass media group representatives (as compared to those who mostly rely on experience) who do not believe in the ability of bribes to solve problems (32 and 15 per cent respectively).

*Table 2.2.6. DOES BRIBE-GIVING HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEMS YOU FACE? (%)*

Year	2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Yes	61	89	63	90
No	19	6	34	9
Has no opinion	20	5	3	1

As seen from the responses provided above, businessmen justify their behaviour in cognitive dissonance situations by pointing at the instrumental characteristics of bribes. Hence this group exhibits both general and instrumental aspects of the attitude towards corruption.

The instrumental aspect of the attitude is in accord with the behaviour of businessmen who have bribery experience, hence a conflict between the attitude and behaviour is avoided. On the other hand, while anticipating the possible changes in the public behaviour in the respective area one should consider the intentions of the survey participants. In other words, when confronted with a corruption situation, will they be willing to behave in line with their generally negative attitude towards corruption or follow its instrumental aspect (when a bribe is seen as an effective problem-solving tool)? The 2001–04 surveys showed that the second option is more likely, i.e. businessmen tend to commit bribery because they believe in the effectiveness of bribes.

Surveys show that faced with a problem company managers usually give a bribe to have it solved. During the period of two years, the number of businessmen who said they would not give a bribe increased, yet the number of those who would resort to bribery did not decrease (Table 2.2.7).

*Table 2.2.7. WOULD YOU GIVE A BRIBE IF YOU HAD TO SOLVE A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM AND A BRIBE WERE EXPECTED FOR THAT? (%)*

Year	2002	2004
Yes	63	67
No	18	29
Has no opinion	19	3

The table above shows the reduction in the number of businessmen having no opinion concerning the matter.

Businessmen who consider whether bribe-giving is a worthy practice usually follow their own experience. Bribe-givers more often than those who lack such experience tend to solve the problems important to their company by resorting to bribery (see Table 2.2.8).

*Table 2.2.8. WOULD YOU GIVE A BRIBE IF YOU HAD TO SOLVE A VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM AND A BRIBE WERE EXPECTED FOR THAT? (%)*

Year	2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Yes	44	81	50	87
No	29	9	46	11
Has no opinion	27	10	4	3

Admittedly, in two years time the number of those who have no opinion about the issue decreased among those businessmen who lack bribe-giving experience. In 2004, this category of businessmen said they would not give a bribe more often than during previous surveys, yet the number of those who admitted they would resort to bribery did not go down.

Those who rely on the mass media less frequently than those who trust experience tend to give a bribe to solve problems. In 2002, they represented 57 per cent of the first group and 72 per cent of the second group businessmen, in 2004, they made up 54 and 78 per cent accordingly.

The opinion of businessmen about the scale of corruption in Lithuania and other countries remained the same during the three years surveyed. They mostly think that corruption is bigger in Lithuania than in

Western countries, the same like in other Central and Eastern European states and smaller or similar to the CIS.

*Table 2.2.9. DO YOU THINK CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA, AS COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IS SMALLER, BIGGER, OR THE SAME? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
<i>As compared with Western countries:</i>			
Smaller in Lithuania	11	10	9
The same	25	23	33
Bigger in Lithuania	60	61	51
Has no opinion	3	7	7
<i>As compared with Central and Eastern European states:</i>			
Smaller in Lithuania	13	12	13
The same	60	55	58
Bigger in Lithuania	22	25	20
Has no opinion	6	9	9
<i>As compared with the CIS countries:</i>			
Smaller in Lithuania	46	38	46
The same	38	36	34
Bigger in Lithuania	11	17	12
Has no opinion	5	9	8

Businessmen who had given bribes in the past five years think more often than those who lack such experience that the scale of corruption in Lithuania is bigger than in Western countries. Non-bribers think more frequently than bribers that the situation in Lithuania and Western countries corruption-wise is the same. However, both groups predominantly think that the situation in Lithuania is worse.

While comparing the situation in Lithuania and Central and Eastern European countries businessmen who have given a bribe and those who have not hold similar opinions. Noteworthy, in 2004, those businessmen who have not given a bribe thought more often than in 2001 and 2002 that the situation in Lithuania and Central and Eastern European states is similar and less frequently that the Lithuanian situation is worse. The opinion of bribe-givers concerning the issue stayed the same during those three years.

While comparing the Lithuanian situation to that of the CIS, bribe-givers think more often than their counterparts without such experience that the level of corruption is smaller in Lithuania.

*Table 2.2.10. DO YOU THINK CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA, AS COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IS SMALLER, BIGGER, OR THE SAME? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
<i>As compared with Western countries:</i>						
Smaller in Lithuania	13	7	10	9	10	8
The same	28	21	25	21	36	29
Bigger in Lithuania	55	70	55	66	46	58
Has no opinion	4	2	10	5	8	6
<i>As compared with Central and Eastern European states:</i>						
Smaller in Lithuania	14	10	10	14	14	11
The same	58	63	55	54	60	56
Bigger in Lithuania	21	23	24	26	16	26
Has no opinion	6	4	12	6	10	8
<i>As compared with the CIS countries:</i>						
Smaller in Lithuania	42	51	34	42	43	49
The same	41	35	39	34	36	32
Bigger in Lithuania	11	11	15	18	12	12
Has no opinion	6	3	12	6	9	8

In 2001 and 2002, those businessmen who rely on the mass media and experience held similar opinions while comparing the situation in Lithuania and other countries. In 2004, their opinions differed concerning the situation in Lithuania and the CIS. 52 per cent of those who rely on the mass media and 40 per cent of those who trust experience thought that corruption is smaller in Lithuania. 14 per cent of the experience group and 10 per cent of the media group businessmen thought of the situation in Lithuania corruption-wise worse than in the CIS.

While assessing the change in the scale of corruption, businessmen give similar responses as common residents. Admittedly, the former constitutes a smaller number of those who have no opinion and a bigger number of those who think that the level of corruption remained the same. Another distinctive character of businessmen is that in 2004 they said more often than in 2001 and 2002 that the level of corruption stayed the same and they thought less frequently that it is increasing (in 2001, the level of corruption was seen increasing by 52 per cent of business-

men, in 2002 and 2004 by 49 and 31 per cent respectively). Table 2.2.11 shows that the opinion of businessmen about the scale of corruption in Lithuania was steadily improving in three years.

*Table 2.2.11. IN RECENT FIVE YEARS, DO YOU THINK THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION HAS INCREASED OR DECREASED IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Increased significantly	25	21	15
Slightly increased	27	28	26
Stayed the same	32	34	37
Slightly decreased	14	15	19
Decreased tremendously	1	1	2
Has no opinion	1	2	1

Interestingly enough, the opinion of those who have given a bribe and those who have not changes similarly, taking the same direction in three years (see Table 2.2.12).

*Table 2.2.12. IN RECENT FIVE YEARS, DO YOU THINK THE SCALE OF CORRUPTION HAS INCREASED OR DECREASED IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Increased significantly	23	26	19	23	16	14
Slightly increased	28	25	27	28	24	27
Stayed the same	33	31	34	34	37	37
Slightly decreased	14	15	17	14	18	19
Decreased tremendously	1	1	1	0	3	1
Has no opinion	1	1	2	1	1	1

In 2004, 40 per cent of businessmen who had given bribes and those who had not saw corruption increasing, 37 per cent thought that the situation stayed the same and 20 per cent said that corruption was reducing.

In 2001, corruption growth was spotted by 49 per cent of businessmen who rely on experience, in 2002 and 2004 they accounted for 47 and 42 per cent respectively. The same trend was noticed by businessmen relying on the mass media, representing accordingly 54, 48 and 38

per cent. Hence in the period of three years the number of those who saw corruption growing in both groups went down.

Analysis of businessmen's opinion about the most corrupt institutions and areas shows that they tend to enumerate the same institutions like common residents. Furthermore, their opinion was subject to the same change like the opinion of residents, i.e. they point at medical institutions more often than at the government. However, businessmen see the police and medical institutions less frequently corrupt than ordinary residents.

*Table 2.2.13. WHICH INSTITUTIONS ARE THE MOST CORRUPT? (10 institutions most frequently mentioned by the respondents themselves) (%)*

	2001	2002	2004
Customs	24	29	23
Courts, law enforcement	22	20	20
Police	10	11	16
Seimas	10	19	13
Medical institutions	5	6	13
Local authorities	7	13	11
Tax inspectorate	9	11	11
Traffic police	4	4	6
Government	9	9	4

Businessmen with bribe-giving experience see more corruption than their counterparts who lack such experience in the following institutions: customs (however, with Lithuania becoming an EU member in 2004 it is no longer mentioned as often as during previous years), tax inspectorate and local authorities.

Businessmen who mostly rely on experience more frequently than their counterparts trusting the mass media as the main source of information mentioned the following institutions: courts, government, tax inspectorate, local authorities, Social Insurance Fund Board, mass media, ministries in 2001, courts, government, tax inspectorate, local authorities, Social Insurance Fund Board, traffic police, land-use planning institutions in 2002 and local authorities, food and veterinary services, county administration and police in 2004.

The media group businessmen mentioned the following institutions: police, law enforcement in general, prosecution offices, educational establishments in 2001, Seimas, courts, ministries, medical institutions, privatisation services, President's office in 2002, and medical institutions,

Seimas, President's office, traffic police, land-use planning bodies, privatisation services, political parties, public procurement offices, pharmaceutical companies in 2004.

*Table 2.2.14. WHICH INSTITUTIONS ARE THE MOST CORRUPT? (10 institutions most frequently mentioned by the respondents themselves) (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Customs	20	31	26	31	20	26
Courts, law enforcement	22	23	20	21	20	20
Police	10	12	8	13	15	18
Tax inspectorate	8	10	7	15	7	15
Medical institutions	6	4	5	7	13	14
Local authorities	6	9	10	15	8	14
Seimas	8	13	19	19	13	13
Traffic police	3	5	3	4	6	7
Government	8	12	8	10	4	5

Further we will compare the opinion of businessmen about the level of corruption in some of the public institutions. We have included those institutions dealt with by at least one tenth businessman. Does the opinion of the latter change from those who have never dealt with their matters in such institutions? Table 2.2.15 provides a summary of the responses provided by those two groups (the percentage is provided of those who stated 'very corrupt').

All of those institutions are seen worse by those businessmen who dealt with their matters in them. Hence, similarly to the case of residents, personal experience in this regard is an important opinion-forming factor.

Similarly to common residents, businessmen changed their opinion about the spread of various forms of corruption in 2001–04. In 2001 and 2002 they thought in the same way like ordinary residents that both political and administrative forms of corruption are equally widespread in Lithuania. The 2004 survey revealed a split of their views into three almost equal parts (like the opinion of residents), where one group regards administrative corruption as the most widespread form, another group thinks of administrative and political corruption equally predominant and the third group mentions political corruption more often than during the previous two surveys.



*Table 2.2.15. TO YOUR OPINION, IS EACH OF THE INSTITUTIONS LISTED VERY CORRUPT, PARTLY CORRUPT, ABSOLUTELY NOT CORRUPT? (% of those who answered 'very corrupt'; analysis made of those institutions dealt with by at least 10 per cent of the respondents in 2002, and 2004)*

Year	2002		2004	
	Dealt with matters	Did not deal with matters	Dealt with matters	Did not deal with matters
Customs units	62	58	61	49
State Food and Veterinary services	40	16	31	16
County courts	36	21	28	22
State Tax Inspectorate	36	31	24	22
Local authorities	35	31	28	25
Non-Food Products' Inspectorate	30	15	25	15
Land and other real estate cadastre and registry companies	29	23	30	23
Vehicle technical inspection centres	28	18	25	17
Public Health Centre	28	17	15	14
State Social Insurance Fund Board	28	21	12	9
Labour inspectorate	19	16	14	13
Fire prevention and rescue service	16	10	7	6
Labour exchange	12	10	12	8
The press	11	8	25	15
Notaries public	11	11	8	8
Statistics department	5	5	3	4

*Table 2.2.16. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST WIDESPREAD IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Political corruption	11	10	26
Administrative corruption	17	17	36
Both equally	72	72	35
Has no opinion	0	1	3

Bribe-givers tend to think more often than businessmen without such experience that administrative corruption is most widespread form of

corruption in Lithuania. In 2004, both groups of businessmen tend to mention administrative corruption more often as a more popular form of corruption. Bribe-givers consider the latter predominant (see Table 2.2.17).

*Table 2.2.17. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST WIDESPREAD IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Political corruption	13	7	13	8	28	24
Administrative corruption	14	21	13	21	33	41
Both equally	72	72	73	72	36	33
Has no opinion	1	0	1	0	3	3

In 2001–02, businessmen who rely on the mass media as well as experience held the same opinion about the two forms of corruption equally rampant, whereas in 2004, they predominantly mentioned administrative corruption, particularly those who rely on their own experience and the experience of their friends and acquaintances.

The opinion of businessmen about the damage brought by various forms of corruption was subject to the same change like the opinion of residents. In 2001 and 2002, they mostly said that both political and administrative forms of corruption are equally harmful and in 2004, they point at either political or administrative corruption as more widespread.

*Table 2.2.18. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST HARMFUL TO SOCIETY? (%)*

Year	2001	2002	2004
Political corruption	16	17	29
Administrative corruption	16	13	24
Both equally	67	70	42
Has no opinion	1	1	6

The opinion of bribe-givers of those who had not given bribes about the damage brought by various forms of corruption experienced similar changes. In 2004, both of the groups mentioned political and administrative corruption. The first group thinks of the damage caused by both of these forms of corruption as equal less frequently than the latter (see Table 2.2.19).

*Table 2.2.19. WHICH FORM OF CORRUPTION IS THE MOST HARMFUL TO SOCIETY? (%)*

Year	2001		2002		2004	
	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Political corruption	18	13	18	16	28	30
Administrative corruption	16	17	10	15	22	26
Both equally	65	70	71	68	45	38
Has no opinion	1	0	1	0	5	6

In 2001–02, the businessmen who rely mostly on the mass media and those who trust experience considered both of these forms of corruption as equally harmful. In 2004, they started to single out one form out of those two, yet holding different views.

Analysis of the three survey findings showed that both common residents and businessmen experience cognitive dissonance with respect to corruption. Although having a negative attitude towards corruption, the majority of them tend to give a bribe in certain situations because it is regarded a reliable tool of solving problems (both of personal and business nature). On the other hand, the respondents try to bring into accord the conflicting attitudes by refusing to assume responsibility for giving a bribe and placing it on the bribe-taker or an institution the staff of which they deal with. Although they themselves resort to bribery as a tool of solving problems, residents and businessmen consider the majority of institutions corrupt.

Attitude towards corruption are formed both on the basis of information provided by the mass media and the personal experience of people ‘with authority’. Once an individual himself or herself experiences corruption in an institution or heard about it experienced by others, he or she will tend to consider it corrupt and have a negative opinion about it. On the other hand, analysis of personal experience of having relations with and solving issues in various institutions shows the importance of personal experience gained by various resident groups in forming a negative opinion about such institutions as well as the role played by the indirectly obtained information. (In the latter case, when the opinion about the level of corruption in a certain institution is worse than the actual experience, one could point out at the weak public relations function performed by the appropriate institution).

### III. ANTI-CORRUPTION POTENTIAL

Corruption is a complex phenomenon, comprising economic, political, legal and moral issues; therefore, it would be wrong to suggest that the fight against corruption is feasible by resorting to criminal prosecution alone. As mentioned before, the roots of corruption lie in the conflict of public and private interests and a just decision depends both on moral features of the participants of the conflict and compliance with the existing legal norms. Reference to criminal justice is the last resort when the other ways of curbing corruption prove to fail.

Unfortunately, the Lithuanian public discourse usually considers anti-corruption initiatives too narrowly, i.e. only in the light of criminal justice. Citizens angry with the rampant public corruption demand, on the one hand, that corrupt public officials and civil servants should be subject to more frequent and stricter punishment and, on the other hand, that law enforcement institutions fighting corruption should be given more powers. The advocates of such anti-corruption methods are convinced that strict punishment of corrupt public officials is intimidating and may deter potential corruptors from illicit actions. Without getting too much involved in a discussion about the role played by strict punishment and criminal justice in reducing the number of crimes (including corruption)<sup>22</sup>, we will focus on two circumstances related to the current criminal rhetoric.

First, talking about criminal offences or crimes, a reference is usually made to one party: an illicit service provider who has an institutional or personal interest. There is hardly any mentioning of the second interested party, i.e. a person who seeks solution of an issue with speeded-up decision-making or evasion of laws. Seeking positive results, favourable or personally beneficial to service providers decision-making is an

<sup>22</sup> Modern criminology, and its critical part in particular, harbours serious doubts about its effectiveness (e.g., see N. Christie. *Nusikaltimų kontrolė kaip pramonė*. Vilnius, 1999).

art of corrupt ‘dealings’. In that case, the mode of behaviour by members of the public depends not only on the rules dictated by the service-providers but also on the public consideration of laws and moral values.

Second, corruption offences and crimes is a problem faced not only by the countries subject to major changes but also by the states maintaining old traditions of democracy. Recently, those states have initiated adoption of a number of legal instruments which contain statements favouring strict mechanisms of corruption control (including criminal ones). These states also have huge practical experience of forestalling corruption. It is no coincidence that when joining the European Union Lithuania was urged, apart from stricter anti-corruption criminal measures, to develop corruption prevention programmes including a wider spectrum than just criminal law provisions.<sup>23</sup>

Prevention of corruption in Lithuania is not a new area of activity; however, systematic attempts have been taken only in recent years. In 1999, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a programme *Concerning Prevention of Organised Crime and Corruption*. On 28 May 2002, the Seimas adopted the Law on Prevention of Corruption. The law defines corruption prevention as *detection and elimination of the causes and conditions of corruption through the development and implementation of a system of appropriate measures as well as deterrence of persons from the commission of crimes of corruption*.<sup>24</sup>

The law lays down the following key tasks of corruption prevention:

- disclosure and elimination of the contributing factors and conditions of corruption;
- deterrence of persons from the commission of crimes of corruption;
- securing a workable and effective legal regulation of corruption prevention;
- setting up of an adequate and effective mechanism of organisation, implementation, oversight and control of corruption prevention through legal, institutional, economic and social measures;
- involvement of the public and public organisations in the prevention of corruption;

<sup>23</sup> A detailed description of the process is provided in the following publication: *Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy*. Budapest: OSI, 2002.

<sup>24</sup> Republic of Lithuania Law on Prevention of Corruption, 28 May 2002, No. IX-904. Official Gazette: 2003, No. 38-1728.

- promotion of transparency and openness in the provision of public services.<sup>25</sup>

During the same year, in 2002, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted the National Anti-Corruption Programme which, among other things, highlights corruption prevention: reduction of political and administrative corruption, public involvement in the fight against corruption, anti-corruption education of the public and mass media.<sup>26</sup>

Yet headway in the area of anti-corruption can be achieved only by joint agreement of the state and its citizens. Anti-corruption measures applicable on a state level could be effective and practically enforceable; yet without a determined position against corruption showed by citizens, the mechanism of control and prevention cannot be fully put into effect.

Bearing the latter in mind, it is worth remembering the thoughts of Lithuanian people prior to the adoption of the National Anti-Corruption Programme. In 2000, Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter initiated a survey *Does Lithuania want Political Transparency?*<sup>27</sup> Right after parliamentary elections Lithuanian residents were interviewed about the contribution of political parties to the fight against corruption and effectiveness of potential anti-corruption methods.

Lithuanian people were given a list of political parties registered in Lithuania and asked to choose from it a political party which they think pays attention to the fight against corruption.

Right after the elections more than one third of the respondents could not identify a single party which they thought took anti-corruption efforts. Every third respondent expressed his general disappointment with political parties. That was a clear signal that Lithuanian people do not trust political parties and are sceptical about the contribution of the latter to the fight against corruption.

The survey also asked Lithuanian people about the most effective measures against corruption and they pointed at stricter criminal liability for corruption crimes, publicity and stricter administrative control. Survey participants were the most sceptical about such corruption pre-

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> LR Seimas Resolution concerning the Approval of the National Anti-Corruption Programme. 17 January 2002. No. IX-711 // Official Gazette, 2002, No. 10-355.

<sup>27</sup> On 8-14 December 2000, the survey was conducted by a joint venture of Lithuania and Great Britain, *Baltijos tyrimai*. The survey findings are available at the website of Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter, [www.transparency.lt](http://www.transparency.lt).

vention measures like civil servants' training and initiatives of civil society and non-governmental organisations.

The 2001–04 survey *Lithuanian Map of Corruption* continued analysing social assessment of anti-corruption efforts. It looked at the anti-corruption potential of residents and business representatives.

### 3.1. ANTI-CORRUPTION POTENTIAL OF LITHUANIAN RESIDENTS

The Survey findings discussed in Chapter I and II of this book show that Lithuanian people despise corruption, yet they are inclined to pay unofficially in the future to resolve an important issue. It seems that Lithuanian residents realise the threat of corruption as an evil, clearly express their opinion about the issue and are not willing to tolerate it, yet, talking about specific circumstances relevant to the person concerned the general disposition against corruption is forgotten. Behaviour is shaped pursuing own interests, even before the problem occurs, i.e. unofficial payment is offered by foreseeing the events, i. e. before problem-solving comes to a standstill at some stage. Hence the question is whether any major changes are possible in a society with 'double' thinking and whose behaviour follows such thinking. In other words, anti-corruption initiatives in Lithuania: are they solely a concern for the Government or could they attract public support and active involvement of their members?

Presently, discussions are less focused on the necessity of having an institutional anti-corruption network. Their emphasis is on the effectiveness of criminal and prevention measures against corruption and the role of residents as a constituent part of corruption prevention system. With a view to assessing the anti-corruption potential of Lithuanian people, analysis should be made of their opinion about state policy concerning the matter and corruption control and prevention measures applied by the state.

In 2001, Lithuanian residents were asked a question about the most effective measures helping to reduce corruption (see Table 3.1.1).

The respondents thought that the most effective anti-corruption measure is stricter punishment (28 per cent). This answer was most frequently chosen by men, also residents aged 50–60, with medium and higher than average household monthly income, city-dwellers. This anti-corruption measure was seen as the least attractive by people younger than 30, with the smallest income and rural residents.

*Table 3.1.1. WHAT CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES YOU THINK WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

Year	2001
Stricter punishment	28
Doesn't know	27
Increasing the standard of living, reduction of unemployment	13
Stricter accountability and control	12
Administrative sanctions, dismissal from work	11
Improvement of law-making	7
Impossible to change	7
Strengthening moral values	6
Publicity	5

Admittedly, every third respondent could not specify a single effective anti-corruption measure, yet the majority had a clearly negative disposition towards corruption. What type of residents have such disposition? The majority constitute women, younger than 20, having the lowest income, residents of villages or small towns.

13 per cent of the respondents thought that corruption is closely related to the standard of living in the state: the lower the standard of living and the higher the rate of unemployment, the more favourable conditions for the spread of corruption. The necessity to raise the standard of living as an effective corruption reduction effort was mentioned by women, middle-aged people, the most well-off and city-dwellers.

Stricter accountability and control as a measure against corruption was mostly chosen by residents aged 40–50, with medium and higher than average household monthly income, city-dwellers.

Administrative sanctions were mostly mentioned by people aged 60 and more.

Bearing in mind, that in 2001, more than one third of Lithuanian residents had bribe-giving experience, it is worth analysing whether opinion about anti-corruption measures differs between those who have given a bribe and those who have not.

The measures against corruption suggested by those two groups in 2001 are included in Table 3.1.2.

Both those who had bribe-giving experience in last five years and those who did not indicated stricter punishment as the most effective anti-corruption measure. The two groups also hold similar opinion concerning the other measures listed. The only difference is that a slightly big-



ger number of people without bribery experience had no opinion about effective corruption reduction measures.

*Table 3.1.2. WHAT CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES YOU THINK WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (% in 2001 of non bribe-givers N=558, bribe-givers N=371)*

Year	2001	2001
The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Stricter punishment	27	29
Doesn't know	29	22
Increasing the standard of living,		
reduction of unemployment	12	17
Stricter accountability and control	12	13
Administrative sanctions, dismissal from work	10	13
Improvement of law-making	6	8
Impossible to change	7	6
Strengthening moral values	6	6
Publicity	7	3

On 17 January 2002, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted Resolution No. IX-711 approving the National Anti-Corruption Programme. The task of co-ordination was given to the Special Investigation Service. The programme was developed with contribution of the most famous Western and Lithuanian experts in the area. One of the key features of the programme is particularly attention to corruption prevention efforts. The programme was widely discussed by the mass media. Prevention was presented as a constituent part of anti-corruption efforts, where the role of civic initiative is of paramount importance.

In 2002 and 2004, Lithuanian residents were once again asked about the most effective measures of tackling corruption. Questions about the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures were adjusted according to the National Anti-Corruption Programme. The 2002 and 2004 survey findings show the change in the opinion about effective anti-corruption measures (see Table 3.1.3).

In 2002 and 2004, as compared with 2001, the opinion of Lithuanian people about stricter punishment remained the same. Survey respondents thought *that introduction of stricter court punishment for corruption* is the most effective measure reducing its level (45 and 49 per cent respectively). In 2002, this measure was predominantly mentioned by women,

residents aged 50 and more, living in cities. In 2004, this measure was mostly chosen by men living in big towns. This view was most frequently held by people living in Utena and Kaunas counties.

*Table 3.1.3. WHAT CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	2002	2004
Introduction of stricter court punishment for corruption, adoption of stricter laws	45	49
Prohibition for public officials who committed an offence to work in state bodies	39	47
Introduction of stricter administrative sanctions, increase of fines, dismissal from work	38	47
Improvement of anti-corruption legislation	36	39
More publicity in the mass media	21	25
Better operation of special services	19	24
Background checks of public officials, monitoring transparency of their family property	18	29
More active public support, having residents report about bribery	17	20
The problem will get solved by itself with the standard of living increasing in the country	17	15
Public awareness raising, educational measures	13	15
Aiming at public officials having less control over various spheres of life	12	11
Increase remuneration for public officials to make them appreciate more their employment	4	5

The second place is taken by the *prohibition for public officials who committed an offence to work in public institutions*. In 2002, this measure was mentioned by four out of ten respondents and in 2004, it became acceptable to every second respondent. In 2002, this measure was mostly chosen by women and city-dwellers and in 2004, it was more favoured by men, middle-aged people and city-dwellers. This measure is believed to be most effective by Telšiai, Kaunas and Klaipėda county residents.

The third most effective measure against corruption in 2002 and 2004 was considered *introduction of stricter administrative sanctions, increase of fines and dismissal from work* (by 38 and 47 per cent respectively). In 2002, this measure was more favoured by people older than 30, living in big cities and towns. In 2004, it was mentioned by residents with medium income and living in rural areas.

The fourth place goes for the *improvement of anti-corruption legislation* (36 per cent in 2002 and 39 per cent in 2004). In 2002, this measure was chosen by city-dwellers and in 2004, it was favoured by people with higher than average household monthly income and city-dwellers.

In 2002 and 2004, *more publicity in the mass media* is regarded the fifth most effective anti-corruption measure (21 and 25 per cent respectively). In 2002, this measure was mentioned by people older than 30, living in towns and cities. In 2004, it was more acceptable to city-dwellers younger than 30 and older than 50.

19 per cent of the respondents in 2002 and 24 per cent in 2004 thought that better operation of special investigation services could ensure more effective fight against corruption. In 2002, this measure was mentioned by people younger than 50, having higher than the smallest household monthly income and city-dwellers. In 2004, this measure was believed to be effective by people with medium income and city-dwellers.

In 2002, 18 per cent of the respondents were in favour of background checks of public officials and monitoring of their family property transparency. This measure was mostly chosen by people older than 50, receiving smaller than the biggest household monthly income and residents of small towns. In 2004, the number of residents who thought this way increased significantly (reaching 29 per cent). It became acceptable to people older than 30 with smaller than the biggest household family income and residents of cities and big towns.

In 2002, as few as 17 per cent of Lithuanian people thought that active public support is necessary. This was stated more often by people younger than 30 and older than 50, and city-dwellers. In 2004, the number of people who believed in this measure increased to 20 per cent. The importance of public support was emphasised by people with the biggest household monthly income and city-dwellers.

In 2002, 17 per cent of the respondents believed that the problem of corruption may be solved by increasing the standard of living. Such respondents comprised people younger than 30, with the smallest income,

and living in rural areas. In 2004, their number of people who thought this way stayed almost unchanged.

In 2002, public awareness raising and educational measures were mentioned by 13 per cent of the respondents comprising women, people older than 50 and city-dwellers. In 2004, of this opinion were people younger than 30, well-off and living in big towns.

In 2002, 12 per cent of the respondents thought that public officials have too much power of controlling various spheres of life. The view that these powers should be more limited was mostly held by men, people older than 50, within medium and higher income and city-dwellers. In 2004, this measure was believed to be effective by people aged 30-50, well-off, living in towns and cities.

In 2002 and 2004, the respondents who thought that public officials should be better remunerated to have less corruption in the country accounted for as little as 4 and 5 per cent respectively.

The opinion of bribe-givers about the most effective measures of targeting corruption in 2002 and 2004 is shown in Table 3.1.4 below.

*Table 3.1.4. WHAT CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

Year	2002	2004
The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	Have given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Introduction of stricter court punishment for corruption, adoption of stricter laws	45	44
Prohibition for public officials who committed an offence to work in state bodies	44	49
Introduction of stricter administrative sanctions, increase of fines, dismissal from work	43	50
Improvement of anti-corruption legislation	38	36
More publicity in the mass media	23	26
Better operation of special services	20	23
Background checks of public officials, monitoring transparency of their family property	17	31
More active public support, to have residents report about bribery	17	18

*Table 3.1.4 continued*

Year	2002	2004
The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	Have given a bribe	Have given a bribe
The problem will get solved by itself with the standard of living increasing in the country	19	20
Public awareness raising, educational measures	15	17
Aiming at public officials having less control over various spheres of life	15	13
Increase remuneration for public officials to make them appreciate more their employment	7	7

In 2002, those who have experience of giving a bribe in the last five years mentioned that the most effective anti-corruption measures are stricter punishment, prohibition to corrupt public officials to work in public bodies and stricter administrative sanctions.

Whereas in 2004, every second respondent who had given a bribe in the last five years was in favour of the introduction of stricter administrative sanctions. Their second choice was prohibition for corruption public officials to work in state institutions and the third one was stricter court punishment.

Admittedly, in 2004, every third respondent with bribery experience thought that background checks of public officials and monitoring transparency of their family property is a very effective anti-corruption measure. In 2002, those who held the view accounted for as little as 17 per cent.

The opinion of those who denied giving a bribe about the most effective anti-corruption measures in 2002 and 2004 is provided in Table 3.1.5 below.

The opinion of bribe-givers in 2004 was far more stricter than in 2002. The majority of the respondents in 2004 favoured stricter court punishment (52 per cent as compared with 45 per cent in 2002), prohibition for corrupt public officials to work in state institutions (45 per cent, and 35 per cent in 2002), introduction of stricter administrative sanctions (45 per cent, and 35 per cent in 2002), improvement of anti-corruption legislation (40 per cent, and 34 per cent in 2002), background checks of public officials and monitoring transparency of their family

property (29 per cent, and 19 per cent in 2002), better operation of special services (25 per cent, and 19 per cent in 2002), more publicity in the mass media (24 per cent, and 20 per cent in 2002), more active public support (20 per cent, and 17 per cent in 2002) and public awareness raising (15 per cent, and 12 per cent in 2002). However, the year 2004 saw the decreasing number of those who believe that the problem will get solved by itself with the overall standard of living increasing in the country (13 per cent in 2004 and 16 per cent in 2002).

*Table 3.1.5. WHICH CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES YOU THINK WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (% of those who did give a bribe in 2002 N=624, gave a bribe N=386, did not give a bribe in 2004 N=571, gave a bribe N=372)*

Year	2002	2004
The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	Have not given a bribe	Have not given a bribe
Introduction of stricter court punishment for corruption, adoption of stricter laws	45	52
Prohibition for public officials who committed an offence to work in state bodies	35	45
Introduction of stricter administrative sanctions, increase of fines, dismissal from work	35	45
Improvement of anti-corruption legislation	34	40
More publicity in the mass media	20	24
Better operation of special services	19	25
Background checks of public officials, monitoring transparency of their family property	19	29
More active public support to have the public report about bribes	17	20
The problem will get solved by itself with the standard of living increasing in the country	16	13
Public awareness raising, educational measures	12	15
Aiming at public officials having less control over various spheres of life	10	9
Increase remuneration for public officials to make them appreciate more their employment	2	4

Admittedly, there is growing trust in the effectiveness of corruption prevention measures.

The dynamics of public assessment is shown in Table 3.1.6 below.

*Table 3.1.6. WHICH OF THESE MEASURES YOU THINK ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

Year	2002	2004
Punitive	43	40
Forestalling corruption, eliminating reasons for corruption	41	46
Has no opinion	16	14

In 2002, respondents held almost the same opinion about the effectiveness of punitive and prevention measures.

In 2002, 43 per cent of the respondents said that punitive measures are more effective than prevention measures. However, in 2004, their number decreased to reach 40 per cent. Punitive measures are more acceptable to people with the lowest income and living in smaller towns. In 2004, the majority of people thinking this way came from Utena, Marijampolė and Tauragė counties.

In 2002, four respondents out of ten chose prevention measures. These are well-off people living in cities. In 2004, the number of those who believe in the effectiveness of prevention measures increased to 46 per cent. The majority of them were also rich city-dwellers. In 2004, prevention measures were more acceptable to the residents of Alytus, Klaipėda, Kaunas and Vilnius counties.

The 2002 and 2004 survey opinion of those who said they had given a bribe about the effectiveness of prevention measures is shown in Table 3.1.7 below.

*Table 3.1.7. WHICH OF THESE MEASURES YOU THINK ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (% , those who did not give a bribe in 2002 N=624, gave a bribe N=386, did not give a bribe in 2004 N=571, gave a bribe N=372).)*

Year	2002	2004
	Have given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Punitive	43	42
Forestalling corruption, eliminating reasons for corruption	42	50
Has no opinion	15	8

The opinion of the respondents with bribe-giving experience was also subject to change. In 2002, almost the same number of them preferred punitive measures as those who favoured prevention measures, whereas in 2004, every second respondent said that elimination of reasons for corruption is a more effective way of reducing corruption.

The 2002 and 2004 survey opinion of those who had no bribe-giving experience about the effectiveness of prevention measures is shown in Table 3.1.8 below.

*Table 3.1.8. WHICH OF THESE MEASURES YOU THINK ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

Year	2002	2004
	Have not given a bribe	Have not given a bribe
Punitive	43	39
Forestalling corruption, eliminating reasons for corruption	40	44
Has no opinion	17	17

Residents without bribe-giving experience became ‘milder’ in the period of 2002-04. In 2002, those who favoured punitive measures outnumbered those who believed stronger in prevention measures and in 2004, the priority was given to prevention measures eliminating the roots of corruption.

The assessment of anti-corruption measures is closely related to public trust in state institutions, including specialised services, directly in charge of corruption control and prevention. The surveys reveal that Lithuanian people do not show big trust in state institutions.

A pessimistic attitude of Lithuanian people towards reduction of corruption in the country is also seen from the 2004 assessment of operation of state and specialised institutions in Table 3.1.9.

In 2004, the absolute majority of the respondents considered anti-corruption efforts taken by the institutions listed as ineffective.

The worst assessment (the difference between ‘effectively’ and ‘ineffectively’) was that of the Seimas (-69), Government (-58) and President’s office (-55). A slightly more positive attitude was held of the State Security Department (-28), Financial Crime Investigation Service (-29) and Special Investigation Service (-33).



*Table 3.1.9. SPEAKING ABOUT EACH OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS INDIVIDUALLY, HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY IN REDUCING CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

	Effective	Ineffectively	N/S
President's Office	14	69	17
Seimas	8	77	15
Government	13	71	16
Special Investigation Service	23	56	21
State Security Department	24	52	24
Financial Crime Investigation Service	23	52	25
Non-governmental organisations	12	44	44

Those who regard performance of the State Security Department and Special Investigation Service effective mostly constitute residents with medium and the biggest household monthly income and city-dwellers.

The Financial Crime Investigation Service was seen as effective by people younger than 30, with medium household monthly income, and living in cities.

As mentioned in Chapter I, almost two thirds of the 2004 survey respondents had not given bribes in the last five years and 73 per cent of people had not given a bribe in the last twelve months. What is their motive against giving a bribe?

The respondents were given a list of reasons and were asked to explain the motives of their behaviour.

The main reasons for not giving a bribe in the last five years are shown in Table 3.1.10 below.

*Table 3.1.10. WHY DIDN'T YOU GIVE A BRIBE? (% of those who did not give a bribe in 2002; N = 624, 2004 m. - N = 571)*

Year	2002	2004
I have never confronted a bribe demanding situation	48	38
So far I have managed to solve all the issues without giving a bribe	0	27
I had no money for that	24	16
That is against my principles	12	12
I didn't believe it can help solve my problem	8	8
I don't know how to behave in such situations	7	7
In that case I would violate the law	4	3
Not stated	12	11

The reason mentioned most frequently (by 38 per cent of the respondents) for not giving a bribe is the very situation when a bribe is not demanded. Bribe demands were not encountered by people younger than 30, the well-off, as well as residents of rural areas and big towns.

27 per cent of the respondents managed to solve their problems without bribes. This group of the respondents could be considered the 'net' anti-corruption potential. In the last five years problems were solved without resorting to bribery by people older than 30, with medium income and living in big cities.

The third most popular reason for not giving a bribe was the lack of money (16 per cent). This reason was mostly mentioned by women, people older than 30, having the smallest income and living in towns.

12 per cent of the respondents did not give a bribe in the last five years because that was against their principles. This was mentioned by women, people older than 50, having smaller and medium household monthly income and city-dwellers.

8 per cent of the respondents do not believe that a bribe can solve their problem.

7 per cent of non bribe-givers simply do not know how to behave in bribe-demanding situations.

As little as 3 per cent of those who did not give a bribe in the last five years said this is a violation of law.

As illustrated in Chapter II, the opinion of Lithuanian people is often formed by the mass media as the main source of information. Bearing this in mind, it is worth analysing the degree at which information about prevention measures applied in this country reaches Lithuanian people.

First systematic anti-corruption efforts were taken several years ago in Lithuania and relate to the aforementioned National Anti-Corruption Programme adopted by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Since it was adopted only in 2002, questions about its assessment and knowledge about it among the members of society was included only in the surveys of 2002 and 2004.

The level of knowledge about the programme among the members of Lithuanian society is shown in Table 3.1.11 below.

In 2002, every third respondent of the survey had heard about the National Anti-Corruption Programme. The most knowledgeable were the well-off and living in big towns of Lithuania.

*Table 3.1.11. HAVE YOU HEARD ABOUT THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY THE SEIMAS? (%)*

	2002	2004
Heard	31	35
Have not heard	63	61
Not stated	6	4

In 2004, the number of people who heard about the programme increased by 4 percentage points. The most knowledgeable group concerning the issue is the most active group of the public, those who are aged 30–50, well-off and city-dwellers.

In 2002–04, one third of the survey participants admitted that they had never heard about the National Anti-Corruption Programme. These were mostly rural residents. In 2004, such response was given by people younger than 30 and having the smallest income.

In 2004, those who were more informed about the National Anti-Corruption Programme were respondents from Utena, Telšiai and Vilnius counties, and those who knew less were from Marijampolė, Šiauliai and Alytus counties.

The level of information possessed by the residents does not always imply their positive attitude towards the subject of such information. Hence it is worth analysing the opinion of the public towards the effectiveness of the National Anti-Corruption Programme in reducing the level of corruption in the country.

The dynamics of the change of assessing the programme is shown in Table 3.1.12 below.

*Table 3.1.12. DOES/WILL THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME HELP REDUCE CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%).*

	2002	2004
Helps	15	13
Does not help	45	25
Not stated	40	62

Noteworthy, in 2002, as many as four respondents out of ten had no opinion concerning the matter. The reason is the lack of information: 76 per cent of those who had no opinion had not heard about the programme.

Out of all the people surveyed, 15 per cent could be called optimists as they believed in the National Anti-Corruption Programme as the corruption reducer.

45 per cent were pessimistic about the effectiveness of the programme.

In 2004, as compared with 2002, the number of people who had not stated their opinion concerning the matter increased significantly (from 42 to 62 per cent).

In 2004, like in previous years, the reason was the same lack of information about the programme: 83 per cent of those who had no opinion had not heard about the programme.

In 2004, the number of optimists decreased by 2 percentage points. Yet the number of pessimists went also down significantly, from 45 to 25 per cent.

In 2004, the respondents who said the National Anti-Corruption Programme does not help reduce corruption in Lithuania (constituting 25 per cent), explained the actual reasons for their pessimism in Table 3.1.13 below.

*Table 3.1.13. WHY DO YOU THINK IT DOESN'T HELP? (% of those who claim that the Programme does not help reduce the level of corruption)*

Reasons for pessimism	Year 2004
No results are seen	31
Bribes have become an inseparable part of public life	19
Law enforcement officials are corrupt and are not interested in fighting corruption	17
It doesn't work because they lie	10
Ineffective laws	10
The strategy was adopted not long time ago	1
The majority are afraid to report	1
Lack of public education, public awareness	1
Low level of standard of living	1
Little publicity over cases of corruption	1
Low public trust of the Seimas	1
Laws are amended by the will of politicians	1
Not stated	14

The main reason for pessimism (constituting 31 per cent of all the answers) is the lack of results rendered by the programme. This attitude is held by people living in small towns, with smaller than average household monthly income.

A slightly less popular answer (19 per cent) was that bribes have become an inseparable part of public life, that people became used to that and act in accordance with those unofficial rules. This opinion was expressed by people younger than 30, having the biggest household monthly income, living in rural areas and cities.

17 per cent of the respondents thought that the law enforcement is corrupt and not interested in fighting corruption. This view was mostly held by men, people aged 30–50, having the biggest household monthly income, living in the biggest towns of Lithuania.

The other reasons listed in Table 3.1.13 were mentioned by a very small number of the respondents (which does not exceed the statistical error).

As mentioned before, anti-corruption efforts cannot be effective if they are taken by governmental bodies alone. Substantial anti-corruption potential lies in the civic society and its organisations. One of such bodies involved in active anti-corruption activities is Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter (further – TILS) established in 2000. One of the key objectives of TILS is promotion of anti-corruption initiatives and public intolerance towards corruption, in other words, increasing of anti-corruption potential. TILS conducts surveys, seminars, raises public awareness, actively co-operates with governmental organisations, the business sector and the mass media.

In 2004, it was decided to supplement the survey with a question about what people know about TILS as a body organising various anti-corruption initiatives.

9 per cent of the respondents said they had heard about TILS, 85 per cent said they had not and 6 per cent gave no response.

### 3.2. ANTI-CORRUPTION POTENTIAL OF LITHUANIAN COMPANY MANAGERS

Business representatives is the active and dynamic social group which has to deal with business issues in various state institutions. Therefore, before we analyse the anti-corruption potential of business representatives, it is worth examining what major obstacles company managers saw for their business during the period surveyed.

The 2001 and 2004 surveys asked company managers (as an open-ended question) to identify obstacles for their business.

In 2001, the main obstacle, as seen by the respondents, was the tax policy (mentioned by 33 per cent), red-tape and corruption (31 per cent) and a deficient legal framework (22 per cent).

The existing tax system was mostly criticised by managers of small and medium companies, established in Panevėžys, Kaunas and smaller towns. Red-tape and corruption was mentioned as an important obstacle by company managers from the services sector and those located in Klaipėda.

In 2004, company managers also mostly mentioned the tax policy (39 per cent) and deficient legislation (21 per cent). The third position was taken by a new problem, big competition (20 per cent).

The tax policy was seen as the most painful by small companies and sole proprietorships. Deficient legislation was identified as a major obstacle by managers of big and medium, public and private companies. Huge competition was considered a major concern for small and medium companies and sole proprietorships.

In 2004, red-tape and corruption did not hit the list of top three obstacles. It stepped down to the fourth position, mentioned by 19 per cent of the respondents, mostly managers of big and medium enterprises, public and private companies.

As seen from Table 1.2.2 of Chapter I, in 2001, about 57 per cent of company managers said that in the last five years their companies did not confront bribe-demanding situations. Company managers were asked if their companies reported bribe demands. Out 586 of those who responded to the question 89 per cent said that they reported to no-one and the majority of those who did (5 per cent) asked for support from their business partners. In 2001, 2 per cent of companies managers reported to law enforcement agencies and 1 per cent informed the non-governmental organisations. Only in individual cases, respondents asked for support from the Seimas, Government and the mass media.

Company managers were also asked why they refused to report bribe demands. The reasons are provided in Table 3.2.1 below.

36 per cent of the respondents did not report bribery as they do not trust public institutions. 24 per cent were afraid that their 'search for justice' may be a financial burden and jeopardise their business in the future. 16 per cent of the respondents thought that it is impossible to solve problems without giving a bribe.

*Table 3.2.1. WHY DIDN'T YOUR COMPANY (COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES) REPORT TO ANYONE? (% , N=521)*

Reasons	Year 2001
Does not expect to prove anything, does not trust public institutions	36
It will cost more, will suffer from negative consequences in the future	24
One can't solve the problem without giving a bribe	16
All are corrupt, there's no-one to report to	9
Is not eager to fight, gave a bribe by its own will	9
Solved the issues without a bribe	4
Didn't know whom to report to	2
Not stated	12

In 2004, the number of company managers who encountered no bribe demands in the last five years, decreased insignificantly, to 55 per cent. Out of 577 who responded to the aforementioned question, 77 per cent said that their company reported to no-one and the majority of those who did (10 per cent), similarly to 2001, informed only their business partners. Noteworthy, this time 3 per cent of those who answered the question reported to law enforcement agencies and 2 per cent to the mass media and non-governmental organisations each.

In 2004, company managers mentioned other reasons about why they refused to report which are shown in Table 3.2.2 below.

*Table 3.2.2. WHY DIDN'T YOUR COMPANY (COMPANY REPRESENTATIVES) REPORT TO ANYONE? (% , N=443)*

Reasons	Year 2004
Were afraid to do harm	29
Had to solve the problem	17
Didn't see any point	16
This wouldn't change anything	14
Had no proof	5
Always give because this is a tradition	5
Gave by their own will	3
Didn't know whom to report	1
Not stated	17

In 2001, company managers were mostly distrustful of state institutions, and in 2004, fear about the possible harm to their business done by reporting moved from the second position to the first one (29 per cent).

In general, as shown by Table 3.2.2 above, company managers usually solve the problems of corruption faced by their company on their own. 17 per cent of the respondents said that they simply had to solve the problem, 16 per cent did not see any point in reporting and 14 per cent did not believe that reporting to various institutions may change anything.

Similarly to the survey of residents, this survey was also interested in the opinion of businessmen about the most effective measures of reducing corruption.

The opinion of company managers about such measures in 2001 is shown in Table 3.2.3 below.

*Table 3.2.3. WHICH CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES YOU THINK WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	Year 2001
Stricter punishment	23
Doesn't know	23
Increasing accountability of public officials	17
Improvement of legislation	14
Less control over people exercised by public officials	9
Raising the standard of living, reduction of unemployment	8
There's nothing to be done	6
Administrative sanctions	6
Awareness raising	6
Publicity, declaration of income	5
Improvement of the tax system	3
Staff selection	3
Political will	2
Necessary public support	1

Similarly to residents, Lithuanian company managers asked to name the most effective anti-corruption measure said it is stricter punishment. It was mostly identified by managers of small and medium companies.

Although company managers mentioned many problems that obstructed their business development and expressed their clear attitude towards corruption as harmful to their business, 23 per cent of the re-



spondents could not suggest a single anti-corruption measure. That was particular characteristic of managers of small companies and those that are engaged in trade.

17 per cent of the respondents thought that one of the most effective anti-corruption measure is increasing accountability of public officials. It most mostly mentioned by managers of big companies.

14 per cent of company managers said that improvement of legislation would help reduce corruption. The legislative framework is mostly relevant for managers of production companies, medium and big companies.

9 per cent of the respondents had a negative view about excess control of public official exercised over people. Almost the same percentage (8 per cent) of company managers said that raising the standard of living and reducing unemployment will help reduce corruption.

As little as 1 per cent of company managers said that to have less corruption in the country, active public position is necessary.

On the basis of the 2001 survey findings, we will compare the opinion of those company managers who had given a bribe in the last five years and those who had not about effective corruption reduction measures (see Table 3.2.4).

*Table 3.2.4. WHICH CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES YOU THINK WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Introduction of stricter punishment	23	24
Don't know	27	16
Increasing accountability of public officials	16	19
Improvement of legislation	15	13
Smaller control over people exercised by public officials	8	11
Raising the standard of living, reduction of unemployment	6	10
There's nothing to be done	4	9
Administrative sanctions	6	7
Awareness raising	7	4
Publicity, declaration of income	4	7
Improvement of the tax system	4	3
Staff selection	3	2
Political will	1	2
Necessary public support	1	1

The opinion of bribe-givers and those without such experience in the last five years about effective corruption reduction measures is almost the same. Both of the groups believe that stricter punishment may render significant results. The only difference is that a much bigger percentage (27 per cent) of company managers without bribery experience could not identify a single effective measure helping to diminish corruption.

Bearing in mind the institutional and organisation changes of the fight against corruption in 2004, the list of corruption reduction measures was slightly changed. Company managers were asked to identify the most effective measures.

The opinion of company managers about such measures in 2004 is shown in Table 3.2.5 below.

*Table 3.2.5. WHAT CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES YOU THINK WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following: Year 2004	
Introduction of stricter court punishment for corruption, adoption of stricter laws	49
Introduction of stricter administrative sanctions, increase of fines, dismissal from work	47
Prohibition for public officials who committed an offence to work in state bodies	47
Improvement of anti-corruption legislation	39
Background checks of public officials, monitoring transparency of their family property	29
More publicity in the mass media	25
Improvement of operation by special services tackling corruption	24
More active public support	19
Public awareness raising, educational measures	15
The problem will get solved by itself with the standard of living increasing in the country	15
Aiming at public officials having less control over various spheres of life	11
Increase remuneration for public officials to make them appreciate more their employment	5
Not stated	5

In 2004, every second participant of the survey was in favour of stricter court punishment for corruption and adoption of stricter laws.

47 per cent of the respondents agreed with the introduction of stricter administrative sanctions and the same 47 per cent chose prohibition for public officials who committed an offence to work in state institutions.

How important in assessing effectiveness of corruption reduction measures is the experience of company manager or their representatives in giving or not giving a bribe?

The 2004 opinion of company managers with or without bribe-giving experience is shown in Table 3.2.6 below.

*Table 3.2.6. WHICH CORRUPTION REDUCTION MEASURES YOU THINK ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE? (%)*

Year	2004	2004
The most effective corruption reduction measures are the following:	Have not given a bribe	Have given a bribe
Introduction of stricter court punishment for corruption, adoption of stricter laws	52	44
Introduction of stricter administrative sanctions, increase of fines, dismissal from work	45	50
Prohibition for public officials who committed an offence to work in state bodies	45	49
Background checks of public officials, monitoring transparency of their family property	29	31
Improvement of anti-corruption legislation	40	36
Improvement of operation by special services targeting cases of corruption	25	23
Increase of remuneration for public officials to make them appreciate more their employment	4	7
Aiming at public officials having less control over various spheres of life	9	13
More active public support	20	18
More publicity in the mass media	24	26
Public awareness raising, educational measures	15	17
The problem will get solved by itself with the standard of living increasing in the country	13	20
Not stated	5	3

Company managers who had not given a bribe in the last five years are more positive about introduction of stricter punishment (52 per cent) than those who had not (44 per cent). Whereas the former group more often than the latter (50 and 45 per cent respectively) favour introduction of stricter administrative sanctions. Moreover, company managers with bribery experience say more often than those who lack it (20 and 13 per cent accordingly) that the problem will get solved by itself with the standard of living increasing in the country.

The two groups hold similar views concerning the other corruption reduction measures.

In 2004, more businessmen (45 per cent) thought that more effective are the measures that eliminate the roots of corruption. This was said by every second company manager with bribe-giving experience and 44 per cent without it.

Punitive measures were acceptable to 42 per cent of bribe-givers and 39 per cent of the respondents without such experience.

The findings of the surveys show that business people do realise the threat of corruption, some of them have experience of corruption relations and more than that, they have their own opinion about the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and know how to behave confronted with different forms of corruption. Moreover, the findings show that the respondents tend to rely on themselves while solving their problems. This is seen from their lack of trust in state institutions. If they do not manage to solve their problems themselves, company managers tend to resort to their business partners for help.

To their opinion, which institutions do have the key function of fighting corruption? This question was included in surveys of 2002 and 2004. The answers are provided in Table 3.2.7 below.

In 2002 and 2004, company managers most often ascribed those functions to the following institutions: STT (66 per cent in 2002 and 61 per cent in 2004), ONTT (52 per cent in 2002) and FNTT (60 per cent in 2004). The fight against corruption was thought to be one of the functions of the Seimas (63 per cent in 2002 and 70 per cent in 2004), Government (58 per cent in 2002 and 65 per cent in 2004) and local authorities (58 per cent in 2002).

In 2004, the number of those company managers who thought that the fight against corruption is the main function of the Special Investigation Service decreased by 5 percentage points, and the number of those

who considered it the main function of the State Security Department increased by the same 5 percentage points.

Table 3.2.7. Do you think the fight against corruption is the main function of this body, one of its function, not its function? (%)

Year	2002				2004			
	Main function	One of the function	Not its function	N/S	Main function	One of the function	Not its function	N/S
President's Office	8	49	33	11	5	46	36	13
Seimas	17	63	10	11	11	70	11	8
Government	26	58	6	10	17	65	10	9
Local authorities*	14	58	17	12	-	-	-	-
Special Investigation Service (STT)	66	24	2	9	61	32	2	6
Organised Crime Investigation Service (ONTT)*	52	34	4	10	-	-	-	-
State Security Department	31	42	15	12	36	47	8	10
Financial Crime Investigation Service (FNTT)**	-	-	-	-	60	31	2	7
Non-governmental organisations**	-	-	-	-	4	33	36	27

\* Institutions not included in the 2004 survey.

\*\* Institutions not included in the 2002 survey.

The same year saw a decrease in the number of company managers who thought that the Government (from 26 to 17 per cent), Seimas (from 17 to 11 per cent) and President's office (from 8 to 5 per cent) are the bodies directly dealing with corruption.

The lack of trust held by company managers in state institutions played an important role in assessing the effectiveness of such institutions.

The assessment of institutions in 2004 is shown in Table 3.2.8 below.

*Table 3.2.8. SPEAKING ABOUT EACH OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS INDIVIDUALLY, HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY IN REDUCING CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2004		
	Institutions	Effective	Ineffective Not stated
	Special Investigation Service (STT)	25	63 12
	Financial Crime Investigation Service (FNIT)	25	61 14
	State Security Department	20	59 21
	Government	7	75 18
	President's Office	6	64 30
	Seimas	6	78 16
	Non-governmental organisations	6	39 55

The effectiveness of the institutions listed in reducing corruption in Lithuania was mostly assessed negatively.

In 2004, company managers gave the worst assessment (showing the difference between 'effectively' and 'ineffectively') of the Seimas (-72), Government (-68) and President's Office (-58). A slightly more positive attitude was held of non-governmental organisations, (-33), Financial Crime Investigation Service (-36) and Special Investigation Service (-38).

Admittedly, more than half of the respondents (55 per cent.) had no opinion about non-government organisations and 30 per cent could not say anything about the President's office.

As mentioned in Chapter I above, in 2004, 52 per cent of company manager said they had not given bribes in the last five years. Similarly to residents, they were provided a list of reasons for not giving a bribe and asked to identify the ones that determined their behaviour.

Table 3.2.9 below shows the main reasons for not giving a bribe.

*Table 3.2.9. WHY DID NOT YOUR COMPANY GIVE A BRIBE? (%; N=550)*

	Year 2004
So far I have managed to solve all the issues without giving bribes	47
I have never confronted a bribe demanding situation	31
That is against my principles	18
I don't believe it can help solve my problem	9
That would be a violation of law	9
I had no money for that	6
I don't know how to act in a situation like that	3

Almost half (47 per cent) of company managers could solve their problems without resorting to bribery. This reason was mostly mentioned by managers of big and small companies, as well as private and public companies.

Every third respondent said he or she had not confronted a bribe demanding situation. This was mostly stated by manager of small and medium companies as well as sole proprietorships.

18 per cent of company managers said that bribe giving is against their principles. This position was mostly held by managers of big and public companies.

9 per cent of the respondents did not believe in the effectiveness of bribes and the same 9 per cent did not want to violate laws.

6 per cent of company managers said they had no resources for bribes and 3 per cent of the respondents did not know how to behave in such situations.

Similarly to Lithuanian residents, business representatives were asked to answer a question about the National Anti-Corruption Programme adopted by the Seimas.

Their knowledge about the issue is show in Table 3.2.10 below.

*Table 3.2.10. HAVE YOU HEARD ABOUT THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY THE SEIMAS? (%)*

Year	2002	2004
Heard	56	55
Not heard	37	38
Not stated	7	7

Slightly more than half of them (56 per cent in 2002 and 55 per cent in 2004) said they had heard about the National Anti-Corruption Programme adopted by the Seimas in 2002. The most knowledgeable about it were managers of big companies, private companies, those established in Kaunas, Vilnius, Klaipėda and Panevėžys. In 2004, there was a bigger share of company managers who knew about the programme.

In 2002, company managers were also asked about the OECD anti-bribery convention. 17 per cent of the respondents had heard about the instrument. The majority of them were managers of big and public companies. The most informed were company managers located in Kaunas.

The level of trust among company managers in the National Anti-Corruption Programme is shown in Table 3.2.11 below.

*Table 3.2.11. DOES/WILL THE NATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME HELP REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN LITHUANIA? (%)*

Year	2002	2004
Helps	19	24
Does not help	47	25
Has no opinion	35	51

Noteworthy, very big number of company managers have no opinion concerning the matter. In 2002, they accounted for 35 per cent and in 2004 as much as 51 per cent. This could be explained, like in the case of residents, by the lack of information received.

In 2002, 19 per cent of company managers were optimistic about the programme and they believed that it will help reduce the level of corruption in the country. This opinion was mostly expressed by managers of medium and big companies, as well as public companies. The biggest optimists were company managers from Kaunas and Vilnius.

In 2004, the number of company managers who thought this way went up by 5 percentage points. An optimistic view was held by managers of public and private companies and there were no major differences in the opinion of managers of small, medium and big companies concerning the issue.

In 2002, almost half of company managers (47 per cent), irrespective of type of business they were engaged in, were sceptical about the National Anti-Corruption Programme. In 2004, the number of pessimists decreased significantly, to 25 per cent, although the number of those who had no opinion increased. The biggest pessimists were managers of private companies.

The company managers who were sceptical about the anti-corruption programme in 2004 were asked to explain the reasons for thinking this way.

The reasons for pessimism of survey participants are show in Table 3.2.12 below.

Almost half of pessimistic company managers explain their attitude by the lack of results rendered by the programme. This was mostly mentioned by managers of private and public companies.

22 per cent of the respondents could not identify a single reason for being pessimistic. This is mostly characteristic of sole proprietorships.



*Table 3.2.12. WHY DO YOU THINK IT DOESN'T HELP? (%., N=260)*

Year	2004
No positive results are seen	46
Not stated	22
There is corruption in the Government itself	10
Bribes have become a common and normal phenomenon in society	9
Deficient legislative framework	4
There's no-one interested in implementing the strategy	4
Artifice is also evolving	3
Too little control	2
Low standard of living	2

Company managers, like residents, were asked to answer a question about a body conducting anticorruption initiatives, Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter.

The level of their knowledge about TILS is shown in Table 3.2.13 below.

*Table 3.2.13. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH OR HEARD ABOUT TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL LITHUANIAN CHAPTER? (%)*

Year	2002	2004
Know	12	25
Do not know	88	66
Not stated	0	9

In 2002, 12 per cent of company managers said they heard about TILS activities in Lithuania. These were mostly managers of big enterprises, public and private companies.

The least informed about the TILS activities are managers of small and medium companies and sole proprietorships.

In 2004, the number of company managers who knew about TILS doubled (constituting 25 per cent). The best informed were managers of big companies and companies with foreign capital.

The least informed about TILS, like in 2002, were managers of small companies and sole proprietorships.

The company managers who had heard about TILS were asked to evaluate its activities. Their evaluations are provided in Table 3.2.14 below.

*Table 3.2.14. WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY THE TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL LITHUANIAN CHAPTER? (% of those who heard about the organisation).*

Year	2002	2004
Very good	2	9
Good	68	66
Bad	18	13
Very bad	2	2

In 2002, 70 per cent of the respondents who knew about TILS activities in Lithuania were positive about this body. In 2004, those who gave positive assessment of TILS increased to 75 per cent.

Since 2001, TILS has been regularly conducting a survey *Lithuanian Map of Corruption* and presents the findings the residents and businessmen of Lithuania as well as other countries. In 2004, the Lithuanian company managers who had heard about TILS (N=260) were asked if they heard about these regular surveys of TILS.

65 per cent of the respondents said they heard about these TILS projects. More knowledgeable were managers of big companies, private companies and those with foreign capital.

To summarise the Lithuanian anti-corruption potential, one should bear in mind that during the period surveyed the system of corruption prevention was created in Lithuania and a lot of attention was paid to corruption control and prevention, i.e. anti-corruption tactics became more focused.

Although both preventive and punitive measures are equally important in reducing corruption, Lithuanian people considered stricter punishment the most acceptable and effective counter-corruption measure. Admittedly, in 2004, quite a big proportion of the public were clearly in favour of prevention measures. The tendency is to consider the system of corruption prevention as important as criminal liability.

In 2002, business representatives, like common Lithuanian people, were mostly in favour of stricter punishment. However, in 2004, company managers consider preventive measures as important as stricter sanctions.

The most frequently mentioned reason for not giving a bribe is the absence of a bribe demand itself. Yet one should not be too pessimistic about that as less than one third of the respondents managed to solve their problems without resorting to bribery. On the other hand, the

number of citizens with integrity is not very big. A similar situation is in the business sector: a slightly less than one half of company managers who had not given bribes managed to solve their important issues without giving a bribe. Every third respondent did not confront a bribe demanding situation and only 1 businessmen out of 10 did not agree to violate laws.

Prevention activities in Lithuania are not very well known. The assessment of the anti-corruption programme is predominantly pessimistic. The main reason for that is the lack of results produced by anti-corruption efforts.

To summarise, one could claim that state efforts in reducing corruption have not remained unnoticed or unappreciated, yet the survey findings show that the public does not receive systematic information about them. It is not only the lack of trust but also the lack of knowledge which could have a negative impact upon the anti-corruption potential of Lithuanian society.

## CONCLUSIONS

The authors present to the readers the *Map of Corruption 2001-04*, which is the first comprehensive sociological survey of corruption conducted in Lithuania. Surveys of the kind is also a rare phenomenon on the international scale. The academic literature is engaged in continuous polemics about the accuracy and practical benefit of such surveys. Without getting involved into those disputes, we tried to show how quantitative sociological methods can be used to measure the spread of corruption in society.

While reading the book, questions may arise as to the reason why this method of sociological survey was chosen, what it measures and how capable it is of disclosing problems of corruption in society. Are there any other reliable methods to identify the level of corruption in the country? There exist, for example, law enforcement agencies which are directly tasked to detect and investigate corruption crimes. Would not it be easier to use the statistics collected by them, similarly the way the crime level is measured in the country using the statistics collected by the police and courts?

The response is, unfortunately, negative. The cases of corruption that are institutionally documented are few and far between. For example, official statistics show that the Special Investigation Service, the main law enforcement agency dealing with corruption crimes in Lithuania, investigates about 100 cases per year. Does this figure represent the level of corruption in Lithuania? Hardly so. It rather shows, similarly to any official law enforcement statistics, the institutional capacity to investigate corruption following criminal laws. From the criminological point of view, corruption crimes are highly latent: they are difficult to disclose and rarely registered. With this regard, Lithuania is not one of a kind. The international practice shows that while making the assessment of the overall crime (including corruption) situation in the country, it is becom-

ing more common to resort to sociological (victimological) surveys<sup>28</sup>, rather than the official law enforcement statistics alone.

Presuming that the law enforcement is capable of disclosing all the corruption crimes listed in the Criminal Code, it would be still difficult to state that criminal statistics reflect the level corruption in society. Many acts that are corrupt in nature do not constitute a crime and are only subject to disciplinary sanctions or regarded as absolutely legal as, for example, gifts for doctors when their value does not exceed 1 minimum subsistence level.<sup>29</sup>

However, the authors of this book do not see their sociological research method, developed in 2000-01, as ideal and the only possible. Like any other academic product, it is subject to the current and future debates and discussions which are the only way of making our knowledge more thorough and mature. Yet while assessing the methodology, the reader should not leave out of consideration several important aspects of this research.

First, like there is no agreement among researchers and practitioners about what corruption is, no agreement has been reached about the methods which should be applied to investigate the spread of corruption in the country. There may be various methods of diagnosing corruption: from analysis of investigative journalism publications to macro-economic surveys. Even sociological methods of analysing corruption may be different, including discussion groups, focus groups, questionnaires. The method presented in this book is not a universal one (although it is very widespread): it simply helps disclose several aspects of corruption.

Second, the method of this sociological survey is a particular method of modelling society and its segments. It is based on mathematical statistics, and the reliability of its results depends on the selection criteria which should ensure representation and homogeneity of the objects surveyed. As important, though more subjective, is the compilation of the questionnaire which depends on the preconditions of the survey, its goals and objectives. All of the aforementioned aspects have a significant impact upon the interpretation of the survey results.

Third, the diagnostic survey *Map of Corruption*, is a follow-up survey of attitudes towards corruption, which had been researched in Lithua-

<sup>28</sup> For instance, such victimological surveys are regularly conducted in the USA or Great Britain.

<sup>29</sup> At present, 1 minimum subsistence level equals LTL 125 or appr. EUR 36.2

nia, with the expanded institutional and geographical aspects. Yet the focus here is made on the analysis of the most infamous forms of corruption, bribery. The reader familiar with the modern methods of criminological research will have no difficulty in identifying the elements used in victimological research and analysis of delinquency self-reporting.

Fourth, public attitude towards corruption and assessments of corruption do not reflect the real situation of corruption. Using the terminology of phenomenological sociology, the knowledge of a 'man of the street' may not be the same as that of an expert, yet it remains unclear how universal and thorough the latter could be. Similarly, bribery experience does not entail all the corruption crimes, let alone all the corruption forms. Nepotism, abuse of office and other crimes remain unattended.

The survey does not have the ambition to make an in-depth generalisation, as the authors themselves are sceptical about the possibility of making an accurate research of the level of corruption by quantitative methods. It is not only because there is no common understanding of corruption but first of all because the concept of corruption is measured by values and entails a public agreement about the dangerous limit whose crossing means that private interests overshadow public interests.

The authors tend to agree with those who think that the concept of corruption is a changing one<sup>30</sup>. With this regard, it is important to find out how the social concept of corruption determines the 'sensitivity' of people and social institutions to the problem of corruption as well as the possibilities of measuring it.

So why is this study called *Map of Corruption*? Because here we do not speak about an *objective picture* of corruption, but rather about its *map* as a conventional expression of this phenomenon in Lithuanian society. Is it worth taking it seriously or is it simply, as it is often claimed to be, an *ungrounded opinion*? The answer is a straightforward one: no, what was measured in 2001–04 is not just an opinion, it is a far more complex phenomenon which forms the basis for possible anti-corruption strategies and tactics. Like there are different kinds of geographic maps (including physical, political, climate and other), corruption maps can also be different, both from the subject matter and its scope point of view. The *Lithuanian Map of Corruption*, presented for readers' judgement, is just one of them. New maps of corruption await to be drawn.

<sup>30</sup> This view is discussed in the book: F. Anechiarico, B. J. Jacobs. *The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996, p. XV.



Transparency International  
Lithuanian Chapter

# **LITHUANIAN MAP OF CORRUPTION 2005**





## PEOPLE SEE INCREASINGLY MORE CORRUPTION

From 28 November to 14 December 2005, *TNS Gallup*, contracted by the Special Investigation Service and employing the methodology developed by Transparency International Lithuanian Chapter, interviewed 1009 residents and 519 business managers in order to assess attitudes related to corruption, its level and role in society; analyse corruption experiences; evaluate the anti-corruption potential of Lithuanian society; and compare survey findings with the findings of analogous surveys performed in 2002 and 2004.

The new *Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2005* shows that both residents and business representatives identify corruption as one of the key problems faced by a modern society. A more serious problem than corruption, as seen by residents, is small salaries and crime and violence, whereas business managers say it is emigration of Lithuanian residents.

Comparison of the 2005 survey findings with those of 2004 show that the share of businesspeople and residents who believe that the scale of corruption “increased significantly” has risen dramatically, from nearly 15% to 38% and from nearly 26% to 50%, respectively. While giving a forecast of the change of corruption levels over the next three years, residents are more pessimistic than business representatives: 43% of residents think that the scale of corruption will grow and only 17% think that it will decrease. Meanwhile, 33% of businessmen forecast the increase of corruption over next three years and 30% of them think that the scale of corruption is going to shrink. Almost one third of residents and businessmen think that the level of corruption will remain the same.

Asked to spontaneously name the most corrupt institutions in Lithuania, residents mostly mentioned institutions that belong to the health care system (58%), the police (47%), Seimas (38%) and courts (36%). Company managers mentioned the following institutions: the police (38%), courts (35%), health care institutions (34%), municipalities (31%),

Seimas (30%) and the Government (24%). Residents and businesspeople hold similar opinions concerning such “leaders” of the corruption sector as the health care system, the police, courts, Seimas and the Government. In addition, businesspeople mentioned municipalities and privatisation services.

Comparison of the level of corruptibility among different branches of the government in 2005, 2004 and 2002 show that during 2005 the number of those who believed that Seimas, Government and courts were “very corrupt” increased dramatically (as regards the former two, the number almost doubled). In 2005, as compared with 2004, the President’s Office was regarded as less corrupt.

The majority of Lithuanian residents and company managers think that a bribe helps to solve problems and in the future they intend, if a need arises, to use it to “fix” their problems. There are more grounds for optimism coming from the younger generation (aged 15-29), the majority of which believe that bribes do not help. Interestingly enough, 33% of Lithuanian residents and 23% of company managers who think bribes do not solve problems still claim that they would give a bribe, if necessary. In 2005, as compared with 2004, the number of businesspeople that would give a bribe was decreasing, whereas the number of residents ready to give a bribe was growing.

In the last five years, 48% of Lithuanian residents and 37% of business managers say they have given a bribe at least once. In the last 12 months, 26% of residents and 20% of company managers have given a bribe. Bribes were more often given by economically active persons (aged 20-39), with higher/college-type education, higher and the highest income per family member per month, self-employed (owners) and employed (having a paid job) residents of major towns, those who think that the material side of their life has improved significantly and Lithuanian residents actively (every day) listening to the news.

The most active bribe-givers were among construction companies with 11 to 50 employees and turnover in 2004 from 1 to 5 million litas.

*The Lithuanian Map of Corruption 2005* calculated bribery indices that allow to compare institutions according to the frequency of bribe demands, payment of bribes and effectiveness of bribes. Lithuanian residents said that most frequently a bribe was implicitly demanded from them by the traffic police, in national and local hospitals, county governor administrations and vehicle technical inspection centres. The respon-

dents said that in most cases they agreed to give a bribe. The “leading” position in the area was held by the traffic police who were given bribes by 52% of residents and 40% of company managers.

The good news is that in 2005, as compared with 2004, the State Tax Inspectorate was no longer included in the list of five most bribed institutions and the scale of bribery decreased in town and regional municipalities.

Participants of the social survey were asked to name the procedures in which they had participated and then were asked to assess the level of corruption of those procedures. Both residents and company managers said the most corrupt procedures are changing the purpose of land use, issuance of permits for construction and reconstruction. Admittedly, business representatives mentioned obtaining support from EU structural funds as a third most corrupt procedure, 25% of them said that it is a “very corrupt” procedure and 41% claimed it is “partly corrupt”.

The survey shows that every fifth resident of Lithuania knows where to go to report a case of corruption. Businesspeople, as compared to residents, are much better informed: 44% know where they would have to report if they faced corruption. Only 23% of residents and 21% of businesspeople would report a case of corruption known to them. 41% of residents and 47% of business representatives would consider not reporting such cases depending on a particular situation. 36% of residents and 32% of company managers would not report a case of corruption known to them. More than half of Lithuanian residents (59%) and company managers (54%) admit that they do not want to participate in anti-corruption activities.

# LITHUANIAN MAP OF CORRUPTION 2005

## ORGANISATION OF THE SURVEY

Ordered by: Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania

Conducted by: TNS Gallup

### Goals:

- Evaluation of attitudes related to corruption, the level of corruption and its role in society;
- Analysis of cases of corruption (bribery) experience;
- Evaluation of the anti-corruption potential of Lithuanian society.
- Comparison of the survey findings with the findings of analogous surveys conducted in 2002 and 2004.

Survey method: direct interview.

### Target respondent groups and planned samples:


- Lithuanian residents: 1009 respondents;
- Business company managers: 519 respondents.

### Type of selection applied:

- The sample of Lithuanian residents representing statistical universe was randomly selected using the Lithuanian Register of Residents' Addresses.
- The sample of Lithuanian business companies, representing statistical universe, was selected using the random numbers generator and the Lithuanian Register of Enterprises.

## ATTITUDES RELATED TO THE PHENOMENON OF CORRUPTION

## Evaluation of the Level of Importance of Different Social Problems




The importance of corruption, as one of the most serious social problems, is emphasized both by residents and company managers.

Residents consider small salaries and crimes/violence and company view emigration from Lithuania managers as more important problems than corruption.


Scale: 1 – is not a problem at all, 2 – is not a particularly serious problem, 3 – a rather serious problem, 4 – a very serious problem

Note: evaluation means are provided

## Comparison of the Change in the Scale of Corruption over the past Five Years and 12 Months, accordingly




## Forecast of the Scale of Corruption for the next 3 Years



The forecast of the change in the scale of corruption in the coming three years shows that *residents are more pessimistic than company managers* : more residents think that the scale of corruption will increase rather than decrease, whereas almost the same number of company managers believe that the scale of corruption will either increase or decrease

## The Most Reliable Sources of Information about Corruption




Two main sources of information about corruption are **mass media** (TV, regional press) and **personalexperience, experience of surrounding people**.

Residents more often trust information about corruption and its cases broadcasted on TV, whereas company managers mostly rely on their own experience or the experience of their friends/acquaintances.


## OPINION: EVALUATION OF THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION IN VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Opinion: the Most Corrupt Institutions in Lithuania  
(spontaneous reaction\*)



Note: the respondents were asked to identify institutions, which they consider the most corrupt in Lithuania, themselves.  
In all other evaluations of institutions, the respondents were provided with a list of institutions.

## Opinion: Corruption Level of Public Authorities




Scale: 1 – absolutely not corrupt, 2 – partly corrupt, 3 – very corrupt

Note: means of evaluation are provided




## Opinion: Corruption Level of Law Enforcement and Similar Institutions



Scale: 1 – absolutely not corrupt, 2 – partly corrupt, 3 – very corrupt


## Opinion: Corruption Level of Different Institutions



Scale: 1 – absolutely not corrupt, 2 – partly corrupt, 3 – very corrupt


Note: evaluation means are provided

Opinion: Evaluation of Bribe Effectiveness and Prospects of Bribe-Giving




CORRUPTION (BRIBERY) EXPERIENCE

Experience: Frequency of Bribe-Giving




54% of residents and 53% of company managers who have given a bribe in the last 5 years have also given a bribe in the last 12 months.

## Experience: Evaluation of Corruption Level of Institutions in which You Handled Your Affairs




Note: only those who handled their affairs in institutions have been included in the calculations

## Experience: Evaluation of Corruption Level of Institutions in which You Handled Your Affairs




Note: only those who handled their affairs in institutions have been included in the calculations

## Experience: Evaluation of Corruption Level of Institutions in which You Handled Your Affairs




Note: only those who handled their affairs in institutions have been included in the calculations


## Experience: Bribery Indices




## Experience: Amounts of Bribes given in Different Institutions

*Residents*


## Experience: Amounts of Bribes given in Different Institutions

*Company managers*

## Experience: Corruption Level of Procedures in which you have participated

*Residents*

## Experience: Corruption Level of Procedures in which you have participated


*Company managers*

# COMPARING THE LITHUANIAN MAP OF CORRUPTION 2005 TO THE DATA OF PREVIOUS SURVEYS


## ATTITUDES

Which of these views do you share? (%)


### *Company managers*



### *Residents*




Scale of corruption during the recent five years in Lithuania... (%)






## Opinion about the level of corruption in different branches of the government (% very corrupt)


### Company managers




### Residents



### Attitude of company managers towards bribe-giving (%)





### Attitude of residents towards bribe-giving (%)




## EXPERIENCE

Have you given a bribe over the last five years? (%)


*Company managers**Residents*

The scale of bribe-giving over the recent five years  
(% 5 most frequently mentioned institutions)

**Company managers**



**Residents**



## Bribery indices (company managers)

	Demanding Index		Giving Index		Effectiveness Index	
	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005
Traffic police	<b>0.41</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.38</b>	<b>0.40</b>	0.95	<b>0.94</b>
Customs authorities	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>0.97</b>	<b>0.76</b>
City and regional	0.22	0.16	0.17	0.08	0.93	0.84
Vehicle technical inspection	0.20	0.32	0.18	0.31	0.91	0.88
Clinics	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.11	0.88	0.85
Local hospitals	0.26	0.17	0.28	0.17	0.68	0.88
National hospitals	0.36	0.27	0.35	0.24	0.89	0.93
Fire prevention services	0.20	0.19	0.17	0.14	0.92	0.91


## Bribery indices (residents)

	Demanding Index		Giving Index		Effectiveness Index	
	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005
Clinics	0.22	0.24	0.21	0.22	0.86	0.80
Local hospitals	0.30	0.39	0.34	0.37	0.84	0.81
National hospitals	<b>0.52</b>	0.49	<b>0.56</b>	0.45	0.77	0.77
Traffic police	0.50	<b>0.61</b>	0.48	<b>0.52</b>	0.95	0.85
Vehicle technical inspection centres	0.29	0.32	0.30	0.31	<b>0.96</b>	<b>0.88</b>


ANTI-CORRUPTION POTENTIAL 2005

Would you want to participate in anti-corruption activities?

*Residents*




*Company managers*




Would you be willing to report the case  
of corruption you know about?

***Residents***




***Company managers***




## Why didn't you give a bribe?

### Residents



### Company managers



Transparency International  
Lithuanian Chapter recommends:

- **Ensure the right of access** of every citizen to the information about public policy decisions and involve citizens into decision-making.
- **Develop** anti-corruption culture of the public (and the youth in particular).
- **Ensure effectiveness** of corruption investigation, prevention and anti-corruption education and constant **diagnostics** of corruption.



## SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

General Attitudes related to the Phenomenon of Corruption:

### 1. Attitude towards the Role of Corruption in Society

1.1. Lithuanian society, both residents and business representatives, *identify* corruption as one of the most important problems of modern society. The only other more important social problems, as seen by residents, are *low salaries* and the *high level of crime and violence*, whereas business representatives consider it to be *emigration* of Lithuanian residents *from Lithuania*;

1.2. The majority (86%) of Lithuanian residents and business people (77%) agree with the statement that corruption is a major obstacle to a harmonious functioning society. While evaluating the impact of corruption on social life, residents have a more categorical opinion than business people: corruption as a “major” obstacle to social life was seen by 58% of Lithuanian residents, whereas as few as 38% of business representatives said it was a “major” obstacle for business development. The change in the attitudes of residents, as compared with 2004, shows almost the same trends of how they regard the impact of corruption on social life, whereas the number of businessmen who view corruption as an obstacle to business development has increased;

1.3. Both residents and business representatives believe that corruption has the biggest negative impact on the political life of the country and the least impact on personal and family life.

### 2. Evaluation of Changes in the Scale of Corruption

2.1. Recognition of the negative impact of corruption on society and business, which is reflected in their general attitudes towards corruption, can be explained by the fact that identification of changes in the scale of corruption as “increased significantly” al-

most doubled in the last five years. In other words, the presumption can be made that the better the understanding of negative impact of corruption on the overall development of the state is, the better and the more informed is the evaluation of residents and business people of the existing level of corruption. This is illustrated by the fact that the analogous surveys conducted in 2002 and 2004 showed that 15% and 19% of Lithuanian residents, accordingly, found it difficult to evaluate changes of the scale of corruption;

2.2. Evaluation of changes in the scale of corruption during the last five years shows that the majority of Lithuanian residents and business people believe that the scale of corruption has increased significantly or slightly whereas during the last twelve months it has remained the same;

2.3. The majority of residents and business people believe that the problem of corruption and its current level is a distinctive feature of social life of independent Lithuania because this problem became particularly apparent, i.e. its level grew as compared both to the Soviet era and early 1990s;

2.4. While making a forecast of the change in corruption over the coming three years, residents are somewhat more pessimistic than business representatives: 43% of residents forecast further growth of the scale of corruption and only 17% of them think that the level of corruption will be reduced; at the same time, 33% of business people forecast the growth of corruption and 30% of them think that the scale of corruption in the coming three years is going to decrease. Almost one third of residents and business people believe that the level of corruption will remain the same.

### 3. Opinion about the Level of Corruption of Different Institutions

3.1. When asked to **spontaneously** name the institutions which are considered the most corrupt in Lithuania, the respondents most often mentioned medical staff and institutions that belong to the health care system (58%), police (47%), Seimas (38%) and courts (36%). Business managers think that the most corrupt institution in Lithuania are the police (38%), courts (35%), health care institutions and medical staff (34%), municipalities (31%), Seimas

(30%), and the Government (24%). In general, the opinion of residents and business people concerning the most corrupt institutions coincide, with the following institutions seen as corruption “leaders” : *the health care system, police, courts, Seimas and the Government*. Business people, more often than residents, also mentioned *municipalities and privatisation services*;

3.2. When asked to evaluate the level of corruption of the specified **branches of the government**, neither residents nor business people were able to point to a clear-cut ‘leader’ in corruption. Both groups named *Seimas, the Government, political parties and courts* as the most corrupt institutions. Residents regard the President’s office, mass media and non-governmental organisations and business people view the President’s office and non-governmental organisations as less corrupt state authorities. Residents, as compared to business people, attributed a higher level of corruption to the President’s office, whereas business people, more often than residents, considered mass media as corrupt.

3.3. Comparison of the level of corruption of different branches of the government in 2002 and 2004 shows a sharp increase of evaluations of “very corrupt” of such institutions as the Seimas, the Government and courts. Last year’s survey findings, as compared to 2004, also show a decrease in the perceived corruptibility of the President’s office, a logical tendency when bearing in mind the Lithuanian political situation of that time.

#### 4. Opinion about Corruptibility of Different Institutions

4.1. Analysis of the respondents’ evaluation of the level of corruption of the **Government ministries** shows a general tendency of almost all the ministries being seen as more corrupt than the average (all the evaluation means are higher than 1.5 out of possible 3).

4.2. Residents view the Ministry of Health as the most corrupt ministry, which is followed by the ministries of Justice, Economy, the Interior, Finance and Agriculture. The least corrupt ministry, as seen by residents, is the Ministry of Culture.

4.3. Business people say that the most corrupt ministries are the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Health, followed by the

Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Environment. Similar to residents, business people regard the Ministry of Culture as the least corrupt ministry.

4.4. The biggest difference of opinion between Lithuanian residents and company managers appears when evaluating the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Social Security and Labour and Ministry of Justice, which are more often regarded as corrupt by residents than business. Residents and business people hold similar attitudes towards the level of corruption in the ministries of Environment, Defence, Culture, Transport, Economy, Interior, and Agriculture.

## 5. Corruption (Bribery) Experience

5.1. The majority of Lithuanian residents and company managers think that bribes help solve problems and they intend, if necessary, to use bribery in the future to “fix” their problems. A growing tendency among the younger generation (aged 15-29) who believe that bribes do not help solve problems creates some grounds for optimism.

5.2. One third of Lithuanian residents (33%) and 23% of company managers, who think that bribery does not solve problems, say they would give a bribe if the need arises.

5.3. Over the last five years, 48% of Lithuanian residents and 37% of business managers said they had given at least one bribe. Over the last 12 months, 27% of residents and 20% of company managers have given a bribe.

5.4. Analysis of social-demographic characteristics of Lithuanian residents shows that bribes are more often given by economically active persons (aged 20-39), with further /higher education and higher and the highest income per family member per month, self-employed (owners) and employed (having a paid job) residents of major towns, those who think that the material side of life has improved significantly and Lithuanian residents actively (every day) listening to the news.

5.5. Those who have not given a bribe during the last five years are more often young (aged 15-19) or senior (aged 60-74) people,

Lithuanian residents with primary, basic, secondary/special secondary education, lower income per family member per month, rural residents who think that the material side of life remained the same or got worse in the last five years.

5.6. The companies that have given bribes mostly include those operating in the construction sector, with 11 to 50 employees and turnover in 2004 from 1 to 5 million litas.

5.7. More than half of residents (56%) and 47% of business company managers who have not given a bribe say it was due to the fact that they have not faced a situation in which a bribe would be demanded from them. Quite a few business people said they did not give a bribe because “so far we have managed to solve our issues without bribes” (47%).

5.8. The survey measured not only the perceived level of corruption of different institutions by residents and company managers, but also the perceived level of corruption of the institutions in which the respondents directly dealt with their matters. Lithuanian residents who handled their affairs in respective institutions, evaluated the following bodies as the most corrupt: customs, traffic police, courts, county governor administrations and national hospitals. According to residents, the least corrupt institutions are notaries, preschool education establishments, emergency medical service, state social insurance fund board and primary and secondary schools.

5.9. The evaluation of the level of corruption by all residents and those who handled their affairs in respective institutions does not differ much, except when it comes to county governor administrations. Those residents who had experience with county governor administrations consider them more corrupt.

5.10. According to business managers who dealt with their matters in certain institutions the most corrupt institutions are Seimas, political parties, traffic police, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Health. The least corrupt are considered the Lithuanian Labour Exchange, social insurance fund board, preschool establishments, State Commission of Youth Affairs and Statistics Department.

5.11. According to Lithuanian residents, they are most often implicitly demanded a bribe by the traffic police, in national and local hospitals, county governor administrations and vehicle technical inspection centres. These institutions are also given bribes most frequently.

5.12. Company managers state that a bribe is most frequently demanded or implied with a prospect of an easier solution to problems in the following institutions: traffic police, customs, State Border Security Service, county prosecution offices and ministries of Economy, Transport, Economy and Health. According to business representatives, these institutions are also given bribes most often.

5.13. While analysing corruption cases not only from institutional but also a procedural point of view, the respondents were asked to identify the procedures in which they participated and assess their corruptibility. Both residents and company managers said that the most corrupt procedures are the following: the procedure of changing the purpose of land use, issuance of permits for construction and reconstruction, and agreement on the text of documents. Apart from the listed procedures, residents identify as more corrupt the following: customs clearance, provision of health services; at the same time, business people say it is support from EU funds and adoption/amendment of legislation.

5.14. The following procedures were identified as least corrupt: the procedure of granting citizenship, calculation of payment of social benefits, obtaining social support, provision of public services, issuance of business certificates.

## 6. Anti-Corruption Potential of Society

6.1. Realizing the damage of corruption to society and business and recognising its growth, both residents and company managers are not inclined to blame themselves or their friends and acquaintances. According to them, the guiltiest groups with regard to the existing scale of corruption are politicians and civil servants.

6.2. In the opinion of every second resident and business person, in cases of bribery, responsibility lies either with both parties or the bribe-taker. Only 7% of residents and 3% of company man-

agers say that the guilty party is the bribe-giver. Comparing this opinion with the 2004 survey findings, one can observe a positive change in attitude as more and more responsibility is attributed to both parties, i.e. a bribe-taker and a bribe-giver.

6.3. The main reason that, according to both residents and company managers, could justify acceptance of bribes is that bribery is rarely punished. Another reason mentioned is the low salaries of civil servants/employees.

6.4. Talking about prevention measures that need to be taken to reduce the current scale of corruption, residents and company managers had different opinions: 58% of residents think that the most effective would be punitive measures, and 60% of business people are in favour of prevention and educational measures. Comparison of the survey findings with those of 2004, shows that residents became more favourable of criminal measures and the opinion of business people remained the same.

6.5. More than half of Lithuanian residents identify the introduction of stricter punishment for the acceptance of bribes as the most effective punitive measure. 37% of business people also believe that this preventive measure should be effective. 36% of business people are in favour of improving legislation and another 36% say that the origin of property of civil servants should be checked.

6.6. The respondents were asked to name the three most effective anti-corruption measures. The first most effective anti-corruption measure, as identified both by residents and business people, is stricter punishment for the acceptance of bribes. The second measure, mentioned by both groups of the respondents, is improvement of legislation and introduction of punishment for bribe-giving (the latter was mentioned by residents only). The third most effective measure, as seen both by residents and company managers, was that the problem of corruption will solve itself with the overall improvement of living standards. According to the respondents, the active role of mass media in informing the public about corruption could also considerably contribute to the reduction of corruption.

6.7. 54% of residents and 61% of business people recognise the importance of mass media as the most effective institution in re-

ducing the scale of corruption. Half of Lithuanian residents (50%) and 32% of business managers mentioned television as the most reliable source of information about corruption. The second most reliable source of information is personal experience or the experience of friends/acquaintances.

6.8. The majority of business managers think that, apart from mass media, the most effective fighters against corruption are special services. Residents say that the National Audit Office is almost as effective as mass media in fighting corruption.

6.9. Only a very small share of residents and company managers believe that the principal socialising agents, i.e. the church, family and education establishments, are effective in fighting corruption in the country.

6.10. While bearing in mind limited resources of the state, both residents and company managers believe that the biggest responsibility for the existing level of corruption lies with politicians and civil servants. Representatives of both groups suggest that when fighting corruption, the focus should be on “frying big fish” or “those who get caught”. The majority of the respondents do not believe it is worthwhile to “fry small fish”.

6.11. As few as one fifth of Lithuanian residents (22%) know who to contact to report a case of corruption. Business people, as compared with residents, are better informed: 44% of them know who they should report to in a case of corruption. Only 23% of residents and 21% of business people would report a case of corruption they are aware of. 41% of residents and 47% of company managers would consider whether or not to report a case of corruption depending on the situation and 36% of residents and 32% company managers would never report the case of corruption that they know about.

6.12. More than half of Lithuanian residents (59%) and more than half of business people (54%) would not like to take part in anti-corruption activities.

6.13. About half of all the respondents think that the main reason justifying the decision to remain silent about a known case of corruption is that “there’s no point in reporting because people



related to that will not get sentenced anyway” and “those who report in the end suffer the most”. About 37% of all respondents emphasise “traditions”: “everybody knows about those cases but nobody reports”, and almost twice the number of residents (37%), as compared to businessmen (20%), say that they simply do not know who to report to.

6.14. Similarly in the case of the most effective anti-corruption measures, the respondents were asked to name three reasons which they considered as the most important in justifying the decision to remain silent about a known case of corruption. Residents identify two main reasons; which are the lack of information (they do not know who to report to) and inefficiency and unreliability of the legal system (“there’s no point in reporting because people related to that will not get sentenced anyway”) - the latter is also the main reason stated by business people. The second reason specified both by residents and business people is that the person reporting does not feel safe and safety is not ensured (“those who report in the end suffer the most”). The third reason is unwillingness to break away from long-established “traditions” (“everybody knows about those cases but nobody reports them”) and awareness that reporting takes up some of their own time (“it’s difficult to report and it takes time”).

6.15. Three fourths of Lithuanian residents and half of the company managers have never heard about the National Anti-Corruption Programme adopted by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Irrespective of whether or not they are informed about the programme, slightly more than one third of the respondents think that it does not help to reduce the level of corruption; one fifth of residents and a quarter of company managers think it helps to reduce corruption.

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